2. Nash Equilibrium in a Cournot Oligopoly a. Using the best response functions you calculated in the previous question, calculate how much each firm produces at the Nash Equilibrium for this game. b. Using the QA and Q you calculated in part a, calculate the market price. C. Does firm A or firm B produce more in this case? Does this result make sense to you? Why do you think this is (in words!)? EXPLAIN d. Use the profit functions you calculated earlier to calculate profits for both firms in this example? Which firm has higher profits? Why do you think this is? EXPLAIN
2. Nash Equilibrium in a Cournot Oligopoly a. Using the best response functions you calculated in the previous question, calculate how much each firm produces at the Nash Equilibrium for this game. b. Using the QA and Q you calculated in part a, calculate the market price. C. Does firm A or firm B produce more in this case? Does this result make sense to you? Why do you think this is (in words!)? EXPLAIN d. Use the profit functions you calculated earlier to calculate profits for both firms in this example? Which firm has higher profits? Why do you think this is? EXPLAIN
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1E
Related questions
Question
Given - Answers for question #1 A-D
(A)πA=780QA−145(QA+QB)QA−400QAπA=780QA-145QA+QBQA-400QA is the firm profit function of firm A .
(B)QA=8550−QB2QA=8550-QB2is the best response function of firm A
(C)πB=780QB−145(QA+QB)QB−260QBπB=780QB-145QA+QBQB-260QB is the firm profit function of firm B .
(D)QB=11700−QA2QB=11700-QA2is the best response function of firm B
Please answer questions #2 A-D
![A³
d. Using the profit function above and assuming that firm A produces QĄ, calculate what
firm B's best response is to firm A's decision to produce QA-
Note: Firm B's best response should be a function of QA
2. Nash Equilibrium in a Cournot Oligopoly
a.
Using the best response functions you calculated in the previous question, calculate
how much each firm produces at the Nash Equilibrium for this game.
b. Using the QA and QB you calculated in part a, calculate the market price.
C. Does firm A or firm B produce more in this case? Does this result make sense to you?
Why do you think this is (in words!)? EXPLAIN
d. Use the profit functions you calculated earlier to calculate profits for both firms in this
example? Which firm has higher profits? Why do you think this is? EXPLAIN](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fd88ec8d8-79cd-4de3-899b-59b8c44c6ac2%2F9cfc1787-5fb8-4c12-8c1f-89377058edb6%2Fq61otqc_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:A³
d. Using the profit function above and assuming that firm A produces QĄ, calculate what
firm B's best response is to firm A's decision to produce QA-
Note: Firm B's best response should be a function of QA
2. Nash Equilibrium in a Cournot Oligopoly
a.
Using the best response functions you calculated in the previous question, calculate
how much each firm produces at the Nash Equilibrium for this game.
b. Using the QA and QB you calculated in part a, calculate the market price.
C. Does firm A or firm B produce more in this case? Does this result make sense to you?
Why do you think this is (in words!)? EXPLAIN
d. Use the profit functions you calculated earlier to calculate profits for both firms in this
example? Which firm has higher profits? Why do you think this is? EXPLAIN
![1. Best responses in a Cournot Oligopoly
Firm A and Firm B sell identical goods
Total market demand for the good is:
The inverse demand function is therefore
Q(P) = 35, 100 - 45P
P(QM) = 780 - Q = 780 -0.02222QM
1
45
QM is total market production (i.e., combined production of firm's A and B.
That is:
P(QA, QB) = 780-
As a result, the inverse demand curve for each firm is:
1
LA
2M = A +QB
-QB = 780 -0.02222QA -0.02222QB
45
45
Unlike the example in class, the two firms have different costs.
TCA (QA) = 4000A
TCB (QB) = 260QB
a. Using the demand function and the cost functions above, what is firm A's profit
function.
b. Using the profit function above and assuming that firm B produces QB, calculate what
firm A's best response is to firm B's decision to produce QB-
Note: Firm A's best response should be a function of
c. Using the demand function and the cost functions above, what is firm B's profit
function](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fd88ec8d8-79cd-4de3-899b-59b8c44c6ac2%2F9cfc1787-5fb8-4c12-8c1f-89377058edb6%2Fohcsc2l_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:1. Best responses in a Cournot Oligopoly
Firm A and Firm B sell identical goods
Total market demand for the good is:
The inverse demand function is therefore
Q(P) = 35, 100 - 45P
P(QM) = 780 - Q = 780 -0.02222QM
1
45
QM is total market production (i.e., combined production of firm's A and B.
That is:
P(QA, QB) = 780-
As a result, the inverse demand curve for each firm is:
1
LA
2M = A +QB
-QB = 780 -0.02222QA -0.02222QB
45
45
Unlike the example in class, the two firms have different costs.
TCA (QA) = 4000A
TCB (QB) = 260QB
a. Using the demand function and the cost functions above, what is firm A's profit
function.
b. Using the profit function above and assuming that firm B produces QB, calculate what
firm A's best response is to firm B's decision to produce QB-
Note: Firm A's best response should be a function of
c. Using the demand function and the cost functions above, what is firm B's profit
function
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