Week 5--RESEARCH PAPER ASSIGNMENT

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Self-Defense Nightmare: A Lesson In Self-Defense Gone Wrong Jesus Emmanuel Jehovah, Student #32643727 Liberty University GOVT280: Undergraduate Torts, Autumn 2023 Professor Jennifer Riedthaler-Williams Due Date: September 25, 2023; Extension Granted

2 I. Introduction Some well-intended efforts can wreak severe harm, giving rise to liability and a multitude of claims against those involved. This is what happened when self-defense instructor Jack Bond decided to give his students a real-life learning experience. Specifically, while working for a local community recreation center and unbeknownst to his class, Bond secretly paid actress Christie Steeple to enter one of his classes and attack him. The plan was for Bond to use such staged fake attack to show his class how to defend themselves in a real-world setting. When the plan was executed, Steeple entered a class, immediately screamed at Bond that he was a “no good man” and “was going to get what he had coming to him,” and then charged at Bond and began choking him. Before Bond could demonstrate his self-defense techniques, new student Kelly Knight ran forward and tried to stab Steeple with a pencil to protect Bond, but missed and ended up stabbing fellow student Larry Lark in the leg. Meanwhile, student Bob Eagen (who attended class for several months) used a technique to throw Steeple to the ground and in doing so broke her arm. Student Sandy Slep was so scared at what she thought was an actual attack that she fled the building, sprinted across the street, and was struck by a car and instantly killed. Other students were so afraid they cowered in corners screaming and sobbing and needed months of intense counseling to regain their confidence. Given this series of tragic events, Bond’s well- intended yet poorly planned lesson went awry, but did such give rise to claims against any of the parties involved? Hereinafter, this question is answered as it relates to specific parties in such incident and claims they may have against other involved parties. II. Does Steeple have a successful claim against Bond and, if so, on what basis? Steeple has a viable claim against Bond for negligence based on her being a commercial invitee of Bond, and also based on their special relationship as employer and employee (Edwards, 2016, §4-10b). Steeple was, in effect, injured while being a commercial invitee of

3 Bond and working/performing in the classroom for Bond. As an inviter, Bond had a duty to use reasonable care to protect his commercial invitee (Steeple) from harm, to consider possible “hidden dangers,” and “to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm that occurred to [Steeple]” (Edwards, 2016, §4-5b). The duty of protection an inviter owes to commercial invitees/visitors includes “[t]he duty to protect visitors…from a foreseeable risk that a third person will injure a visitor” on the property and that “as the risk of danger increases, the amount of care to be exercised also increases. Adams v. C3 Pipeline Constr. Inc. , 30 F.4th 943, 973 (10th Cir. 2021). And as employer, Bond had a duty to protect Steeple (his employee) from dangers she was not able to protect herself from (Edwards, 2016, §4-10b) and “to prevent foreseeable harm to [his] employe[e].” McKenzie v. Allconnect, Inc. , 369 F. Supp. 3d 810, 818 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (bracketing supplied). Here, the risk of harm to Steeple was foreseeable and she was not able to protect herself from such. 1 Bond had a duty to prevent such danger and harm and could have easily done so by, for example, yelling to students that it was a fake attack before they hurt Steeple or having someone else present to prevent students from using physical force against Steeple, to tell students to watch Bond defend himself, or to tell students it was a fake attack. Bond negligently failed to do so. As a direct and proximate result of such negligence, Steeple incurred a broken arm (and several students were hurt and one killed), and Bond is liable for such. Id , Adams , 30 F.4th at 973. 1 Conducting a staged/fake violent attack in a self-defense class unbeknownst to the students created an extreme probability and risk that: (a) some or many of the students would respond to such fake attack with physical force to incapacitate Steeple to prevent her from harming Bond, and (b) such physical force could and would result in injury to Steeple. Moreover, Steeple would not be able to defend herself from such a student defensive attack because the students very likely would not be dissuaded from incapacitating her if she if she asserted the attack was fake because they would not believe such unless Bond were to corroborate such, and because she would very likely be overpowered in numbers and/or strength. In these circumstances there is a much greater likelihood than not that Steeple would have been (and was) unable to protect herself from harm from the students without Bond acting to prevent such harm, yet Bond failed to do so.

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4 As for damages, Steeple would be entitled to recover from Bond general and special compensatory damages to compensate her for her pain and suffering, lost wages, and medical bills, and to try to restore her to the position she was in before she sustained her broken arm (Edwards, 2016, §7-1). While it may be more challenging to do so, Steeple could also potentially get punitive damages. “Punitive damages have long been an available remedy at common law for wanton, willful, or outrageous conduct, but have also been awarded when a defendant engaged in reckless action, that was worse than negligent but less than malicious.” Kenai Ironclad Corp. v. CP Marine Servs., LLC , 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 27513, *13 (5th Cir. 2023)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A jury could find Bond not acting to prevent harm to Steeple was outrageous (especially since he could have at any time before Steeple was injured very easily yelled to the students that it was fake and to not touch Steeple, but did not) and a jury could find that such constituted “reckless action, that was worse than negligent but less than malicious,” and award punitive damages on such basis. Id , Kenai , 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 27513 at *13. III. Does Steeple have a successful claim against Eagen and, if so, on what basis? Based on the limited facts provided, Steeple has a viable claim against Eagen for battery based on the unwanted offensive physical contact and broken arm she incurred when Eagen used a manipulative technique to throw her to the ground. 2 A person is subject to liability to another for battery if he acts “to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact[, and] harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, §13. Here, it is obvious that Steeple did not want to have her arm broken by Eagen, yet that is what Eagen did and such constituted battery. For such, Steeple could obtain general and special compensatory 2 Steeple may also have a claim against Eagen for assault, depending on whether she was aware of the impending offensive or harmful contact from Eagen (Edwards, 2016, §3-2b), but the information provided does not indicate whether Steeple was aware of the impending offensive or harmful contact from Eagen before it occurred.

5 damages to compensate her for her pain and suffering, lost wages, and medical bills, and to try to restore her to the position she was in before she sustained her broken arm (Edwards, 2016, §3-2a and §7-1). Punitive damages would be inappropriate against Eagen because he acted with intent to protect Bond and under the belief that Steeple was committing a crime against and harming Bond, which precludes finding Eagen’s conduct was wanton, willful, outrageous, or reckless, and such precludes an award of punitive damages. Id , Kenai , 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 27513 at *13. IV. Does Lark have any successful claims against Knight and Bond? Lark has a viable claim for battery against Knight resulting from Knight stabbing Lark in the leg with a pencil and such being offensive and harmful contact, and also possibly a claim against Knight for assault depending on whether Lark saw Knight brandishing the pencil in a way that caused him to apprehend harmful or offensive contact (Edwards, 2016, §3-2b). Lark’s intent to stab only Steeple is irrelevant, since such intent to commit battery is transferable to the person she actually injured (Edwards, 2016, §3-1, §3-2a, and §3-2b). Lark also has a viable negligence claim against Bond based on Lark being a student commercial invitee in the classroom and Bond’s negligent conduct in orchestrating the entire incident without implementing measures to ensure Steeple and students were not hurt from the foreseeable risk of harm that could occur in the circumstances. Under the direct causation view where “a defendant is liable for all consequences of his negligent acts, no matter how unforeseeable those consequences may be, so long as they flow directly from his actions” (Edwards, 2016, §6-2b), Bond’s negligence was the proximate cause of Lark’s stab wound injury, which flowed directly from Bond’s negligence, and Bond is liable to Lark for such, although the actual cause of his stab wound injury was the battery committed by Knight.

6 As for damages, Lark could recover from Knight and Bond general and special compensatory damages to compensate Lark for his pain and suffering, lost wages, and medical bills, and to try to restore Lark to the position he was in before Knight stabbed him in the leg (Edwards, 2016, §3-2a and §7-1). Punitive damages would not be proper against Knight because she acted reasonably in trying to protect Bond and believed that Steeple was committing a crime against and harming Bond, but in attempting to stab Steeple she negligently missed and stabbed Lark due to her bad aim, and such negligence—while itself giving rise to liability—was not wanton, willful, outrageous, or reckless as is required to award punitive damages. Id , Kenai , 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 27513 at *13. While Lark cannot recover punitive damages from Knight, Lark could recover punitive damages from Bond because, as mentioned above, Bond’s negligence amounted to “reckless action, that was worse than negligent but less than malicious,” and punitive damages can be awarded for such. Id , Kenai , 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 27513 at *13; Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker , 554 U.S. 471, 510 (2008). V. Do any of the students who fled into corners have successful claims and against whom? The students who fled into corners have a colorable claim against Bond and Steeple for infliction of emotional/mental distress. While petty manipulation of others is not sufficient to establish this tort (Edwards, 2016, §3-2d), what occurred here is not a “petty manipulation of others” because it involved deceptively causing the students to believe their teacher was experiencing serious criminal conduct and was being assaulted, battered, and choked to death (an attempted murder felony) right in front of them merely feet away. Criminal conduct (such as assault, battery, and especially attempted murder) is extreme and outrageous conduct that is completely unacceptable and intolerable in a civilized society—which is exactly why society has

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7 proscribed such as crimes—and in these circumstances such satisfies the requirement of “extreme and outrageous conduct” for this claim (Edwards, 2016, §3-2d). 3 While the class textbook states that this claim is generally not available to those who witness tortious conduct inflicted on others, except when the tortious conduct is inflicted on a relative (Edwards, 2016, §3-2d), the Second Restatement on Torts provides otherwise: Where such [extreme and outrageous] conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress (a) to a member of such person’s immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or (b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm . Restatement (Second) of Torts §46(2); Owens v. Republic of Sudan , 864 F.3d 751, 810 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Commentary on such rule states that the law is “still in a stage of development, [that] the ultimate limits of this tort are not yet determined,” and that “[t]he rule stated is not, however, limited to cases where there has been bodily harm; and if the conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous there may be liability for the emotional distress alone, without such harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, Comments (c) and (k). Thus, the Restatement makes clear the students did not need to experience bodily harm because “if the conduct [wa]s sufficiently extreme and outrageous there may be liability for the emotional distress alone, without such harm.” Here, this standard is satisfied and they have viable infliction of mental distress claims. 3 On an infliction of mental/emotional distress claim, “[t]he peculiar characteristics of the plaintiff[s] may be taken into consideration in evaluating the defendant’s conduct” (Edwards, 2016, §3-2d). This scenario involves students in a self-defense class occurring in the evening. The students’ ages are not known. They could be young children taking karate classes at night and doing the self-defense class in conjunction with such, or they could be adults of a variety of ages. If they were young children, such would increase the likelihood of them experiencing significant mental/emotional distress from witnessing this fake attack. Also, the nature and strength of each student’s special relationship with the teacher could also impact the amount of emotional/mental distress they have when witnessing such teacher being choked in what they would have perceived as an attempted murder.

8 The students here witnessed not merely tortious conduct inflicted on another, but what appeared to be and what they believed was serious criminal conduct occurring right in front of them, which was very extreme and outrageous, and they were so traumatized by such that they cowered in fear and cried in corners of the classroom and needed months of intense counseling to help regain their confidence. Bond and Steeple recklessly and egregiously acted to deceive them into believing Bond was being assaulted, battered, and choked to death in their presence, and they did so recklessly “in deliberate disregard of the emotional distress that [they knew their fake attack was] very likely to cause the [students]” (Edwards, 2016, §3-2d). Bond and Steeple knew or should have known that doing so would inflict severe mental distress upon such students. Anyone so closely witnessing what they believed were such criminal acts would experience mental distress from such (to some extent or another) and a sense of exigency to help their teacher or to take cover or flee (all of which occurred in this case where some students tried to help Bond, others took refuge in corners, and one fled). It is common knowledge that mental distress occurs in response to witnessing a live criminal physical attack upon a person in close proximity to such attack. That Bond and Steeple knew of this extreme likelihood and were recklessly indifferent to such may be inferred from their agreement to create a “real-life” experience involving a criminal physical attack that required self-defense in response. Such students would be entitled to general and special compensatory damages and possibly also punitive damages on the same basis as others aforementioned. VI. What claims revolve around Sandy Slep and against whom? For causation purposes related to identifying what claims Slep’s estate has, it is useful to analyze what happened to Slep in terms of her injuries. Slep had two different sets of injuries: (i) mental distress, fear, anxiety, and terror; and (ii) being hit by a car and instantly dying. Regarding

9 these injuries, Slep’s estate has viable claims against Bond and Steeple for infliction of mental distress and on the same basis mentioned above that the other students do. For such claims, the Slep estate may recover compensatory and punitive damages for reasons also given above regarding other students. However, her estate may also be able to recover special compensatory damages associated with her death and funeral. Regarding her second injury (being hit by a car and dying), the car hitting and killing Slep was an intervening and superseding event that was not reasonably foreseeable to occur as a result of the negligence of Bond and Steeple or as a result of their infliction of mental distress. As such, Bond and Steeple cannot be held liable for her death under civil law. However, there is another law—God’s law—which is the source of all true morality, decency, righteousness, love, and goodness. Under God’s law, Bond and Steeple are guilty of and liable for perpetuating a fraud upon Slep, which so traumatized and scared her that she fled into traffic and was hit by a car and died. Such fraud was a violation of God’s law: If someone sins and acts unfaithfully against the LORD by deceiving his neighbor…, or if he extorts his neighbor or finds lost property and lies about it and swears falsely—or if he commits any such sin that a man might commit— once he has sinned and becomes guilty, he must return what he has stolen or taken by extortion, or the deposit entrusted to him, or the lost property he found, or anything else about which he has sworn falsely. (Berean Standard Bible, 2016/2020, Leviticus 6:2-5). Under God’s law, Bond and Steeple are liable to Slep’s estate for fraud resulting in her wrongful death and should compensate her estate to try to make up for the loss of her life.

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10 References Adams v. C3 Pipeline Constr. Inc. , 30 F.4th 943 (10th Cir. 2021). Edwards, J.S. (2016). Tort Law (6th Edition) . Cengage Learning Incorporated: Boston, MA. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker , 554 U.S. 471 (2008). Kenai Ironclad Corp. v. CP Marine Servs., LLC , 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 27513 (5th Cir. 2023). McKenzie v. Allconnect, Inc. , 369 F. Supp. 3d 810 (E.D. Ky. 2019). Owens v. Republic of Sudan , 864 F.3d 751, 810 (D.C. Cir. 2017) Restatement (Second) of Torts. (1965). American Law Institute. The Holy Bible: Berean Standard Bible . (2020). Biblehub.com. https://biblehub.com (Original work published 2016).

Week 5--RESEARCH PAPER ASSIGNMENT

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