1. On a market, half of the consumers have the demand given by QH = 140 - P, and the other half have the demandgiven by QL = 100 - P. The monopoly firm cannot identify each consumer's demand type. The firm's marginal cost is%3D20. Solve for the optimal two-part tariffs.2. The market demand is given by P = 160 - Q. Both the manufacturer and the retailer are profit-maximizing%3Dmonopolists. The manufacturer's marginal cost is 40. The retailer's marginal operational cost is 20 and the retailerpays the manufacturer to order its product. Solve for the optimal prices the two firms charge, the optimal quantity,and the optimal profits of the firms.

1. On a market, half of the consumers have the demand given by QH = 140 - P, and the other half have the demand given by QL = 100 – P. The monopoly firm cannot identify each consumer's demand type. The firm's marginal cost is 20. Solve for the optimal two-part tariffs.

1. On a market, half of the consumers have the demand given by QH = 140 - P, and the other half have the demand given by QL = 100 – P. The monopoly firm cannot identify each consumer's demand type. The firm's marginal cost is 20. Solve for the optimal two-part tariffs.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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