Imagine a small town, in which only two residents, Tony and Jill, own wells that produce water for safedrinking. Each Saturday, Tony and Jill work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump,bring the water to town, and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. Meanwhile, suppose that itcosts $1/gallon for Tony &Jill to pump & deliver water to the customer: i.e., the marginal cost, MC =$1.The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is reflected in the tablebelow. Note: Price (P) is a function of the weekly market quantity (Q): i.e., P = 13 – 0.1 QTotalMarginalTotalMarginalCostRevenue RevenueQuantity(Q)PriceCostProfit(P)(TR)(MR)(TC)(MC)(TT)13N.AN.A101212012101110201122010201200301030014015086077061801904110031110220112011201130-121301-130(1) Complete the above table by filling all blanks.(2) As long as Tony and Jill operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly, what will the weekly marketquantity of water supplied by Tony & Jill (QM), price of water (PM), and their weekly joint profit?QM =(Q51)PM = $.(Q52)Profit =(Q53)

A monopolist represents the industry and faces the industry's negatively sloped demand curve for the…

(1) Complete the above table by filling all blanks. (2) As long as Tony and Jill operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly, what will the weekly market quantity of water supplied by Tony & Jill (Qm), price of water (PM), and their weekly joint profit? QM (Q51) PM = $ (Q52) Profit = $ (Q53)

(1) Complete the above table by filling all blanks. (2) As long as Tony and Jill operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly, what will the weekly market quantity of water supplied by Tony & Jill (Qm), price of water (PM), and their weekly joint profit? QM (Q51) PM = $ (Q52) Profit = $ (Q53)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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