The image presents a game theory problem asking to convert an extensive form game into normal form to find all pure strategy Nash equilibria.### Description of the Game Tree:- **Players**: Two players are involved in this game.1. **Initial Decision Node (Player 1)**: - Player 1 starts at the top node and has two options: - **A**: Leads to the left branch. - **B**: Leads to the right branch.2. **Middle Decision Node (Player 2)**: - If Player 1 chooses A, Player 2 gets a choice between: - **W**: Results in the payoff (4, 3). - **X**: Results in the payoff (1, 2).3. **Middle Decision Node (Player 2)**: - If Player 1 chooses B, Player 2 gets a choice between: - **W**: Results in the payoff (3, 1). - **X**: Results in the payoff (2, 4).### Explanation of the Diagram:- **Nodes**: The circles represent decision points for the players.- **Branches**: Lines leading from nodes show the possible actions available to the player at that node.- **Payoffs**: The pairs of numbers at the terminal nodes represent the payoffs for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively.### Goal:Convert this extensive form into a normal form matrix and identify the pure strategy Nash equilibria. The task involves outlining the strategies and calculating potential outcomes to determine equilibrium conditions in the strategic form of the game.

Extensive form game has a sequence of action element to it , where as normal form games are…

Answered: 17) Convert the following extensive…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

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Problem 1 Consider the following two-person game: 1 2 C ea Prsover's D U 4, 7 6,0 10, 4 11, 5 M 5, 4 7,5 0, 3 6, 3 D 3, 12 5, 10 12, 5 8, 16 Use successive elimination of dominated strategies to find the optimal strategies.
Consider the following normal-form game (a) Calculate the rationalizable set ? (b) Find all Nash equilibria. (c) Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.
1. Consider the following game. 21 Player 1 U D Player 2 LR 2,4 4,2 6,2 2,4 ium. thi c) Are there any pure strategy Nash equilibria in this sequential game?
7
3. Nash Equilibria Consider the following (normal-form) game. Compute a Nash Equilibrium of this game. U C D L | M R 5,0 1,3 4,0 2,4 1,4 3,5 0,1 1,0 5,0
Table 8. This table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs are given in the table as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B). A Select one: Up Middle Down Left (4,2) a. Middle-Center O b. Down-Center (3, 1) (1,3) B Center (2,5) (5, 3) (4,4) Refer to Table 8. This table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs in the table are shown as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B). Which of the following outcomes represents a Nash equilibrium in the game? Right (3, 3) (5,2) (6, 1) O c. Up-Left O d. More than one of the above is a Nash equilibrium in this game.
GAME 5 Player B B1 B2 Player A A1 7,3 | 5, 10 A2 3, 8| 9, 6 In Game 5 above, O Neither player has a dominant strategy. O Player B has a dominant strategy. O Player A has a dominant strategy. O Both players have dominant strategies.
Question > Consider the following matrix game where Player 1 moves first then Player 2 observes player 1's move and responds. Draw the game tree for the sequential move game and then determine all the Nash equilibria. Player 1 Strategy A Strategy B Strategy C Strategy D -3, -2 10, 12 9, 20 Player 2 Please show each step on how to get the answer. Thank you! Strategy E 13,7 17, 17 12, 21 Strategy F 20,8 22, 16 19, 19
12. What is the subgame-perfect outcome from a finitely repeated game? a. Iterated Elimination Outcome played in each stage b. Backwards Induction Outcome played in each stage Nash Equilibrium played in each stage d. Nash Equilibrium in stage 1 only

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17) Convert the following extensive form game into a normal form game. Solve the game to find all pure strategy Nash equilibria. 1 A B 2 W X X W 4,3 1, 2 2, 4 3, 1 2.