2. (Lehr #5.3) Doing it Once: Group Think. It is Wednesday afternoon and a group of students are discussing when to meet to work on a group project that is due on the following Monday. It will only take one meeting to complete the project. The only days that everyone is available to work are Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. The costs are increasing every day since it is worse to give up weekend time than weekday time for a project. In addition, the project will be of lower quality if it is done on Friday, when everyone is exhausted and distracted. We can model this situation as a case of immediate costs in the Doing it Once model with T = 3 and the following reward and cost schedules: V= = (16, 14, 16) C= : (6, 8, c) where 10 < 3 < 18 a. What is the strategy if the students are time-consistent (ß = 1)? When does the group meet? b. What is the strategy if the students are naifs (with ß = 1/2)? When does the group meet? c. The strategy for the case in which the students are sophisticates depends on c3. Assume that ß = 1/2. Find a value of c3 € (10, 18) such that the sophisticates meet on the same day as the time-consistents and a value of c3 € (10, 18) such that the sophisticates meet on the same day as the naifs.
2. (Lehr #5.3) Doing it Once: Group Think. It is Wednesday afternoon and a group of students are discussing when to meet to work on a group project that is due on the following Monday. It will only take one meeting to complete the project. The only days that everyone is available to work are Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. The costs are increasing every day since it is worse to give up weekend time than weekday time for a project. In addition, the project will be of lower quality if it is done on Friday, when everyone is exhausted and distracted. We can model this situation as a case of immediate costs in the Doing it Once model with T = 3 and the following reward and cost schedules: V= = (16, 14, 16) C= : (6, 8, c) where 10 < 3 < 18 a. What is the strategy if the students are time-consistent (ß = 1)? When does the group meet? b. What is the strategy if the students are naifs (with ß = 1/2)? When does the group meet? c. The strategy for the case in which the students are sophisticates depends on c3. Assume that ß = 1/2. Find a value of c3 € (10, 18) such that the sophisticates meet on the same day as the time-consistents and a value of c3 € (10, 18) such that the sophisticates meet on the same day as the naifs.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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