[1] Six decades ago, a British sociologist named Michael Young anticipated the hubris and resentment to which meritocracy gives rise. In fact, it was he who coined the term. In a book called The Rise of the Meritocracy (1958), he asked what would happen if, one day, class barriers were overcome, so that everyone had a truly equal opportunity to rise based solely on his or her own merit. [2] In one respect, this would be something to celebrate; the children of the working class would at last compete fairly, side by side with the children of the privileged. But it would not, Young thought, be an unmitigated triumph; for it was bound to foster hubris in the winners and humiliation among the losers. The winners would consider their success a "just reward for their own capacity, for their own efforts, for their own undeniable achievement," and would therefore look down on those less successful than themselves. Those who failed to rise would feel they had no one to blame but themselves. [3] For Young, meritocracy was not an ideal to aim at but a recipe for social discord. He glimpsed, decades ago, the harsh meritocratic logic that now poisons our politics and animates populist anger. For those who feel aggrieved by the tyranny of merit, the problem is not only stagnant wages but also the loss of social esteem. [4] The loss of jobs to technology and outsourcing has coincided with a sense that society accords less respect to the kind of work the working class does. As economic activity has shifted from making things to managing money, as society has lavished outsize rewards on hedge fund managers, Wall Street bankers, and the professional classes, the esteem accorded work in the traditional sense has become fragile and uncertain. [5] Mainstream parties and elites miss this dimension of politics, like archers shooting at a target. They draw their bows, aim at the problem, and miss by thinking the problem with market-driven globalization is simply a matter of distributive justice. Their misguided arrows decide that those who have gained from global trade, new technologies, and the financialization of the economy have not adequately compensated those who have lost out. [6] But this misunderstands the populist complaint. It also reflects a defect in the technocratic approach to governing. Conducting our public discourse as if it were possible to outsource moral and political judgment to markets, or to experts and technocrats, has emptied democratic argument of meaning and purpose. Such vacuums of public meaning are invariably filled by harsh, authoritarian forms of identity and belonging-whether in the form of religious fundamentalism or strident nationalism. [7] The best sociologist agree that is what we are witnessing today. Four decades of market- driven globalization have hollowed out public discourse, disempowered ordinary citizens, and prompted a populist backlash that seeks to clothe the naked public square with an intolerant, vengeful nationalism. [8] To reinvigorate democratic politics, we need to find our way to a morally more robust public discourse, one that takes seriously the corrosive effect of meritocratic striving on the social bonds that constitute our common life.

[1] Six decades ago, a British sociologist named Michael Young anticipated the hubris and resentment to which meritocracy gives rise. In fact, it was he who coined the term. In a book called The Rise of the Meritocracy (1958), he asked what would happen if, one day, class barriers were overcome, so that everyone had a truly equal opportunity to rise based solely on his or her own merit. [2] In one respect, this would be something to celebrate; the children of the working class would at last compete fairly, side by side with the children of the privileged. But it would not, Young thought, be an unmitigated triumph; for it was bound to foster hubris in the winners and humiliation among the losers. The winners would consider their success a "just reward for their own capacity, for their own efforts, for their own undeniable achievement," and would therefore look down on those less successful than themselves. Those who failed to rise would feel they had no one to blame but themselves. [3] For Young, meritocracy was not an ideal to aim at but a recipe for social discord. He glimpsed, decades ago, the harsh meritocratic logic that now poisons our politics and animates populist anger. For those who feel aggrieved by the tyranny of merit, the problem is not only stagnant wages but also the loss of social esteem. [4] The loss of jobs to technology and outsourcing has coincided with a sense that society accords less respect to the kind of work the working class does. As economic activity has shifted from making things to managing money, as society has lavished outsize rewards on hedge fund managers, Wall Street bankers, and the professional classes, the esteem accorded work in the traditional sense has become fragile and uncertain. [5] Mainstream parties and elites miss this dimension of politics, like archers shooting at a target. They draw their bows, aim at the problem, and miss by thinking the problem with market-driven globalization is simply a matter of distributive justice. Their misguided arrows decide that those who have gained from global trade, new technologies, and the financialization of the economy have not adequately compensated those who have lost out. [6] But this misunderstands the populist complaint. It also reflects a defect in the technocratic approach to governing. Conducting our public discourse as if it were possible to outsource moral and political judgment to markets, or to experts and technocrats, has emptied democratic argument of meaning and purpose. Such vacuums of public meaning are invariably filled by harsh, authoritarian forms of identity and belonging-whether in the form of religious fundamentalism or strident nationalism. [7] The best sociologist agree that is what we are witnessing today. Four decades of market- driven globalization have hollowed out public discourse, disempowered ordinary citizens, and prompted a populist backlash that seeks to clothe the naked public square with an intolerant, vengeful nationalism. [8] To reinvigorate democratic politics, we need to find our way to a morally more robust public discourse, one that takes seriously the corrosive effect of meritocratic striving on the social bonds that constitute our common life.

Social Psychology (10th Edition)

10th Edition

ISBN:9780134641287

Author:Elliot Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers

Publisher:Elliot Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers

Chapter1: Introducing Social Psychology

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1RQ1

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Question

In the text I have used the following colors to indicate Signal Words, Main concepts and the Main point or topic sentence of each point

Yellow = Signal Words

Blue = Main concepts

Green: Main point or topic sentence of each point

I would like you to check my answers in the following steps.

step 1: The significant, non-trivial, signal words and logical (premise and conclusion) indicator words. (yellow)

step 2: The main or central concepts

Step 3: The main point or topic sentence of each paragraph.

No over lapping of highlights, which is why it needs to be done in that order. If I have highlighted something from the second step that was from step 1 that would indicate overlapping. Please let me know if something wrong is highlighted or if I have missed any words or phrases that where a part of the steps. If I have please let me know what is the correct answer