Ali_s Family Law LONG CAN - Fall 2018

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Toronto Metropolitan University *

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515

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Nov 24, 2024

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1 LAW 515: Family Law Fall 2018 Sowter Table of Contents INTRODUCTION TO FAMILY LAW ...................................................................................................................... 7 Division of Powers under Constitution Act .......................................................................................................................................... 7 Conflicting Orders ................................................................................................................................................................................ 7 Processes in Family Law ....................................................................................................................................................................... 7 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ........................................................................................................................................ 7 L EGISLATION ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 7 D OMESTIC V IOLENCE ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 E MERGENCY P ROTECTION O RDERS .................................................................................................................................................................. 8 PC Emergency POs under the Prevention of Family Violence Act ........................................................................................................ 8 Provincial Court Emergency Protection Orders under the Prevention of Family Violence Act ............................................................ 9 QB Protection Orders under the Protection Against Family Violence Act ........................................................................................... 9 Siwiec v Hlewka, 2005 ABQB ................................................................................................................................................. 9 P RACTICAL M ATTERS IN F AMILY L AW P RACTICE : D OMESTIC V IOLENCE ................................................................................................................. 10 Intake Interviewing: ........................................................................................................................................................................... 10 Representing the Abuser ................................................................................................................................................................... 10 Impact of DV on Outcome ................................................................................................................................................................. 10 MARRIAGE & VALIDITY ................................................................................................................................... 10 O VERVIEW : V ALIDITY OF M ARRIAGE .............................................................................................................................................................. 10 Keywords: .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 10 E LEMENTS OF THE E SSENTIAL V ALIDITY OF M ARRIAGE L EX D OMICILE ................................................................................................................ 10 Elements of validity: .......................................................................................................................................................................... 10 Consummation ................................................................................................................................................................................... 11 Degrees of Consanguinity/Affinity ..................................................................................................................................................... 11 Prior Existing Marriage ...................................................................................................................................................................... 11 Consent .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 11 Age ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 11 F ORMAL V ALIDITY OF M ARRIAGE L EX L OCI C ELEBRATIONIS .............................................................................................................................. 12 Location of Marriage Ceremony ........................................................................................................................................................ 12 Other Presumptions ........................................................................................................................................................................... 12 Hassan v Hassan .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 12 Vo v Vo, 2017 ABQB ............................................................................................................................................................. 12 Same-Sex Marriage ........................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Layland v Ontario (Minister of Consumer & Commercial Relations), 1993 Ont Div Ct ....................................................... 13 Halpern v Canada (AG), 2002 Ont Div Ct ............................................................................................................................. 13 Halpern v Toronto (City), 2003 ONCA ................................................................................................................................. 13 Re Same Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC ........................................................................................................................................ 13 DIVORCE ........................................................................................................................................................ 13 T ERMS ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 G ROUNDS FOR D IVORCE .............................................................................................................................................................................. 13 Reconciliation .................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 i. Lawyers must ask about possibility of reconciliation unless circumstances show it’s inappropriate: s. 9(1) DA ................... 13 J URISDICTION ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 13 Molson v Molson, 1998 ABQB ............................................................................................................................................. 13 Wang v Lin, 2013 ONCA ....................................................................................................................................................... 13 S AME -S EX D IVORCES .................................................................................................................................................................................. 14 R ECOGNITION OF F OREIGN D IVORCES UNDER THE D IVORCE A CT ......................................................................................................................... 14 Zhang v Lin, 2010 ABQB ..................................................................................................................................................................... 14 L IVING S EPARATE AND A PART ....................................................................................................................................................................... 14 Living Separate and Apart ................................................................................................................................................................. 14
2 Factors: Living Separate and Apart ................................................................................................................................................... 14 Dorchester v Dorchester, 1971 BCSC .................................................................................................................................. 15 Rushton v Rushton, 1968 BCSC ........................................................................................................................................... 15 Dupere v Dupere, 1974 NBCA ............................................................................................................................................. 15 Greaves v Greaves, 2004 ONSC ........................................................................................................................................... 15 Kansal v Bhardwaj, 2016 ABQB ........................................................................................................................................... 15 A DULTERY ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 15 Orford v Orford, 1921 ONHC ............................................................................................................................................... 15 MacLennan v MacLennan, 1958 Scotland ........................................................................................................................... 15 P(SE) v P(DD), 2005 BCSC ..................................................................................................................................................... 16 I NTOLERABLE C RUELTY ................................................................................................................................................................................. 16 General Principles .............................................................................................................................................................................. 16 Knoll v Knoll, 1970 ONCA ..................................................................................................................................................... 16 A(I) v D(S), 2009 ABQB 513 .................................................................................................................................................. 16 Delaney v Delaney, 1971 ONCA ........................................................................................................................................... 16 B ARS TO D IVORCE ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 16 Bars to Divorce ................................................................................................................................................................................... 16 Merchant v Dossani, 2007 ABQB 487 .................................................................................................................................. 17 Watkins v Watkins, 1980 NFLD TD ...................................................................................................................................... 17 Berger v Berger, 1974 BCSC ................................................................................................................................................. 17 Savoia v Savoia, 2009 ABQB ................................................................................................................................................ 17 ADULT INTERDEPENDENT PARTNERS .............................................................................................................. 17 T HE AIP MODEL IS UNIQUE TO A LBERTA , AND ALLOWS REGISTERED ADULT INTERDEPENDENT PARTNERS (AIP S ) WHO MAY BE OF THE SAME SEX TO ACCESS SOME OF THE SAME RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIED PEOPLE ( SUCH AS SPOUSAL SUPPORT BUT NOT PROPERTY UNDER THE MPA). ...................... 17 A LBERTA S A DULT I NTERDEPENDENT R ELATIONSHIPS A CT .................................................................................................................................. 17 F RAMEWORK : ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 18 AIP Act Relationship of Interdependence Factors ............................................................................................................................. 18 Spracklin Framework Common Law Relationship Factors ................................................................................................................ 18 Medora v Kohn, 2003 ABQB ................................................................................................................................................ 18 Wright-Watts v Watts, 2005 ABQB ..................................................................................................................................... 19 THE MATRIMONIAL HOME ............................................................................................................................. 19 D EFINITION OF M ATRIMONIAL H OME ............................................................................................................................................................ 19 Matrimonial Property Act .................................................................................................................................................................. 19 Family Law Act ................................................................................................................................................................................... 19 E XCLUSIVE P OSSESSION O RDERS U NDER THE MPA ........................................................................................................................................... 19 Exclusive Possession Orders Under the MPA: Process ....................................................................................................................... 19 E XCLUSIVE P OSSESSION O RDERS U NDER THE FLA ............................................................................................................................................. 20 Boutin v Viau, 2007 ABQB ................................................................................................................................................... 20 S(TJ) v S(LM), 2005 ABQB .................................................................................................................................................... 21 Tawiah v Tawiah, 2002 ABQB .............................................................................................................................................. 21 H OUSEHOLD G OODS UNDER THE MPA/FLA ................................................................................................................................................... 21 Exclusive Use of Household Goods under MPA ................................................................................................................................. 21 PROPERTY: UNMARRIED PARTNERS ................................................................................................................ 21 Charter Challenges to Treatment of CL Partners: .............................................................................................................................. 22 Murdoch v Murdoch ............................................................................................................................................................ 22 Rathwell v Rathwell, 1978 SCC ............................................................................................................................................ 22 Pettkus v Becker, 1980 SCC ................................................................................................................................................. 22 Sorochan v Sorochan, 1986 SCC .......................................................................................................................................... 23 Peter v Beblow, 1993 SCC .................................................................................................................................................... 23 Kerr v Baranow, 2011 SCC ................................................................................................................................................... 23 SPOUSAL SUPPORT: ENTITLEMENT ................................................................................................................. 24 K EY E LEMENTS ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 24 F RAMEWORK : ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 25 Medora v Kohn, 2003 ABQB ................................................................................................................................................ 25 S POUSAL S UPPORT U NDER THE D IVORCE A CT .................................................................................................................................................. 25 Court Powers Under the Federal Divorce Act .................................................................................................................................... 25
3 Factors for Determining Support under the Divorce Act ................................................................................................................... 25 Objectives of Spousal Support under the Divorce Act ....................................................................................................................... 25 Variation under the Divorce Act ........................................................................................................................................................ 25 Resuming Support After Expiration ................................................................................................................................................... 26 Compensatory Support ...................................................................................................................................................................... 26 Factors for Entitlement to Compensatory Support ............................................................................................................................ 26 Non-Compensatory Support .............................................................................................................................................................. 26 Contractual Support ........................................................................................................................................................................... 26 Quantum of Support .......................................................................................................................................................................... 26 S POUSAL S UPPORT U NDER THE F AMILY L AW A CT ............................................................................................................................................. 26 Support Obligations under the Family Law Act ................................................................................................................................. 26 Factors for Determining Support under the Family Law Act ............................................................................................................. 26 S POUSAL S UPPORT A DVISORY G UIDELINES ...................................................................................................................................................... 26 Overview ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 26 Determining the Support Amount Within the SSAG Range ............................................................................................................... 27 Note tax implications: ........................................................................................................................................................................ 27 Pelech Trilogy, 1987 SCC ...................................................................................................................................................... 27 Moge v Moge, 1992 SCC ...................................................................................................................................................... 27 Bracklow v Bracklow, 1999 SCC ........................................................................................................................................... 27 Leskun v Leskun, 2006 SCC .................................................................................................................................................. 27 Shields v Shields, 2008 ABCA ............................................................................................................................................... 28 Knight v Wowk, 2015 ABPC ................................................................................................................................................. 28 SPOUSAL SUPPORT: APPLICATION .................................................................................................................. 28 Fisher v Fisher, 2008 ONCA ................................................................................................................................................. 31 Sawatzky v Sawatzky, 2008 ABCA ........................................................................................................................................ 32 Anand v Anand, 2016 ABCA ................................................................................................................................................. 32 H(JL) v W(RS), 2017 ABCA .................................................................................................................................................... 32 Pickett v Walsh, 2016 ABQB ................................................................................................................................................ 32 Rockall v Rockall, 2010 ABCA ............................................................................................................................................... 32 Rocky v Hartwell, 2016 ABQB .............................................................................................................................................. 33 FORMING FAMILIES ........................................................................................................................................ 33 K EY E LEMENTS ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 33 P ATERNITY U NDER THE F AMILY L AW A CT ........................................................................................................................................................ 33 Applicable Sections ............................................................................................................................................................................ 33 I N L OCO P ARENTIS : S TANDING IN THE P LACE OF A P ARENT ................................................................................................................................. 33 Standing in the place of a parent: s. 48 of the Family Law Act ......................................................................................................... 33 Test for “Standing in Place of a Parent” (Chartier): .......................................................................................................................... 34 A SSISTED R EPRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................................ 34 The Family Law Act ............................................................................................................................................................................ 34 Surrogacy ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 34 P ARENS P ATRIAE J URISDICTION ..................................................................................................................................................................... 34 Parens Patriae Jurisdiction ................................................................................................................................................................ 34 A DOPTION ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 35 Overview ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 35 Voluntary Adoption ........................................................................................................................................................................... 35 Involuntary Adoption ......................................................................................................................................................................... 35 Trociuk v British Columbia, 2003 SCC .................................................................................................................................. 35 AB v CD, 2012 ABCA ............................................................................................................................................................. 35 M(JR) v M(TD), 2006 ABPC .................................................................................................................................................. 35 Jane Doe v Alberta, 2007 ABCA ........................................................................................................................................... 35 W(HL) v T(JC), 2005 BCSC .................................................................................................................................................... 36 H(DW) v R(DJ), 2013 ABCA .................................................................................................................................................. 36 PARENTING ISSUES ......................................................................................................................................... 37 R ESEARCH , ETC ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 37 Research Overview ............................................................................................................................................................................ 37 Parenting Plans and Parenting Agreements ..................................................................................................................................... 37
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4 Living Arrangements and Parenting Time ......................................................................................................................................... 37 Decision-Making ................................................................................................................................................................................ 37 S TATUTORY F RAMEWORK FOR C USTODY AND A CCESS ....................................................................................................................................... 37 Overview ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 37 Divorce Act: Custody and Access ....................................................................................................................................................... 37 Family Law Act: Guardianship and Access ........................................................................................................................................ 38 Shared Parenting ............................................................................................................................................................................... 38 Parallel Parenting .............................................................................................................................................................................. 39 G UARDIANSHIP .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 40 Guardianship Under the Family Law Act ........................................................................................................................................... 40 The Role of a Guardian ...................................................................................................................................................................... 40 Duties of Guardians ........................................................................................................................................................................... 40 Termination of Guardianship ............................................................................................................................................................. 40 Guardianship Orders .......................................................................................................................................................................... 40 Consent to Guardianship ................................................................................................................................................................... 41 Parenting Orders ................................................................................................................................................................................ 41 Contact Orders ................................................................................................................................................................................... 41 R v R, 1983 ABCA ................................................................................................................................................................. 41 C USTODY AND D ECISION - MAKING .................................................................................................................................................................. 41 W HO IS A CHILD ? ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 41 R ELOCATION .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 41 E X P ARTE C USTODY O RDERS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 42 M ARITAL C ONDUCT AND D OMESTIC V IOLENCE ................................................................................................................................................ 42 Varying a Parenting Order under the Divorce Act ............................................................................................................................. 42 P OST G ORDON V G OERTZ T RENDS ...................................................................................................................................................... 42 Third Party Access/Custody Orders ................................................................................................................................................... 43 Shared Custody/Guardianship ........................................................................................................................................................... 43 Wakaluk v Wakaluk, 1976 SKCA .......................................................................................................................................... 43 S(D) v Y(T), 2010 ABPC ......................................................................................................................................................... 43 M(A) v M(J), 2016 ONCA ...................................................................................................................................................... 43 Spencer v Spencer, 1980 BCCA ............................................................................................................................................ 43 Dix v Thomas, 2006 ONSC VARYING CUSTODY ORDER under Gordon rules ................................................................... 43 DS v TY, 2010 ABPC VARYING CUSTODY ORDER under Gordon rules (moving) .............................................................. 44 Kaplanis v Kaplanis, 2005 ONCA .......................................................................................................................................... 44 Terin v Krisco, 2008 ABPC .................................................................................................................................................... 44 D(J) v P©, 2009 ABQB .......................................................................................................................................................... 44 Domestic Violence ............................................................................................................................................................................. 44 P(JY) v M(RJL), 2007 NSCA ................................................................................................................................................... 44 Isakhani v Al-Saggaf, 2007 ONCA ......................................................................................................................................... 44 P(JY) v M(RJL), 2007 NSCA ................................................................................................................................................... 44 S(J) v S(M), 2014 ABPC ......................................................................................................................................................... 45 Impact of Extended Family ................................................................................................................................................................ 45 Dix v Thomas, 2006 ONSC .................................................................................................................................................... 45 S(J) v W(R), 2008 ABQB ........................................................................................................................................................ 45 Culture etc .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 45 Van de Perre v Edwards, 2001 SCC ...................................................................................................................................... 45 Perron v Perron, 2012 ONCA ............................................................................................................................................... 45 Variation of Orders ............................................................................................................................................................................ 45 Gordon v Goertz, 1996 SCC ................................................................................................................................................. 45 Guardianship ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 45 SB v JF, 2008 ABQB REQUESTING GUARDIANSHIP under FLA .......................................................................................... 45 AM v JM, 2016 ONCA EX PARTE CUSTODY ORDER ........................................................................................................... 46 JS v MS, 2014 ABPC MUST CONSIDER BIC ........................................................................................................................ 46 Sharing Custody/Guardianship .......................................................................................................................................................... 46
5 Baker v Baker, 1979 ONCA .................................................................................................................................................. 46 Kruger v Kruger, 1979 ONCA ............................................................................................................................................... 46 B(S) v F(J), 2008 ABQB ......................................................................................................................................................... 46 Kaplanis v Kaplanis, 2005 ONCA .......................................................................................................................................... 46 Terwi v Krisco, 2008 ABPC ................................................................................................................................................... 46 JS v RW, 2008 ABQB AUNTS WANT CONTACT ORDER ..................................................................................................... 46 D(J) v P(C), ABQB .................................................................................................................................................................. 47 Van de Perre v Edwards, 2001 SCC ...................................................................................................................................... 47 Perron v Perron, 2012 ONCA ............................................................................................................................................... 47 Stefurak v Chambers, 2004 ONSC ....................................................................................................................................... 47 Moving Variation of Parenting Orders ........................................................................................................................................... 47 Gordon v Goertz, 1996 SCC ................................................................................................................................................. 47 ACCESS .......................................................................................................................................................... 48 K EY P RINCIPLES .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 48 A PPLICATION U NDER THE FLA: ..................................................................................................................................................................... 48 S EEKING A CCESS ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 48 Access Under the Divorce Act ............................................................................................................................................................ 48 Contact Orders Under the Family Law Act ........................................................................................................................................ 48 A LIENATION AND E NFORCEMENT ................................................................................................................................................................... 49 How do you meaningfully enforce access? ........................................................................................................................................ 49 Enforcement under the FLA ............................................................................................................................................................... 49 Supervised Access .............................................................................................................................................................................. 49 Alienation ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 49 Young v Young, 1993 SCC .................................................................................................................................................... 50 C(JL) v L(JL), 2016 ABPC ....................................................................................................................................................... 50 Hardie v Payne, 2010 ABQB ................................................................................................................................................. 50 L(AG) v D(KB), 2009 ONSC ................................................................................................................................................... 50 L(N) v M(RR), 2016 ONCA .................................................................................................................................................... 50 LSUC v Curtis, 1993 .............................................................................................................................................................. 51 POTENTIAL ABUSE .......................................................................................................................................... 51 CHILD SUPPORT ............................................................................................................................................. 51 O VERVIEW : ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 51 H OW MUCH SHOULD A STEP - PARENT PAY ? ...................................................................................................................................................... 51 S TATISTICS ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 51 Child Support Statistics ...................................................................................................................................................................... 51 Child Support Agreements ................................................................................................................................................................. 52 C HILD S UPPORT O RDERS U NDER S TATUTE ...................................................................................................................................................... 52 The Divorce Act .................................................................................................................................................................................. 52 C HILD S UPPORT O RDERS U NDER THE FLA ....................................................................................................................................................... 52 Family Law Act ................................................................................................................................................................................... 52 Child Support: Step-Parents ............................................................................................................................................................... 53 Chartier v Chartier, 1999 SCC .............................................................................................................................................. 53 H(KA) v H(RS), 2001 ABPC .................................................................................................................................................... 53 M(ST) v F(MD), 2002 ABQB .................................................................................................................................................. 54 Child Support: How Long? ................................................................................................................................................................. 54 Achkewich v Achkewich, 1998 ABQB .................................................................................................................................. 54 Wahl v Wahl, 2000 ABQB .................................................................................................................................................... 54 B(L) v V(PA), 2009 ABQB ...................................................................................................................................................... 54 FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES ............................................................................................................ 55 F RAMEWORK : ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 55 K EY E LEMENTS : .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 55 S PLIT C USTODY .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 55 S HARED C USTODY ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 55 I NCOMES OVER $150 K ................................................................................................................................................................................ 55 S PECIAL OR E XTRAORDINARY E XPENSES .......................................................................................................................................................... 56 U NDUE H ARDSHIP ( S . 10(1)). ...................................................................................................................................................................... 56
6 T AX .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 56 I NCOME .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 56 I MPUTING I NCOME ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 57 Cunningham v Seveny, 2017 ................................................................................................................................................ 57 Bak v Dobell, 2007 ONCA ..................................................................................................................................................... 57 A(AE) v E(H), 2016 ABPC ...................................................................................................................................................... 58 Hanmore v Hanmore, 2000 ABCA ....................................................................................................................................... 58 R v R, 2002 ONCA ................................................................................................................................................................. 58 RETROACTIVE CS ............................................................................................................................................ 59 DBS v SRG, 2006 SCC ............................................................................................................................................................ 59
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7 Introduction to Family Law Division of Powers under Constitution Act i. Federal powers : a. s. 91(26): marriage capacity and divorce e.g. Federal Divorce Act . b. Also: bankruptcy, first nations, criminal law. ii. Provincial powers : a. s. 92(12): solemnization of marriage (formalities) b. s. 92(13): property and civil rights e.g. Alberta’s Matrimonial Property Act, Adult Interdependent Realtionships Act, Protection Against Family Violence Act. iii. Which Court? a. QB: divorce, property, child support, spousal support, custody and access. b. PC: child support, spousal support, parenting arrangements, guardianship, adoption, and child protection. Vanier Institute Statistics i. Shift from 6.3% of couples living CL in 1981 to 21.3% of couples living CL in 2016. ii. 60.7% increase in number of same-sex couples between 2006-2016. iii. 33.4% of same sex couples were married; 12% have children living with them. iv. Average duration of marriage before divorce was 13.7 years; highest rate is less than 5 years. Conflicting Orders i. Under s. 20 of the Divorce Act an order for divorce or corollary relief has “legal effect throughout Canada.” a. Can be registered in QB of any province then enforced as an order of that court. b. Renders inoperative any inconsistent prior order made under prov. law (through paramountcy). c. Multiple Access Ltd v McCutcheon , 1982 SCC paramountcy where provincial/federal conflict. Processes in Family Law i. Mediation a. Considered the most generally useful process (except for in high-conflict cases). b. 78.3% result in long-lasting relationships process makes it easier for parties to collaborate later. c. Average: i. High conflict: 13.7 months/$31k. ii. Low conflict: 4.8 months/$6k. d. Results 90.2% in client’s interest; 85.4% in kid’s interest. ii. Collaborative Process a. Second most useful process after mediation. b. 71.1% result in long-lasting relationships process makes it easier for parties to collaborate later. c. Average: i. High conflict: 14.8 months/$25k. ii. Low conflict: 5 months/$6k. d. Results 94% in client’s interest; 98.9% in kid’s interest. iii. Arbitration a. 18.5% result in long-lasting relationships. b. Average: i. High conflict: 14.8 months/$40k. ii. Low conflict: 6.6 months/$12k. c. Results 34.2% in client’s interest; 39.5% in kid’s interest. iv. Litigation a. Most useful for high-conflict cases. b. 6.4% result in long-lasting relationships. c. Average: i. High conflict: 27.7 months/$54k. ii. Low conflict: 10.8 months/$12k. d. Results 31.2% in client’s interest, 30.2% in kid’s interest. v. Also : negotiation, mediation-arbitration, parenting coordinator. Domestic Violence Legislation i. Protection Against Family Violence Act (AB): a. Can seek EPO to protect from FV see below for steps. ii. Family Law Act (AB): a. Best interests of the child takes into account any family violence and its impact on (s. 18(2)(vi)): i. the safety of the child and other family and household members;
8 ii. the child’s general well -being; iii. the ability of the person who perpetrated FV to care for & meet needs of the child, and iv. appropriateness of making an order requiring co-operation on issues affecting the child. iii. Divorce Act a. A spouse may apply for divorce if (s. 8(1) and (2)): i. Separate & apart for at least one year; or ii. Adultery; or iii. Physical or mental cruelty such that it is intolerable to continue cohabiting. Domestic Violence i. Types: a. Coercive Control: Spousal violence as part of a pattern of coercive control and abuse; includes emotional and psychological control. Pattern of intimidation, humiliation, frightening the victim. b. Litigation Abuse: Litigation abuse tries to keep the abused spouse in litigation for as long as possible; often the parent who has never had primary caregiver role is seeking sole custody. c. Cycle of Abuse: i. Tension building acute battering incident loving contrition. ii. Pattern continues over period of weeks/months/years. ii. Period of Risk a. 40% of spousal homicides occur within 2 months of separation. b. Often occurs when the woman returns to the family home to retrieve belongings. c. 32% occur within 2-12 months of separation. d. 19% occur more than 1 year after separation. iii. Violence post-separation: a. 50% of women who leave abusive relationships report continuing abuse. b. 25% of batterers use access as a way to continue abuse . iv. Intimate partner violence: a. Includes all types of violence: threats, sexual violence, physical violence, death. b. 79% of victims are women; leading cause of violence against women in 2016. c. 35% perpetrators current partners; 32% current spouses. v. Effects on children: a. 33% of DV victims report kids saw violence; 10% incidence of child abuse too. b. Causes social, behavioural, emotional problems. c. Infants experience increased developmental delay/attachment disorder. d. Babies experience slow fetal growth, premature delivery and neonatal death. vi. Risk factors include: a. Perpetrator abused/witnessed DV as a child or suicidal behaviour in family of origin. b. Actual or pending separation. c. New partner in victim’s life. d. Child custody or access disputes. e. Excessive alcohol/drug use by perpetrator. f. Depression (opinion of family/friend and professionally diagnosed). g. Prior attempts/threats to commit suicide. h. Obsessive behaviour (stalking/spying/repeated phone calls/excessive gift giving). i. Sexual jealousy. j. History of: i. Destruction/deprivation of victim’s property. ii. Violence outside of the family. iii. DV with previous partners; DV with current partner/victim. iv. Prior threats to kill victim/threats with a weapon/assault with a weapon. v. Attempts to isolate victim; hostage taking/forcible confinement. vi. Forced sexual acts/assaults during sex. k. Escalation of violence. l. Victim’s intuitive sense of fear of the perpetrator. Emergency Protection Orders PC Emergency POs under the Prevention of Family Violence Act i. Family members: married spouses, AIP and CL, parents regardless of whether they have ever lived together, and children (s. 1(1)(d)). ii. “Family violence” includes ( s. 1(1)(e)): a. any intentional or reckless act or omission that causes injury or property damage and that intimidates or harms a family member; b. any act or threatened act that intimidates a family member by creating a reasonable fear of property damage or injury to a family member;
9 c. forced confinement; d. sexual abuse; and e. stalking. Provincial Court Emergency Protection Orders under the Prevention of Family Violence Act i. An extraordinary remedy because can be granted ex parte . ii. Exist to protect family claimants from FV can’t have primary ulterior purpose (e.g. getting MR or custody). a. Siwiec lied to get control of MH. iii. Can be issued as long as (s. 2(1) PAFVA): a. FV has occurred; b. The claimant thinks FV will occur again; and c. It is required to immediately protect the claimant & family members who live w/ them. iv. Court must consider (s. 2(2) PAFVA): a. History of FV; b. Controlling behaviour; c. Whether behaviour is repetitive/escalating; d. Existence of immediate danger (people/property); e. Vulnerability of elderly; f. Effect on kids; g. Need for safe environment in interim. v. Court EPO powers: a. Stop abuser from attending places where complainant/kids attend or from communicating (s. 2(3)(a) and (b) PFVA) b. Exclusive possession of residence regardless of ownership (s. 2(3)(c) PAFVA) c. Removal of respondent from home (s. 2(3)(d) PAFVA). d. Require officer to go to house with someone to get belongings (s. 2(3)(e) PAFVA). e. Seizure and storage of weapons (s. 2(3)(f) PAFVA) f. Anything else to protect claimant (s. 2(3)(g) PAFVA). vi. Emergency protection order must be confirmed with QB judge within 7 working days (s. 3 PAFVA, Siwiec ). vii. Offenses and penalties: a. Offence not to comply w/ or obstruct a right exercised under a PO (s. 13.1 PAFVA). b. Penalties: i. 1 st offence fine of no more than $5k and/or 90 days imprisonment. ii. 2 nd offence 14 days 18 months imprisonment. iii. 3 rd offence 30 days 24 months imprisonment. QB Protection Orders under the Protection Against Family Violence Act i. Same as PC EPO, except notice is required . ii. EPO can be made if claimant is subject of family violence: s. 4(1) PAFVA. iii. The court has additional abilities involving property (s. 4(2)(d) PAFVA): a. Can require to reimburse monetary losses suffered by the claimant/child due to FV: i. Loss of earnings/support; ii. Medical/dental expenses; iii. Out-of-pocket losses for injuries sustained; iv. Moving and accommodation; v. Legal costs. b. Can grant either party temporary possession of specified personal property (vehicle, checkbook, bank cards, children’s clothi ng, medical insurance cards, ID, keys): s. 4(2)(e) PAFVA. c. Restrain either party from taking/converting/damaging property: s. 4(2)(f) PAFVA. d. Post bond: s. 4(2)(j) PAFVA. e. Respondent or child to receive counselling: s. 4(2)(k)(k.1) PAFVA. Siwiec v Hlewka, 2005 ABQB i. Can’t use an EPO just to try to get possession of the house or kid! EPOs are an extraordinary remedy granted to prevent FV; court doesn’t take ex parte orders lightly. ii. Alice and Gary, had one child and cohabitated 1999-2000. Started living on different floors until incident in 2005; Alice moved out, and 6 weeks later applied for and received an EPO. iii. A PC judge or justice of the peace can grant an ex parte EPO if there is FV and the order is needed for immediate protection. Must be scheduled for QB review within 7 working days. a. QB judge can grant a PO if there is family violence (no need for emergency, since it’s on notice). b. EPOs are an extraordinary remedy since they can be granted on ex parte basis. They exist to protect claimants from family violence, and not to: i. Obtain custody of children; ii. Get exclusive possession of the home; iii. Or get possession of chattels.
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10 Practical Matters in Family Law Practice: Domestic Violence Intake Interviewing: i. Every new client should be screened for DV. ii. Clients might not disclose, even if asked directly or recognize CC (e.g. not know ok to refuse sex w/ spouse.) iii. Question it if a client refuses/is hesitant about pursuing a claim for SS, doesn’t want division of property, or agrees to a low offer – notwithstanding advice to the contrary. iv. Victims know their own risk better than anyone. Representing the Abuser i. Most will deny the abuse; try asking if their spouse will accuse them of abuse/DV. ii. Set ground rules early if they don’t comply, can withdraw. iii. Instruct them to: a. Obey court orders; b. Reduce contact; c. Do access pick-up/drop-off in front of witnesses to protect themselves from further allegations. iv. Encourage counselling. v. If there are criminal charges await that outcome before finalizing custody/access. a. Abusers are twice as likely to seek sole custody way to regain control over spouse. b. More likely to involve children in dispute and ask kids to choose. Impact of DV on Outcome i. Victim might be more inclined to accept less attractive offer due to fear. ii. Safety planning for court appearances, mediation, and settlement meetings. iii. DOJ recommends: a. Sole custody to victim-spouse; b. Specified access to abusing parent (including specific pick-up/drop-off, no flexibility); no direct contact between spouses (email can be ok creates record); c. Supervised access. Marriage & Validity Overview: Validity of Marriage Keywords: i. Marriage: a. Family Law Act “marriage” includes a void marriage and voidable marriage. b. Matrimonial Property Act “spouse” includes a former spouse and a party to a marriage notwithstanding that the marriage is void or voidable. i. s. 2 if you knew or had reason to believe the marriage was void, the MPA doesn’t apply. ii. Divorce dissolves the marriage as from the date of judicial decree. iii. Annulment void ab initio , declaration that marriage never existed/was void from beginning. iv. Voidable marriage was valid, until court declared it void (retroactively voids the marriage). v. Void but subject to ratification marriage is void, but if parties live together after the ceremony, and represent themselves as married, court would likely not declare it void. You need both elements of validity to have a valid marriage: Lex loci celebrationis law of the jurisdiction where the wedding event took place (event - formal validity ). Lex domicile law of the jurisdiction where the parties are resident (capacity essential validity ). *** The presumption is that two people who live together and hold themselves out as married are validly married (this presumption is rebuttable)*** Meszaros v Meszaros Elements of the Essential Validity of Marriage Lex Domicile Elements of validity: 1. Consummation 2. Consanguinity/Affinity 3. Prior Existing Marriage 4. Consent
11 5. Age Consummation i. Ground for annulment. ii. Rules for inability to consummate Rae v Rae : a. The impotence must exist at the time of marriage; i. Must also exist at the time of hearing C(SS) v C(GK) b. The incapacity must render intercourse impractical; c. Incapacity may stem from physical, mental or moral disability ; and i. Psychological incapacity to have sex can suffice C(SS) v C(GK) d. The impotence must be incurable. iii. If you knowingly enter a platonic relationship, you can’t request nullity for lack of intercourse . a. Norman couple married for companionship, knowingly platonic. iv. Can’t get annulment if you entered the marriage knowing about the condition . a. Aisacan v Kahnapace got married knowing he was quadriplegic before marriage. v. Need evidence/proof is unable to be consummated. a. C(SS) v C(GK) he refused to have sex with her, psychologically incapable. b. Medical evidence isn’t always necessary – evidence of impotence is required. Degrees of Consanguinity/Affinity i. Consanguinity relationship by blood; ii. Affinity relationship by marriage. iii. Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Act : a. Prohibited from marrying if lineally related as brother or sister or half-brother or half-sister including by adoption: s. 2(2) MPDA. b. Allowed: i. Marriage between uncles/nieces or aunt/nephew. ii. Related by marriage if divorced can marry the brother/sister etc. of former spouse. iii. No prohibition against marriages involving step-relations. Prior Existing Marriage i. A marriage is void if one party is already married to someone else at the time of marriage. ii. It is a crime to marry two people (bigamy s. 290 of Criminal Code ). iii. Must end marriage by divorce, nullity or death before marrying a second time. iv. There is a presumption that two people who live together/hold themselves out as married are indeed validly married but you can rebut this presumption with evidence of a prior marriage Meszaros v Meszaros a. Meszaros there was a strong presumption that her first husband was dead at time of marriage, so the second marriage was presumed valid. Consent i. As long as there is capacity to understand and no duress ( Banton ), fraud or mistake a marriage probably won’t be invalidated for incapacity. ii. Court not empowered to determine if consent given too readily/improper purpose S(A) v S(A) . a. Limited Purpose Marriages: Marriage is valid even if it was only for immigration purposes and one party deceived the other about intent. iii. Public policy requires marriages not be lightly set aside S(A) v S(A) . iv. Very low threshold for understanding a marriage contract Durham v Durham . v. If someone understands they’re signing a marriage contract, it won’t be set aside just because the marriage involved someone else taking advantage of them; some people are “willing victims.” i. Banton v Banton elderly man married young woman because he wanted one last fling; she took him for everything he was worth; marriage upheld because his mental state was no issue. ii. Duress requires establishing that the applicant’s mind was so overcome with oppression that there was absence of free choice. i. S(A) v S(A) issue of whether consent given at ceremony was real and voluntary; wife was 16 when she married and wanted annulment. iii. Note: i. Forced Marriage: When people are coerced into marriage against their will and under duress can include emotional and physical pressure. No consent. ii. Arranged Marriage: Free and informed consent. Age i. Minimum age at common law Legebokoff v Legebokoff a. Under 7 = void. b. Male 7-14 = voidable. c. Female 7-12 = voidable.
12 ii. Where both parties were underage the marriage can be validated if they continue to cohabitate after they reach the age of capacity. iii. Civil Marriage Act 16 is the minimum age (s. 2.2 CMA). iv. Marriage Act (AB) prohibits licenses being issued to those under 16 (s. 17 MA). a. Between 16-18 can issue license with consent of parent/guardian (ss. 18-19 MA). Rae v Rae Test for Annulment of Marriage i. Impotence must exist at time of marriage; ii. Incapacity must make intercourse impractical; iii. Incapacity can stem from physical or moral disability; and iv. Importence must be incurable. Aisaican v Kahnapace 1996 Sask QB i. She knew he was quadriplegic before she married him, so couldn’t get annulment for no sex. CSS v GSK 1999 ABQB i. Need proof of impotence. Formal Validity of Marriage Lex Loci Celebrationis Location of Marriage Ceremony i. There is a strong presumption of valid marriage for: a. Canadians who marry elsewhere; and b. Individuals who marry elsewhere then immigrate to Canada. Other Presumptions i. Presumption of marriage where there’s evidence of a ceremony , the parties cohabit after, and acquired reputation for being married Lozinko v Bozylak ii. Can rebut the presumption of marriage with evidence of defect in formal requirements Hassan v Hassan a. Hassan got married in Alberta but didn’t comply with AB law; defects in lex loci celebrationis rebutted presumption of marriage. iii. Evidence of cohabitation + ceremony create presumption of valid marriage Le v Le Hassan v Hassan i. A marriage ceremony that doesn’t comply with the law of the place of the ceremony ( lex loci celebrationis ) may be recognized as valid where it is : a. Impossible to conform to the local form of marriage ; or b. The parties have not submitted to local law . ii. There strong presumption for valid marriage… but defects in the formal requirements of lex loci celebrationis can rebut this presumption . iii. Their marriage was performed in Alberta under Islamic Sharia Law, but it didn’t comply with AB law ( Marriage Act ) because it was done over the phone . iv. Court held it was not legally valid the parties intended their marriage to be governed by Pakistani law . Vo v Vo, 2017 ABQB i. Need both lex loci and lex domicile for valid marriage . ii. Traditional marriage in Vietnam; never obtained marriage certificate (in Vietnam or in Canada). They held themselves out as married, she wanted divorce and division of property. iii. Issue was were they validly married? In this case, there was an elaborate marriage ceremony; but, they held themselves out to be common law partners on their tax returns.
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13 Same-Sex Marriage Layland v Ontario (Minister of Consumer & Commercial Relations), 1993 Ont Div Ct i. Application from two gay men who wanted to marry, arguing the denial of that right was discriminatory and a violation of s. 15 of the Charter . ii. Court rejects their application and says gay men can get married to women. Halpern v Canada (AG), 2002 Ont Div Ct i. Ont Div Ct declared that the exclusion of same-sex marriage contravened s. 15 and was invalid . ii. Eight same-sex couples sought order requiring the clerk of Toronto to grant them civil marriage licenses. iii. Court emphasized need to understand marriage in context of contemporary Canadian society. Halpern v Toronto (City), 2003 ONCA i. ONCA reformulated the CL definition of marriage: “The voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all others.” Re Same Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC i. Unanimous decision held that extending capacity to marry to same-sex couples is consistent with the Charter the FOR provision protects religious officials from being compelled to perform same-sex marriages contrary to their beliefs . Divorce Terms i. Separation period of time when parties no longer living together. ii. Divorce court procedure dissolving the marriage. iii. Corollary relief spousal support, child support, custody & access. Grounds for Divorce i. Breakdown of Marriage (s. 8), defined as: a. Spouses have lived separate and apart for one year: s. 8(2)(a); b. Adultery: s. 8(2)(b)(i); c. Physical or mental cruelty: s. 8(2)(b)(ii). Reconciliation i. Lawyers must ask about possibility of reconciliation unless circumstances show it’s inappropriate: s. 9(1) DA. ii. Lawyers must discuss advisability of negotiating support and custody issues: s. 9(2) DA. a. Must also sign a certificate saying both have been done: s. 9(3) DA. iii. Before considering the evidence, the court must satisfy itself that there is no possibility of reconciliation unless inappropriate: s. 10(1) DA. Jurisdiction i. Must be brought in the Superior Court of province & either spouse has been “ordi narily resident in the province for at least one year immediately preceding the commencement of the proceeding.”: s. 3(1) DA. a. “Ordinarily resident” = the arrival of a person in a new locality with the intention of making a home in that locality for an indefinite period MacPherson, Molson b. First come first served whoever applies first determines jurisdiction: s. 3(2) DA. c. Convenience and forum shopping aren’t necessarily considerations required by Act. Molson v Molson, 1998 ABQB i. Applicant became ordinarily resident in Alberta the day she arrived, because she arrived with the intention of making a home there for an indefinite period . ii. Claimant had to show evidence of when she moved , and that she intended it to be her home (and not that she shopped around to get better spousal support!). She wanted divorce in AB, he wanted a divorce in QC. Wang v Lin, 2013 ONCA i. Intention alone can’t determine ordinary residence; maintaining a home is not enough to make you ordinarily resident. We are looking to deter mine the “real” home . ii. Born and married in China, moved to Canada with kids. High conflict divorce; wife and kids went back to China to live with family and friends, she came back to Canada and filed for divorce. iii. Issue: where should the divorce be dealt with?
14 a. Court says her intention to live in Ontario is not enough she had friends, family, assets, property and more of it in China rather than Ontario. Her actual, real home was China and she couldn’t choose Ontario laws out of convenience. Same-Sex Divorces i. The Civil Marriages Act was amended to reflect the fact that couples who married in Canada but lived in a foreign jurisdiction couldn’t obtain a divorce in Canada because of the jurisdictional rules in the Divorce Act . ii. Now, under of the Civil Marriages Act : a. A court in the province where the marriage was performed can grant a divorce if (s. 7(1) CMA): i. Lived separate and apart for one year; ii. Neither spouse lives in Canada at time of application; iii. Spouses have lived for one year immediately prior to the application in a state that doesn’t recognize the marriage. b. Application must be made jointly, or on consent or with an order that the other spouse is incapable of making decisions, unreasonably withholding consent, or has disappeared: s. 7(2) CMA. Recognition of Foreign Divorces under the Divorce Act i. Foreign divorces are recognized if (s. 22 DA): a. Either spouse was ordinarily resident in the foreign country for one year immediately preceding the commencement of the proceeding for divorce; OR b. Either spouse was domiciled in the foreign country. i. Court will consider jurisdiction fraud/shopping and public policy Zhang v Lin ii. The Act also preserves CL re recognition of foreign divorces (s. 22(3) DA). Zhang v Lin , 2010 ABQB i. Court refused to recognize order under s. 22(3), for likely several reasons : a. Jurisdiction fraud ; ii. Public policy Texas treatment of CS and SS contrary to Canadian public policy . iii. Mr. Lin obtained divorce order in Texas where he no longer lived and previously only lived for 6 months. The order was favourable towards him for unequal distribution of property, no CS and no SS. iv. This case is controversial, because public policy doesn’t usually want the courts to look into motivations for seeking divorce, etc. Living Separate and Apart Living Separate and Apart i. Living separate and apart for one year is required by the Divorce Act : s. 8(2)(a) ii. Calculating the period of separation (s. 8(3)): a. There are two parts to the test: b. Lived apart; AND c. Had the intention to live separate and apart; AND i. Can be physical separation w/out finding the parties are separate & apart ( i.e. if it’s involuntary like a psychiatric institution, it doesn’t count! ) Dorchester . ii. Need evidence for the date when the parties starting living apart and date the matrimonial relationship ceased to exist Dorchester . d. Exceptions: The period they lived separate and apart will not be interrupted or terminated by: i. One spouse being incapable of forming/having an intention to live separate and apart (i.e. they would have continued living together if the spouse wasn’t incapable); or ii. Resumed cohabitation for not more than 90 days with reconciliation as the primary purpose. Factors: Living Separate and Apart i. The determination of “separate and apart” is fact -specific Dupere. a. Core elements are physical separation and withdrawal from matrimonial obligation with intent of destroying matrimonial consortium Rushton, Dupere . b. Thus, an unhappy household is not the same as a separated one Dupere . c. Doesn’t need to be a shared intention – Kansal v Bhardwaj ii. Can have physical separation in a single dwelling unit Dupere . a. For example, living in same home out of economic necessity Oswell v Oswell . iii. Consider ( Oswell v Oswell ): a. Meal pattern? b. Discussion of family problems? c. Presence/absence of joint activities? d. Performance of household tasks? e. True intention of spouses not just stated intentions (e.g. tax returns).
15 iv. Cessation of sex is not conclusive (just a factor) Dupere , Oswell v Oswell v. Generally, spouses are living separate and apart when they are ( Cooper v Cooper ): a. Occupying separate bedrooms; b. Not having sex; c. Communicating very little; d. Not providing any domestic services for each other; e. Eating meals separately; f. Not partaking in social activities together. Dorchester v Dorchester , 1971 BCSC i. There can be physical separation without a finding that the parties are living separate and apart; need evidence for the date when the parties started living apart and the date the matrimonial relationship ceased to exist . ii. If the separation is involuntary, it doesn’t count! iii. Husband took wife to psychiatric hospital; did not cohabit since (3 years). Court did not find they were separate and apart, even though they were physically separated. If it’s involuntary it doesn’t count! Rushton v Rushton , 1968 BCSC i. To be found to be living separate and apart, there m ust be a “ withdrawal from the matrimonial obligation with the intent of destroying the matrimonial consortium ” as well as a “ physical separation ” – BOTH must exist . ii. Couple were joint caretakers of a building to keep the job they had to appear to be husband and wife (to live in caretaker suite). They lived separate lives but still in the same suite found by BCSC to be living “separate and apart.” Dupere v Dupere , 1974 NBCA i. An unhappy household is different from a separated one. ii. While there can be a physical separation within a single dwelling unit, there must be both physical separation and a withdrawal by one or both spouses from the matrimonial obligation with the intent of destroying the marital consortium . iii. Not having sex isn’t conclusive, it’s just a factor! iv. Couple had three kids; after separation, they moved into separate bedrooms but lived in the same house for the sake of the kids. Court held that they were not living separate and apart their household lacked harmony, but it was a shared household. Greaves v Greaves , 2004 ONSC i. It’s possible to still have sex and interact but be separated! This was “ more like a longstanding affair” than a reconciliation. Didn’t hold themselves out as couple. ii. After 20 years of marriage, wife left and took two kids with her (because husband was abusive); later, in 1996 she would begin to visit him at the matrimonial home and have sex with him regularly while also doing housework for him and sleeping over. iii. According to court, from 1996 onwards there was no reasonable hope of reconciliation since they lived separately, wife held herself out as separated, and she refused his requests to return home. Their ongoing relationship was “more like a long - standing affair” than a marriage. Thus the date she moved out was the date of separation. Kansal v Bhardwaj , 2016 ABQB i. Intention to live separate and apart does not need to be a shared intention. ii. As long as one person has manifested the intention to live separate and apart and there has been a destruction of the consortium vitae /marriage breakdown . iii. Need both elements of the test, but can be living under the same roof . iv. Got married in 2013 in India lived together for 2 months. Wife eventually moved to Canada, husband went to Canada then returned to India. Neither articulated the marriage was over, husband filed for divorce in 2015 claiming fraudulent marriage and told wife not to call him again as of that date, when he ceased communication with her, there was clear destruction of consortium vitae. Adultery Orford v Orford , 1921 ONHC i. Adultery is the invasion of reproductive function on public policy, court held that artificial insemination without husband’s consent in considered adultery . ii. Wife sought support, husband claimed adultery (at the time a bar to alimony) because she admitted she gave birth to a child fathered by someone else; she claimed baby was conceived by artificial insemination. MacLennan v MacLennan , 1958 Scotland i. Court held that artificial insemination does not constitute adultery . ii. Would be TERRIBLE for public policy for them to hold otherwise! iii. Wife gave birth to daughter over a year after separation; she claimed artificial insemination.
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16 P(SE) v P(DD) , 2005 BCSC i. Adultery includes same-sex sexual activities . ii. Wife wanted divorce because husband admitted to having sex with a man; issue was whether same-sex activities could be adultery. Intolerable Cruelty General Principles i. Test ( S(JG) v S(WOJ) ): a. Question of fact. b. Plaintiff bears onus of proof ii. Mental cruelty must be cumulatively “grave and weighty” in nature and more than incompatibility of temperament between the spouses Knoll v Knoll , A(I) v D(S) . iii. Fact specific, and the whole of the matrimonial relations must be considered Knoll v Knoll . a. Looking at the cumulative effect of the behaviour. iv. Cruelty must be proven on a balance of probabilities A(I) v D(S) . v. The test is objective and subjective ( A(I) v D(S) ): a. First, is the conduct capable of causing physical or mental hurt? b. Second, what is the subjective effect of the conduct complained of on the affected spouse? Knoll v Knoll , 1970 ONCA i. Cruelty is serious something more than incompatibility. It is fact-specific, and requires looking at the whole of the matrimonial relations for the cumulative effect . ii. “The wife’s return to her home after a day’s work only to find her husband in an inebriated state, given to quarrelsomeness and abuse, heaping insult upon insult and indignity upon indignity, was clearly conduct amounting to mental cruelty of such kind as to render intolerable the continued cohabitation of the spouses. I cannot be convinced that our community standards require a wife to tolerate such an intolerable situation.” iii. Husband drank heavily and wife left him as a result; the old rule at the time required proof of danger to life, limb, health (bodily or mental) so as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of danger. Court changes the rule. A(I) v D(S) , 2009 ABQB 513 i. Cruelty is a question of fact and the plaintiff bears the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities that the cruelty renders continued cohabitation intolerable. Two-part objective/subjective test . ii. Needs to be “cumulatively grave and weighty ” behaviour. iii. Wife sought divorce based on mental/physical cruelty on the basis of the fact that: she and husband fought over her wearing a bikini; when she complained about pain in the ocean after getting a bikini wax, husband swam away; he called her stupid; complained that she wasn’t doing a good job of cleaning . iv. Court found his conduct wasn’t objectively cruel and found his evidence more credible (since he delivered it calmly, while she was animated, agitated and angry). Conduct Delaney v Delaney , 1971 ONCA i. Cruelty can be subtle; it exists where conduct is calculated to render intolerable the continued cohabitation of the spouses; e.g. refusing to have sex with your spouse, if it has a cruel effect on them . ii. Husband refused to have sex with wife. Wife alleged cruelty court found that the wife’s physical and ment al health was impaired by the husband’s behaviour and it amounted to cruelty (she was a nervous wreck, lost weight intolerable conditions ). Bars to Divorce Bars to Divorce 1. Collusion in the application for divorce: s. 11(1)(a) DA. a. An absolute bar to divorce. b. Manufacturing evidence to have divorce granted “conspiracy” to which applicant for divorce is a party ( Merchant ). c. Examples: i. Marriage entered into on agreement wouldn’t be consummated – Singh . ii. Marriages of convenience, w/ parties intending to divorce as soon as one party received Citizen Act benefits and one party got paid Johnson iii. Marriage for sole purpose of allowing one party to immigrate, and separation occurred on same day as the marriage Kaur 2. No reasonable arrangements made for the support of children of the marriage: s. 11(b) DA. a. Divorce can be severed from corollary issues if it is uncontested and if the other issues remain in dispute. The Court will only grant if it is satisfied it won’t prejudice the other spouse – if there are kids, it’s usually deferred until child support is determined. b. Rules from Savoia :
17 i. What is reasonable depends on the facts of each case. ii. Need evidence as to income including social assistance . iii. Need evidence as to support arrangements (objective test). 3. Condonation or connivance of adultery/cruelty unless public interest is better served by granting the divorce: s. 11(1)(c) DA. a. If you agree to resume/continue cohab. with a partner who committed a matrimonial offence (i.e. adultery) then you can’t hold that offence over their head: s. 11(c) DA. i. Discretionary bar. ii. Reconciliation up to 90 days is not condonation: s. 11(3) DA. b. Three-step test ( Watkins ): i. Knowledge of matrimonial offence; ii. Intention to forgive; iii. Restoration into marriage of guilty spouse. 4. Connivance: a. A corrupt intention i.e. the person complaining of misconduct consented or willfully contributed to its commission or promoted it. b. Berger telling your spouse you want them to cuckold you and then divorcing them when they cheat on you! Merchant v Dossani , 2007 ABQB 487 i. The courts are reluctant to get involved in “sham” marriages – marriages entered into for improper purposes or reasons other than living together (e.g. for immigration). ii. Even with extremely short marriages, the requirements under s. 8(2) of the Divorce Act must be met. iii. They are reluctant to find that improper purposes invalidate marriages. iv. There is a limited line of cases following Johnson v Smith where the courts have held that where the intention of a party or one of the parties in entering into the marriage is to facilitate immigration, then the marriage is not valid and is void an initio . v. Generally, courts are reluctant to invalidate marriages on the basis of improper purpose. a. EXCEPT: Limited line of cases where one party has deceived the other to facilitate their own immigration, that married is not valid and void ab initio . Watkins v Watkins , 1980 NFLD TD i. Three elements needed for condonation: a. knowledge of the offence, b. intention to forgive, and c. restoration of the guilty spouse into the marriage . ii. Couple reconciled after husband sought divorce on the basis of adultery. The court is basically looking at the purpose of the sex in this case was it pity sex, or were they legitimately getting back together? Berger v Berger , 1974 BCSC i. It wasn’t connivance – he didn’t have a corrupt intention, although he did actively encourage the intimacy of which he complained ! ii. Husband encouraged wife to have sex with another man in his presence; the three lived together for three years until wife left the husband for the other man (they moved out). Connivance is a corrupt intention, where the spouse is complaining about conduct to which they willfully contributed! iii. Court held that the husband, “actively encouraged the intimacy of which he now complains.” Savoia v Savoia , 2009 ABQB i. There is no set test for reasonable arrangements for child support what is reasonable must be determined based on the particular facts of each case; need evidence as to income (including social assistance) and support arrangements (objective test) . ii. Don’t require extensive evidence , just need something as simple as a tax return to show salaried income, etc. iii. Wife wanted to sever corollary relief from divorce judgment; court needed to be satisfied that “reasonable arrangements” had been made for child support . Adult Interdependent Partners The AIP model is unique to Alberta, and allows registered adult interdependent partners (AIPs) who may be of the same sex to access some of the same rights and obligations of married people (such as spousal support but not property under the MPA). Alberta’s Adult Interdependent Relationships Act i. Legislative coverage includes: a. Spousal support under the Family Law Act . b. Family violence protection under the Protection Against Family Violence Act . c. Benefits under the Income and Employment Supports Act .
18 d. Succession, including intestate under the Wills and Succession Act . ii. Does not include coverage under the Matrimonial Property Act . Framework: i. Same-sex people can be AIP. ii. Does not have to be a sexual relationship people related by adoption or by blood can enter into an AIP agreement under s. 7 per s. 3(2) AIRA. iii. AIP is established where two people (s. 3(1) AIRA): a. Live in a relationship of interdependence for not less than 3 years, or b. Live in a relationship of some permanence if there is a child of the relationship (by birth or adoption), or c. Have an AIP agreement. i. On exam, note whether or not there is a child or an agreement AND THEN ask whether it is more than 3 years. If yes, move on to AIP analysis. iv. A relationship of interdependence exists between two people who (s. 1(1)(f) AIRA): d. Share each others’ lives; e. Are emotionally committed to each other; and f. Function as an economic and domestic unit. v. AIP ends where (s. 10 AIRA): g. Written agreement provides it; h. The parties live separate and apart for one year; or i. Marriage to each other or someone else. AIP Act Relationship of Interdependence Factors All factors as listed in s. 1(2) AIRA: a) Conjugal relationship; b) Degree of exclusivity of relationship; c) Conduct and habits re household activities and living arrangements; a. Shared residence not mandatory Wright-Watts . d) Degree to which they hold themselves out as an economic domestic unit; e) Degree to which they formalize their legal obligations to each other; f) Contributions toward mutual well-being; g) Degree of financial interdependence; a. Financial interdependence is not mandatory to establish a CL relationship Medora v Kohn h) Care and support of children; i) Ownership, acquisition and use of property. a. These factors must be regarded holistically Medora v Kohn . Spracklin Framework Common Law Relationship Factors From Spracklin v Kichton, in Medora v Kohn: i. Shelter: Do they live under the same roof? Sleeping arrangements? Anyone else live there? ii. Sexual and personal behaviour: Sex; fidelity; feelings toward each other; communication; meals together; response during illness; gifts for special occasions. iii. Conduct and habit: Preparation of meals; washing and mending clothes; shopping; household maintenance; domestic services. iv. Social: Together at social events? Conduct with families? v. Societal: Attitude and conduct toward them as a couple. vi. Economic support: Financial arrangements re necessaries of life; acquisition and ownership of property; special financial arrangements? vii. Children: Attitude and conduct regarding kids. a. More likely to find AIP relationship if there are kids, but not always the case. b. The Sprackin factors are not mandatory, but are useful for considering whether the relationship is AIP. Important not to stereotype what a relationship does/doesn’t look like. c. Highly discretionary sometimes finding AIP comes down to how much need there is. Medora v Kohn , 2003 ABQB i. Look to Spracklin framework; financial interdependence is not required to find AIP interdependent relationship for support claim!!! ii. No kids, lived together 9 years. Issue was whether Ms. M was entitled to spousal as AIP. Factors examined under Spracklin framework: a. Separate bank accounts, credit cards, vehicles. b. Filed tax returns as singles. c. Held separate insurance policies. d. He helped pay for school (though she had loans in her name). e. Apartment was in his name alone. f. No co-mingling of assets/debts unclear whether intention or out of habit. g. No kids.
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19 h. No AIP agreement. iii. Court held that they were partners in an interdependent relationship although there was no financial interweaving, Ms. M and Mr. K were involved in a “long -term, exclusive, conjugal relationship. They held themselves out to the community as a couple [and] made contributions to each other’s’ well -being . They divided household chores and jointly cared for the home in which they lived.” iv. He claimed that she didn’t perform domestic services and would suffer no economic consequences from the breakup; she was going to be a lawyer! He claimed no AIP because she was self sufficient . Court rejects his emphasis on financial interdependence. Wright-Watts v Watts , 2005 ABQB i. AIP Act does not apply to relationships which started and ended before the Act came into force . ii. This case is also an example of a relationship where AIP was not found particularly because: a. No interconnected finances, no joint bank accounts or credit cards, friends didn’t recognize them as domestic unit, no split of household chores. iii. No children; she wanted divorce, division of property, spousal support and costs. She also wanted a constructive trust from their pre-marital relationship (dating 1992-1996 dom, dos 2000). Never lived together until after the wedding she claims CL, he says they were just dating. iv. Threshold issue of whether CL relationship existed before wedding then court can consider unjust enrichment analysis. Court found that they didn’t reach CL status; he didn’t sleep over much, brought few possessions over; he had to be home to care for his own farm. Few domestic services provided, no division everything was more consistent with dating than with common law. The Matrimonial Home An order for exclusive possession can be made under any of the following: i. PAFVA where there is a threat of family violence. ii. MPA where the partners are married/divorcing. iii. FLA everyone else. Definition of Matrimonial Home The definitions under the MPA and FLA are essentially the same: Matrimonial Property Act i. s. 1(c): “matrimonial home” means property a. (i) that is owned or leased by one or both spouses, b. (ii) that is or has been occupied by the spouses as their family home, and c. (iii) that is i. (A) a house, or part of a house, that is a self-contained dwelling unit, ii. (B) part of a business premises used as living accommodation, iii. (C) a mobile home, iv. (D) a residential unit as defined in the Condominium Property Act , or v. (E) a suite. Family Law Act i. s. 67 : “family home” means property a. that is owned or leased by one or both spouses or AIPs, b. that is or has been occupied by the spouses or AIPs as their home, and c. that is i. a house, or part of a house, that is a self-contained dwelling unit, ii. part of business premises used as living accommodation, iii. a mobile home, iv. a residential unit as defined in the Condominium Property Act , or v. a suite. Exclusive Possession Orders Under the MPA Exclusive Possession Orders Under the MPA: Process 1. Threshold Questions: a. Court can only make the order if (s. 5(1) MPA):
20 i. Divorce has been granted/declaration of nullity has been made; ii. Spouses have declaration of irreconcilability under FLA ; iii. The spouses have been living separate and apart for a year. iv. … see s. 5(1) for other grounds. b. Is it the matrimonial home? i. Apply s. 1(c) definition. 2. In deciding whether to grant an exclusive possession order, the court must consider (s. 20): a. The availability of other accommodation within the means of both spouses. i. Can one spouse find alternative accommodation easier than the other? S(TJ), Tawiah b. The needs of any children living in the MH. IMPORTANT, heavy weight. i. Who is actually taking care of the kids/who has custody ( is order still valid )? Boutin 1. Strong factor whoever has primary care will usually remain in the home with the kids. ii. Who is the traditional caregiver? Kids can remain in home and traditional caregiver took possession S(TJ) c. What is the financial position of each spouse? i. Does one spouse’s income depend on using the home? – Tawiah ii. Court doesn’t care about new financial responsibility for new girlfriend’s kids – Boutin iii. Will losing access to the house freeze the income of one of the spouses (e.g. because they operate a business out of it?) Tawiah d. Any order made by the court with respect to the property or support/maintenance of one or both of the spouses. i. Has the property already been divided, or spousal/CS been settled? S(TJ) ii. Are the grounds on which the previous order was made still valid? Boutin e. Note: The court is not looking at conduct (it is not a ground under s. 20), the court is solely focused on financial stability and making sure children are taken care of. i. Don’t care about allegations: Doesn’t matter if one spouse is a bad housekeeper or might have substance abuse issues S(TJ) 3. Remedies: a. The court can order (s. 19(1) MPA): i. That a spouse be given exclusive possession of the MH; ii. That a spouse be evicted from the MH; 1. Boutin 30 days for ex, his girlfriend, her kids and adult child to leave. iii. That a spouse be restrained from entering/attending at or near the MH. b. The order can include possession of surrounding MH as is necessary for use/enjoyment of the MH (s. 19(2) MPA). c. Can add conditions and time limits (s. 19(3) MPA). i. Boutin ex had to leave the building supplies for the renovation he never finished d. Can make an order for exclusive use of household goods (s. 25(1) MPA). 4. Other Considerations: a. One spouse may owe occupation rent, unpaid property taxes, etc. (e.g. Boutin she bought him out of his interest, but he still owed her for the time he spent in the MH living rent-free). Exclusive Possession Orders Under the FLA i. A court making a child/spousal/AIP support order may also order that a spouse/AIP (s. 68 FLA): a. Have exclusive possession of the family home; b. Be evicted from the family home; or c. Be restrained from entering the family home. ii. In exercising this power, the court must consider (s. 69 FLA): a. The availability of other accommodation within the means of both spouses/AIPs; b. The needs of any kids living in the family home; c. The financial position of each spouse/AIP; d. Any order made by the court re property/support/maintenance; e. Any restrictions/conditions of the lease. Same language under s. 69 of FLA for spouses and AIP, but adds consideration of: (e) any restrictions or conditions of any lease involving the family home, if applicable. Boutin v Viau , 2007 ABQB i. The court will pay special attention to the needs of COM and who can more easily find other accommodation; ii. T he court does NOT care about your new girlfriend’s kids (i.e. “obligations willingly assumed”) . iii. Cheryl and Norman were married 20 years, divorced. Had three kids together. Court granted Norman EP of MH and primary residence of 3 kids; in 2006, two out of three kids lived with Cheryl while Norman lived with his gf, her two kids, and he and Cheryl’s adult child in the MH. iv. Norman didn’t pay CS, SS, or occupation rent for those 2 years, and was an undischarged bankrupt. v. Section 20 analysis:
21 a. Norman presented no evidence of unavailability of alternative accommodation. in her favour b. Only COM lived with Cheryl. in her favour c. He earned 2x more than she did. in her favour d. Previous order was based on him having responsibility of the children. he no longer did; in her favour i. As a result court granted possession to Cheryl w/ 30 days notice for everyone else to get out. Order included building su pplies (for reno he never finished) and appliances (except children’s furniture). ii. Cheryl could purchase his interest in the MH w/ adjustments for occupation rent, child support, and unpaid property taxes otherwise she would have to pay occupation rent. S(TJ) v S(LM) , 2005 ABQB i. What housing arrangement will preserve the status quo for the kids? If there is an existing order, was it based on substantiated allegations ? ii. Two COM; husband granted ex parte order for exclusive possession of MH and had primary residence of the children. Wife applied for exclusive possession and primary residence. iii. He wanted his ex parte MH to be maintained, on the basis of his claims that she couldn’t maintain a healthy lifestyle/household; she lost her job and had problems w/ drugs and alcohol . She said she wasn’t aware of the ex parte order and that she immediately commenced the action; she claimed to be the traditional caregiver . iv. Section 20 analysis: a. He could afford to find alternative accommodation; she was living with friends and having financial difficulties. in her favour b. Two COM, to whom she was the traditional caregiver. in her favour, strong c. He had steady employment plus financial assistance from family; she was employed as a nurse’s aid with no evidence she co uldn’t hold a job. she was in precarious financial situation after EPO kicked her out of her home; she had no body to rely on in her favour d. Previous order was ex parte and based on allegations (e.g. pictures of messy house) that she rebutted with 3 rd p arty info; no evidence of children’s safety being jeopardized. e. She also hadn’t received any property or support yet. v. Held: Court granted her exclusive possession. Tawiah v Tawiah , 2002 ABQB i. Mary and John 4 kids, all independent. 22 year marriage; MH wa s in John’s name and Mary wanted exclusive possession because she ran a catering business out of it. ii. Section 20 analysis: a. He earned significantly more than she earned and could find other accommodation; she could not afford to move. in her favour b. He wanted to sell the home; she needed it for his business. in her favour, she could buy him out of his interest c. She couldn’t find other accommodation within her budget that she could operate her business out of. – in her favour d. The business was her only income. in her favour, high importance to her. iii. Held: Exclusive possession granted to Mary. Household Goods under the MPA/FLA Exclusive Use of Household Goods under MPA i. On application by a spouse, the court can make an order directing that a spouse be given the exclusive use and enjoyment of any or all of the household goods (s. 25(1) MPA). a. An order under subsection (1) may be made subject to any conditions and for any time that the court considers necessary (s. 25(2) MPA). b. An order made under this section may be varied by the court on application by a spouse (s. 25(3) MPA). c. Same language in the Family Law Act s. 73(1) FLA re spouses and AIP when the court is making a child or spousal support order minus the ability to vary the order . ii. “Household goods” means personal property ( s. 67(2) MPA): a. (i) that is owned by one or both spouses, and b. (ii) that was ordinarily used or enjoyed by one or both spouses or one or more of the children residing in the matrimonial home, for transportation, household, educational, recreational, social or esthetic purposes. a. Same language in s. 67(2) FLA for “household goods.” Property: Unmarried Partners Generally:
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22 s. 92 of the Constitution Act gives provinces exclusive authority to enact legislation about property and civil rights within a province. All provinces allow married and CL partners to contract out of statutory rights and obligations concerning property (to an extent). After Laskin J’ s dissent in Murdoch v Murdoch , a wave of reforms for property regimes: o Per the SCC in Nova Scotia v Walsh , it is not discriminatory for the Matrimonial Property Act to treat married couples differently from unmarried couples. Charter Challenges to Treatment of CL Partners: Miron v Trudel , 1955, SCC: o SCC held that excluding long- term unmarried cohabitants (i.e. CL/AIP) from “spouse” from insurance benefits was contra ry to s. 15 of the Charter . Taylor v Rossu , 1998 ABCA o AB recognized CL relationships, citing Miron and ruling it was against s. 15 to exclude them from the definition of spouse. o Legislature responded by enacting AIP legislation. Walsh v Bona , 2002 SCC: o SCC held it was not discriminatory for NS legislation to treat CL partners differently from married ones (re marital property in particular) because they chose to avoid the property consequences of marriage and shouldn’t have them imposed on them as a result. o Emphasis on “freedom of choice” – dissent argued that these choices might not always be so free (e.g. rich CL spouses pressuring other spouse not to get married). Eric v Lola , 2009 QCCS rev’d in part 2013 SCC o Not unconstitutional to deny the property rights afforded to married spouses from being access by CL spouses. Murdoch v Murdoch Beginning of the “constructive trust” for matrimonial property claim s for unmarried spouses who are seeking a piece of real property to which they have contributed. The Murdochs worked on a ranch together as a “hired couple” – husband later bought a ranch under his name alone with the money the couple earned , and the wife ran the guest ranch herself plus was in charge of upkeep. The business helped them buy another valuable ranch in the husband’s name alone . The wife contributed to the venture in a number of ways. After separating, Ms. M claimed an interest in the ranch . SCC (majority) said: a. Rejected resulting trust as a possible remedy ( old remedy ) because Ms. M had established no proof of financial contribution to the ranch. b. Held that doing ranch work “any ranch wife” would do was not a substantial contribu tion to the acquisition of the ranch. c. Her work was due to being married to Mr. M, not because she expected to gain an interest. Laskin (dissenting) said: a. Ms. M made significant physical contributions and minor financial contributions. b. He advocated for the use of the constructive trust , instead because resulting trust requires contributing purchase money, and attribution of intention to share in interest is “artificial.” Rathwell v Rathwell, 1978 SCC CURRENT TEST FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT: a. An enrichment; b. A corresponding deprivation; c. The absence of any juristic reason . This is the test that applied to CL spouses claiming a constructive trust! Pettkus v Becker, 1980 SCC Constructive trusts extended to CL partners as an available remedy. No presumption of equal shares - Rosa Becker and Lothar Pettkus lived together for 19 years; he put his wages into an account, she used her wages for food and living expenses . She wanted to marry, he didn’t but he introduced her to people as his wife. They later bought a farm with his money and started a bee-keeping business together. At the end of the relationship, there were three properties in his name worth $300k; she made a claim for a ¼ interest in the business and land . TC gave her $1500 and 40 beehives. ONCA allowed appeal, gave her ¼ interest in all property acquired during the relationship. SCC held:
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23 a. Applied the Unjust Enrichment test and found that he received the benefit of 19 years’ unpaid labour which he freely accepted , thus first two elements were satisfied. b. For the third element “Where one person in a relationship tantamount to spousal prejudices herself in the reasonable expectations fo receiving an interest in property and the other person in the relationship freely accepts benefits conferred by the person in circumstances where he knows or ought to known of that reasonable expectation, it would be unjust to allow the recipient of the benefit to retain it. Sorochan v Sorochan , 1986 SCC Constructive trusts should not be limited to the acquisition of property housework and childcare, for example, have a sufficient nexus to the property . Contributions related to the preservation, maintenance, or improvement of property are enough to establish a constructive trust . RECOGNITION THAT DOMESTIC CONTRIBUTIONS COUNT. New Unjust Enrichment Test for Constructive Trusts : a. Enrichment? b. Corresponding Deprivation? c. Reasonable expectation of receiving something in return? (went back to “no juristic reason” in Peter v Beblow ). Mary and Mr. S lived together for 42 years; she used his name, they worked on farm together with her having sole responsibility for the farm for months at a time while he was away working. At the end of the relationship, all of the assets remained in his name. TC awarded 1/3 beneficial interest in the land, ABCA rev’d the TC decision on the basis that Mary’s contribution to the property was not “specific” enough and because contributing childcare and h ousework did not mean she contributed to the acquisition of the real estate. They noted that the real estate she was claiming interest in was not acquired during relationship no help acquiring. She did, however, contribute to its maintenance and preservation. SCC Held: a. Restored TC decision all 3 steps of unjust enrichment test are satisfied; they awarded her a beneficial interest in the property on the basis that her work was of a sufficient nexus to the property. That satisfied step 3 of the test. b. Instead of “no juristic reason,” STEP 3 NOW REQUIRES THERE BE AN EXPECTATION OF RECEIVING SOMETHING IN RETURN or of RECEIVING SOME BENEFIT IN RETURN. Peter v Beblow , 1993 SCC Confirmation that domestic contributions can underpin a successful claim for UE/CT and they can be sufficiently linked to a home to justify a proprietary remedy. Monetary awards are preferable , and a constructive trust should only be imposed on property where: a. A monetary remedy would be insufficient, and b. There is a direct link between the plaintiff’s contributions and the property. Value received approach (“dollar amount” work is worth) is the wrong approach. Must instead use the “value survived” approach (calculating how much actually accrued during the relationship). Woman was providing paid childcare to man (his kids from prior relationship) but when she moved in, he stopped paying her. He owned the house the family lived in for 12 years. She cared for both her and his children during the relationship that looked like a marriage. After separation, she stayed in home and he moved onto houseboat. BC TJ gave her entire beneficial interest but he owned the house before she moved into it. Mistakenly calculated on “value received approach,” lat er. Appeal to SCC. SCC Held: a. Peter enriched Beblow by providing “housekeeping and childcare services,” by doing them without compensation, and suffered a corresponding deprivation. There was no juristic reason or obligation she didn’t do the work as a gift or pursuant to a legal/contractual obligation. b. Monetary remedies are preferable constructive trust tied to property should only be imposed where: i. Monetary remedy would be insufficient; or ii. There was a direct link between the plaintiff’s contributions a nd the property. c. Must used “value survived” approach – Kerr v Baranow , 2011 SCC Modern approach to UE for CL partners. De- links requirement for a “direct” contribution to a specific asset and confirmation that a monetary remedy is the preferred remedy (as opposed to beneficial interest that could not be easily turned into money). Test for Unjust Enrichment: a. Was the defendant enriched by the plaintiff? i. Must show something was given, which the defendant received & retained.
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24 ii. Must be a tangible benefit but can even include sparing someone an expense they would have had to undertake. b. Did the plaintiff suffer a corresponding deprivation? i. Must correspond to the deprivation suffered by the plaintiff. c. Was there an absence of juristic reason? i. Apply the established categories: 1. Gift, contract, disposition of law, other CL, equitable or statutory obligations. ii. Defendant must show why the enrichment must be retained: 1. Consideration of the reasonable expectations of the parties (gift?) and individual autonomy whether the parties’ expectations show that the retention is just. 2. Moral and public policy arguments re whether enrichments are un/just. Three bases for unjust enrichment claims: provision of unpaid services , unrecognized contributions to the acquisition/improvement/maintenance/preservation of specific property , or JOINT FAMILY VENTURE. Test for Joint Family Venture: a. Mutual effort; i. Worked collaboratively for goals; pooling effort; child; length of relationship. b. Economic integration; i. Extensive integration, economic interest, economic well-being strong indicators of JFV; prioritizing the welfare of the family. c. Actual intent; i. Why didn’t they marry? Express or inferred – conduct (held themselves out as married?) title to property estate planning can indicate they intend to hold property independently? d. Priority of the family. i. Detrimental reliance on the relationship for the sake of the family; financial sacrifices for welfare of family whether one party made sacrifices for the other/for the family (left the workforce, relocated, gave up advances, education). REMEDIES: a. Money should be considered first: i. Must demonstrate: 1. JFV; 2. Link between contributions and accumulation of assets/wealth. ii. Both value received and value survived are permissible . But, don’t treat person as an employee treat it as a co-venture. iii. Need to look at what both parties have contributed , not just what the female spouse has contributed. b. Property (i.e. constructive trust): i. Only appropriate where the plaintiff can demonstrate a substantial and direct link or causal connection between their contributions and the acquisition, preservation, maintenance and improvement. ii. Rules: 1. Interest proportionate to contribution. 2. Proprietary relationship required; indirect contributions of money/ direct contributions of labour are ok. 3. Monetary remedy must be insufficient. Kerr and Baranow (man) cohabited for 26 years he owned a house in Vancouver with a small mortgage, had modest savings and an RRSP. Both worked outside the home, he earned twice as much as she did. They shared household expenses she has a stroke and is no longer able to work (she did housework and received disability). He retired, eventually suffered caretaker fatigue and she was moved into an extended care facility. Their home increased in value from $250k to $942k. Heard together with Vanasse v Seguin , who lived together for 12 years and had two children together. They owned a house as joint tenants, and during the relationship his net worth increased from $94k to $8.5M hers increased from $40k to $322k (half of the house they owned as joint tenants, and an RRSP). They moved to Halifax for him ( important factor when one spouse moves/gives something up for the other spouse ) and then the moved back to Ottawa. Spousal Support: Entitlement Key Elements i. Eligibility a. AIP? FLA b. Married? FLA or MPA
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25 ii. Entitlement ( Bracklow ) a. Compensatory b. Non-compensatory c. Contractual iii. Quantum iv. Duration Framework: 1. Begin with the objectives of support under s. 15.2(6) ( Moge ). 2. Then, consider 15.2(4) factors condition, means needs and other circumstances. a. What is the spouse’s actual ability to fend for themselves, and the effort that has been made to do so – including after the relationship breakdown? b. Support obligations arise from the relationship between the parties and the expectations that may reasonably flow from it: Bracklow 3. Must consider all three bases of support. a. If economic loss can be determined, then compensatory . b. If based on means and needs, then non-compensatory . i. Since Moge , courts have been awarding support to sick or disabled spouses (sometimes to help them transition to self- sufficiency): Bracklow Medora v Kohn , 2003 ABQB i. The Divorce Act analysis applies to AIP couples when determining whether spousal support should be granted . ii. With quantum and duration, whether or not they have kids (and whether someone is at home taking care of the kids) is a huge piece of the puzzle. iii. Lived together 1993-2002, no kids. Issue of whether she was entitled to spousal as AIP. iv. Maintained separate bank accounts, credit cards, vehicles, filed their tax returns as singles, and held separate insurance policies. He helped pay for school (but she had loans in her own name); apartment was in his name alone, no co-mingling of assets or debts. Spousal Support Under the Divorce Act Court Powers Under the Federal Divorce Act i. Order a spouse to secure and/or pay a lump sum or periodic support as the court thinks is reasonable for the support of the other spouse: s. 15.2(1) DA. ii. Make an interim order pending determination of the above application: s. 15.2(2) DA. iii. Make an order for a definite or an indefinite period, or until a specified event occurs: s. 15.2(3) DA. iv. Can impose terms, conditions or restrictions: s. 15.2(3) DA. Factors for Determining Support under the Divorce Act i. The court must consider the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including (s. 15.2(4)): a. Length of time cohabited; b. Functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and c. Any order, agreement or arrangement relating to the support. ii. SS does not guarantee the same standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, but the longer the relationship, the closer the economic union and therefore the greater the presumptive claim to equal standards of living upon dissolution Moge iii. Must be aware of the social reality of the economic impact of divorce on women Moge iv. The court must not consider the misconduct of a spouse in relation to the marriage : s. 15.2(5); Leskun Objectives of Spousal Support under the Divorce Act i. An order should (s. 15.2(6)): a. Recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; b. Apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage; i. Medora kids are highly influential in determining means, needs c. Relieve economic hardship arising from the breakdown of the relationship; d. Promote economic self-sufficiency within a reasonable period of time. Variation under the Divorce Act i. The court can vary, rescind, or suspend prospectively or retroactively a support order (s. 17(1)(a) DA). ii. To vary an order, there must be a change in the conditions, means, needs or other circumstances of either former spouse since the last order/variation (s. 17(4.1) DA). a. Has to be a material change i.e. an actual change of status that would have made the order different at the time it was originally decided. iii. Once again, can’t consider conduct ( s. 17(6) DA). iv. Per s. 17(7) DA, exact same considerations for varying an order as considered under s. 15.2(6) DA objectives.
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26 Resuming Support After Expiration i. Per s. 17(1) , if the order provides support for a definite period/until an event occurs, after that event/period the court can’t resume s upport unless it is necessary to relieve economic hardship arising from a change in the means, needs and other circumstances ***AND*** the changed circumstances would have resulted in a different order if they had existed at the time of the original order or last variation. Compensatory Support i. Compensation for contributions to the marriage and for losses sustained as a consequence of marriage ( Moge ). ii. Can be varied by contract ( Bracklow ). Factors for Entitlement to Compensatory Support i. Losses directly related to care of children e.g. loss of seniority, missed promotions, lack of access to fringe benefits and pensions Moge ii. Lowered value of job training and education from being outside of workforce Moge iii. Birth of children causing cutback from work Moge iv. Continuation of childcare responsibilities after childbirth Moge v. One spouse staying home Moge vi. Sacrifice of declining a promotion/transfer or leaving a position to allow the other spouse to take advantage of an opportunity Moge vii. Taking on responsibilities so other can earn degree/training Moge viii. Contribution to the operation of a business Moge Non-Compensatory Support i. Based on needs and means i.e. need and ability to pay. Based on social obligation model ( Bracklow ). ii. Can be varied by contract ( Bracklow ). Contractual Support i. Spousal agreements influence rights and obligations during the marriage and upon breakdown; courts will take into account both express and implied agreements ( Bracklow ). Quantum of Support i. Same factors as entitlement help determine quantum. ii. Must establish entitlement first, then make necessary adjustments through quantum. iii. Quantum varies with the circumstances ( Bracklow ). a. Need and length of marriage are factors but Court has overriding discretion ( Bracklow ). b. There are no “magical cut - off dates.” ( Bracklow ). Spousal Support Under the Family Law Act Support Obligations under the Family Law Act i. Every spouse or AIP has an obligation to provide support for their former spouse/AIP: s. 56 FLA ii. The court can make an order for spouses/AIP under the FLA where (s. 57 FLA): a. Spouses have obtained a declaration of irreconcilability under s. 83 FLA; b. Spouses are living separate and apart; or c. Not living separate and apart but are experiencing discord and can’t be expected to live together, or one spouse has refused to provide the necessaries of life to the other. Factors for Determining Support under the Family Law Act i. The court must consider the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse/AIP, including (s. 58 FLA): a. Length of time cohabited; b. Functions performed during cohabitation; c. Any order, agreement or arrangement relating to the support; d. Legal obligation to support anyone else; e. Extent to which payor’s ability to pay is increased by someone else contributing to their household expenses; f. Extent to which recipient’s ability to pay is reduced by someone else contributing to their household expenses. ii. The court must not take into account misconduct, except where it arbitrarily or unreasonably precipitates, prolongs or aggravates the need for support or affects the ability to pay (s. 59). Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines Overview i. The SSAGs provide ranges (amount and duration) according to the basis for SS entitlement. ii. However, they ( Fisher ): a. Are not legislated or binding, only advisory ( Lust, Sawatzky ). b. Don’t apply in every case. c. Encourage settlement ( Sawatzky ).
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27 d. If they conflict with case law, case law will prevail. iii. Two formulas: a. With child support formula; and b. Without child support formula. iv. Spousal support is awarded based on: a. Percentage of income; b. Income sharing, not budgets; c. Duration of cohabitation/marriage, number of children, and other factors. v. The SSAGs leave room for negotiation/discretion based on: a. Strength of recipient’s compensatory claim; b. Recipient’s needs; c. Age; d. Number, needs and standard of living of any children; e. Needs and ability to pay of the payor; f. Work incentives for the payor; g. Property division and debts; h. Self-sufficiency incentives. Determining the Support Amount Within the SSAG Range i. Look at basis of entitlement: a. Compensatory amount will be higher and duration will be longer. b. Non-compensatory amount will be lower and the duration will be shorter. ii. Exceptions: a. Compelling financial circumstances in the interim period; b. Debt payment; c. Prior support obligations; d. Illness and disability of recipient spouse; e. Compensatory exception in short marriages without children; f. Reapportionment of property; g. Basic needs/hardship (without CS and custodial payor formulas); h. Non-taxable payor income; i. Custodial payor formula; j. Special needs of a child. Note tax implications: SS is tax deductible by the payor, and taxable in the hands of the payee. Pelech Trilogy , 1987 SCC i. APPLIES TO SEPARATION AGREEMENTS . There must be a causal connection between the changed circumstance and the marriage; separation agreements should be given considerable deference; SS should not continue indefinitely . Moge v Moge , 1992 SCC i. Compensatory model of support . Spousal support is meant to deal with the economic consequences of marriage/its breakdown, and requires consideration of advantages/disadvantages as a result of roles in the marriage. All four objectives of the Act must be considered no single one is paramount . ii. Moved from Poland together in 1960, had three kids wife had grade 7 education and was primary caregiver, worked as a cleaner while kids were in school. Separated in 1973. iii. Husband argued that support should be terminated based on Pelech trilogy (self-sufficiency, causal connection) because she should have been self-sufficient by now. Bracklow v Bracklow , 1999 SCC i. There are three bases as entitlement for support: a. Compensatory; b. Non-compensatory; c. Contractual. Leskun v Leskun , 2006 SCC i. Spousal misconduct is not a relevant factor. However, the emotional consequences of misconduct (e.g. depression making spouse unable to work) are relevant to determining need . ii. Wife provided Husband with support while he went to school to earn MBA; that allowed him to earn a good income later. She was laid off and suffered a back injury and psychological distress that kept her from working. Her illness was exacerbated when she found out about his affair.
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28 Shields v Shields , 2008 ABCA i. 15 year marriage, she had few skills re paid work force same at beginning and end of marriage. Husband prospered and had high income. ii. Court held that: “a spousal support order ought to provide the mother with a realistic time frame to return to the workforce and acquire adequate income to achieve self-sufficiency .” Knight v Wowk , 2015 ABPC i. Good example of the analysis for an AIP couple where there was no compensatory basis and both parties are technically self-sufficient . ii. Lived together 8-10 years, never married. Had to establish AIP status before she could claim spousal support under the Family Law Act . iii. Issue of whether they were an “economic and domestic unit”: a. The conjugal and exclusive nature of their relationship was assumed based on their living arrangements. b. Conduct and habits re household activities and holding themselves out as a domestic unit: i. Spent time together with friends; ii. She looked after house, garden, cooking; he did heavier outdoor work; iii. She moved into his place, he paid rent while she paid expenses; both bought groceries; iv. Did not discuss finances or have joint account; v. He paid when they ate out or went on vacation; she paid for one holiday; vi. Held themselves out as an economic and domestic unit. vii. No formalized legal obligations to each other; viii. Made direct and indirect contributions to each others’ well being; ix. She was dependent on him for her lifestyle (she made $29k, he made $200k); x. No joint property, she claimed no interest in the house; c. It is not true that AIP can be rebutted by fact that parties didn’t share finances. Court held that they lived in a relationship of interdependence, and functioned as an economic and domestic unit, and so AIP WAS ESTABLISHED. d. Was she entitled to spousal? i. Look at purposes: 1. Provide compensation when a relationship has increased the earning power of one spouse at the expense of the other ( COMPENSATORY ); 2. Relieve the financial need a spouse experiences when a relationship ends ( NON- COMPENSATORY ). ii. Here, contractual and compensatory were irrelevant so must look at non-compensatory model of support: 1. Consider s. 58 (factors) and s. 60 (objectives) of the Family Law Act . iii. Under s. 58 factors: 1. Conditions, means, needs and other circumstances: a. Lived together 8-10 years (average 9). b. No order or other arrangements between them. c. She was working as a housekeeper in an oil patch ($60k, $8k was RRSP income) and during relationship average income was lower; took job out of need. 2. He had no other support obligations and lived alone. 3. She lived with her sister and adult children and did not pay room and board (income of $700 imputed to her per child). 4. He received no economic advantages from the relationship (he paid for most things); her economic circumstances have improved with her new job, but not the standard she enjoyed with him. iv. Under s. 60 objectives: 1. No economic advantages to him from relationship; he paid for most things. 2. She received significant benefit during relationship; he provided her with a good lifestyle. 3. No children together. 4. Both parties self-sufficient. a. Note that the fact that she is self-sufficient does not disentitle her to spousal support. v. An award of SS under FLA satisfies the objectives of the act by recognizing the economic disadvantages and relieving economic hardship arising from the breakdown of the relationship. vi. She was entitled to NC Support. Spousal Support: Application
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29 Anand v Anand , 2016 ABCA 23 paras 28-64 Spousal Support Order: TJ: $2600 for 2006; $1,800 for 2007; $1,050 for 2008. ONCA: Key Factors: NO EFFECT ON HER EDUCATION OR EARNING POTENTIAL; ALL NON-COMPENSATORY. Facts: Married in 1985, when she was 22 and he was 23. Separated in 2004, when she was 41 and he was 42. She did clerical work while he earned his BA; they moved cities so he could get his B.Ed. She looked for new work and continued to contribute to expenses. He taught HS for 11 years and earned $65k; later earned $81k per year eventually up to $140k in 2006. Ms. Anand argued that the TJ failed to apply the SSAGs. ONCA HELD: Set aside the SS order and instead made new order of $3,000 monthly for four years (until 2008), then $1,500 until September 1, 2011 (end date). TJ did not err by basing his decision on speculation about her future i ncome (she said she “hoped” she would earn $35k/year soon), because he included subsequent review in the support order. TJ erred by speculating about her future relationships. It influenced his time-limited SS order. APPLYING THE DIVORCE ACT: Must consider the mandatory factors under 15.2(4) DA and objectives under s. 15.2(6) DA. Factors: o s. 15.2(4)(a) Length of cohabitation: Lengthy marriages (+15 years) can lead to indefinite support orders, where appropriate because the dependent spouse has a hard time becoming self-sufficient. In this case, relative youth and employment position weigh against indefinite order. o s. 15.2(4)(b) Functions performed during cohabitation: Even chores; some non-economic responsibilities for her; assumption of household resp onsibilities didn’t affect her career goals. Neutral factor. o s. 15.2(4) Other circumstances: “First family first” principle applies. But, obligations to new family may decrease payor’s ability to pay for the first family. Needs contextual consideration. He voluntarily assumed responsibility for second family when he knew or ought to have known about his responsibility to his first family . New family receives CS from kids’ bio dad. No evidence his SS obligations would impoverish second family. Second family can’t be relied upon to reduce his SS obligation. Objectives: o s. 15.2(6)(a) Economic disadvantages/advantages from marriage/breakdown: THIS IS COMPENSATORY SUPPORT! ( Moge ). In this case, parties formed a relationship of interdependence and the husband depended on her assistance to complete his education. This allowed him to benefit: started career at young age , advanced his career during the marriage and after its breakdown . Clear economic advantage to him. SHE WAS ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED by the breakdown, but not by the marriage itself . So, she lost her usual standard of living and lost out in the future she expected to share with him. Disadvantages were more pronounced for her. o s. 15.2(6)(c) Economic hardship: She didn’t experience economic hardship, strictly, because she could provide for her basic needs on her $30k income. She did, however, suffer economic hardship in the reduction of her standard of living. Can analyze under the objective of self-sufficiency. o s. 15.2(6)(d) Self-sufficiency: ONLY NEED TO PROMOTE SELF- SUFFICIENCY WHERE IT IS “PRACTICABLE” TO DO SO. And where the objective can be realized in a “reasonable period of time.” Ability to support a reasonable standard of living. Assessed relative to the SOL at marriage; requires considering present and potential incomes, SOL during marriage (often impossible to guarantee SOL during marriage, though Moge ), efficacy of steps to increase means, likely post- separation circumstances. More attainable in: short-term marriages, particularly ones without children, where lower- income spouse has not been entrenched in specific lifestyle. Won’t give priority to self- sufficiency in long-term marriages. Summary of objectives: She suffered no established economic disadvantage arising from the marriage through assumption of child care responsibilities or compromising her career. No comparison to long-term marriage disadvantage. Primary claim is non-compensatory , based in inability to attain self-sufficiency in light of the original marital standard of living.
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30 Park v Slevinsky , 2010 ABQB 762 pars 37-50 Spousal Support Order: Partner support for one year, $800/month under FLA. Key Factors: Minimal impact on career even though he was out of workforce for 5 years primarily non-compensatory in nature. Facts: Young when they began their relationship; neither had established track record of employment. Similar work history after end of relationship. Entitlement: o Applying s. 58 factors of FLA: Parties lived together for a long time; compared with SSAG guidelines this qualifies as a “lengthy” marriage. Four kids. He did some parenting as stay-at-home-dad , and there is a career cost to staying home to raise kids. Didn’t take any household goods when he left the relationship. He needs furniture and furnishing to re-establish himself and requires amenities to parent the kids . He earns considerably less income than her. His means, needs and “general financial circumstances” are much worse than hers. Quantum: o Court applies SSAGs and finds that $800/month is appropriate based on her average 3-year income of $105,000.00 and his projected income for 2010 of $30,000. Duration: o Nature of the work is highly determinative. Both employed in the hospitality sector, where seniority is not important for total remuneration and so him being out of the workforce for 5 years isn’t a huge deal. o He is only entitled to short-term assistance to get him back on his feet. H(JL) v W(RS) , 2017 ABCA paras 13-25 Spousal Support Order: Awarded mid-range of SSAGs. Key Factors: DISSIPATING ASSETS CAN’T MAINTAIN SAME HIGH SOL – IMPUTED INCOME FROM DISSIPATION. Facts: ABCA: o Court notes that within the framework of s. 15.2(1) of the DA, compensation can be compensatory, non- compensatory, or contractual ( Moge ). o Court imputes $50,000 in income from dissipated assets to the appellant who is seeking spousal support, because she dissipated a ton of assets. Found that her actual budget way exceeded a reasonable level for living expenses o She got a HUGE property division payout!!! $5.5 million which she squandered. She didn’t actually suffer any economic disadvantages from the marriage or from its breakdown . Matrimonial property division is a factor in determining condition, means, needs and other circumstances ( Moge ). Payout can be of a magnitude that no SS can be justified . o Her role in the marriage kept her out of the workforce for about 8 years . It left her economically uncompetitive, and her qualifications out of date . Thus she can demonstrate a claim for compensatory SS. o Re Quantum: TJ found that she needed to adjust her b udget. Her “needs” were ridiculous While it’s true that SOL is looked at during marriage, that’s only within limits. ( Moge ). Can’t guarantee SOL during marriage ( Moge ) and the SS award shouldn’t aim for marriage SOL. There will always be an impact on SOL! ( Moge ). Therefore it wasn’t an error for TJ to conclude she couldn’t expect to keep living in lavish MH. Irresponsibly dissipating marital assets is relevant to determining means/needs of the spouses. Neither payor nor payee can dissipate to reduce/increase this . Pickett v Walsh , 2016 ABQB paras 25-27 Spousal Support Order: Key Factors: EFFECTS OF REPARTNERING Facts: She had a new partner for about three years, after their separation. He has a medical condition and can’t work. Key Principles: o Repartnering doesn’t mean that compensatory support comes to an end. The foundation of the compensatory claim lies in the relationship between the spouses and the new partner/spouse is not
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31 responsible for having “caused” the payee spouse’s economic injury and responsibility for that injury isn’t transferred to the new partner/spouse ( Wolters ). o Repartnering can bring non-compensatory support to an end. That’s because the new partner takes on the obligation of support for the payee spouse ( Wolters ). Rockall v Rockall , 2010 ABCA 278 paras 20-30 Spousal Support Order: Key Factors: LUMP SUM AWARDS Facts: Lump sum support is an exception, not a rule. Trial judge should have stated why he was awarding lump sum support because it goes against the general rule of periodic support barring “exceptional circumstances.” Must consider the tax consequences of lump sum . Can be appropriate where : o The payor spouse may fritter away capital leaving him unable to pay periodic support; o Where the recipient needs a lump sum to go to university or retrain; o Where the ill will means a clean break is ideal. Rockey v Hartwell , 2016 paras 231-266 Spousal Support Order: NO OBLIGATION Key Factors: NO NC and NO C she was in a better position because of the relationship, and was well on her way to becoming self-sufficient; her plans to quit her job and go back to university isn’t his problem Facts: AIP applied under s. 57 of the FLA for SS. Court applies AIP analysis and finds that being economically intertwined is not mandatory for SS order/to find AIP . They were in AIP relationship despite lack of financial interconnections. Applying s. 58 of the FLA: o Must consider s. 58(a)/(b)/(c)/(d) of the FLA in making an award. o Section 60 of the FLA is the bases of entitlement. o Must review s. 58 factors in light of the s. 60 bases of entitlement. She claims she is entitled to support based on both compensatory and non- compensatory (“needs”) basis – she has the need and he has the means to pay support. o She gained tons of advantages because of their relationship she earned a degree, got a job in her field, earned a higher income than she would have been able to when their relationship started. o No children of the relationship . o She says she would have pursued a Masters degree, but there’s not evidence she actually would have! Need actual evidence if you’re going to claim plans to education, etc. Economic hardship arising from breakdown of the relationship: o Her budget was unreasonable, she has an obligation to become self-sufficient and self-supporting. Any need she had would have been addressed by her transitional support payment and her unjust enrichment payment. She’s in a position to become self -sufficient. Fisher v Fisher , 2008 ONCA i. Under the Divorce Act . ii. Factors: a. Length of cohabitation (s. 15.2(4)(a)): i. Lengthy marriage (19 years); lengthy marriages usually point toward indefinite support (because dependent spouse has difficult time achieving self-sufficiency). ii. However her youth and employment made indefinite duration inappropriate. b. Functions performed during marriage (s. 15.2(4)(b)): i. No argument advanced that assumption of household responsibilities negatively affected her career goals or advanced his. ii. He also did household chores. c. Means, needs and other circumstances (s. 15.2(4)): i. He had a second family, but first family first . Reality is that it decreases ability to pay when there’s a second family. ii. Here, no evidence obligations to first family would impoverish the second. iii. Objectives: a. Economic advantages or disadvantages from the marriage or its breakdown (s. 15.2(6)(a)): i. This is the foundation of compensatory support. ( Moge ) ii. She was not disadvantaged by the marriage, but by the breakdown due to a reduction in standard of living. b. Economic hardship (s. 15.2(6)(c)): i. She suffered hardship in the reduction of her standard of living (despite ability to meet basic needs). c. Self-sufficiency (s. 15.2(6)(d)):
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32 i. Must consider present and potential outcomes, standard of living during marriage, post-separation circumstances (including equalization), duration of cohabitation, other relevant factors. ii. Goal of self-sufficiency on her income-earning potential was not practical. Sawatzky v Sawatzky , 2008 ABCA i. Under the Family Law Act (AIP). ii. Lived together 17 years, 4 kids together (joint guardianship, Mom has primary care and Dad has generous access). He was stay-at-home dad for 5 years; her income was higher. iii. Analysis: a. He took little when he left, needs to re-establish himself. b. The years he spent as a stay-at- home dad had a detrimental impact on his career… but not extremely damaging, because he works hospitality/retail where seniority is not as important. c. Sandra did well in her career during the same years. d. SSAGs = $800/month. iv. Court ordered AIP support for one year so he can become self-sufficient. Anand v Anand, 2016 ABCA i. Married 9 years, two kids: a. First order, 2014: $5k/month in interim SS. b. Second order, 2015: $15k/month in interim SS. ii. Facts: a. Married in 2004; had two kids . They moved to Saudi Arabia so he could purs iii. Overview of rules for interim SS: a. Might be different from final order because evidence regarding family assets and the consequences of the family breakdown haven’t fully developed. b. There’s an incomplete record for the judge to assess in making an interim order. c. Greater emphasis of needs and means (than on ss. 15.2(6) objectives and 15.2(4) factors). d. Looking at what is reasonable on a temporary basis pending trial. e. Must consider need relative to station in life prior to marriage collapse. f. Where there is ability to pay, consider reasonable standard of living. H(JL) v W(RS) , 2017 ABCA i. Each party received $2.7M of the family assets in the divorce. ii. Principles: a. Some cases might involve such large property settlements that no SS can be justified ( Boston ). b. Vidision of property is one factor to be assessed ( Moge ). iii. Analysis: a. She trained as a lawyer but worked as a homemaker, and was economically disadvantaged by her role in the marriage pointing to compensatory support. b. Quantum: i. Standard of living relevant within limits. Need to examine the disparities in the standard of living that would be experienced in the absent of support. ii. SS should not perpetuate living beyond a party’s means. iii. Dissipation of assets relevant to condition, means and needs ( MH ). Pickett v Walsh , 2016 ABQB i. Married 19 years, lived together 19.5 years; two kids (both independent). She suffered a slip and fall post-separation, is disabled and not working. Her new partner is also ill and not working; no insurance. Husband diagnosed with heart condition post-separation, not working and on long-term disability; his new partner is disabled and has no insurance. ii. The effect of re-partnering is persuasive under the FLA s. 58(d): a. Compensatory: i. Re-partnering does not bring compensatory support to an end, because the basis for compensatory lies in the relationship between the original spouses . The new partner is not responsible for having “caused” the payee spouse’s economic injury and the responsibility for that injury is not transferred to the new partner or spouse. b. Non-compensatory: i. Re-partnering may bring non-compensatory support to an end, since the new partner takes on the obligation of support for the payee spouse. Rockall v Rockall , 2010 ABCA i. Courts can order lump sum or periodic support under s. 15.2(1), but lump sum is the exception not the rule. Can be exercised where: a. Payor will fritter money away. b. Recipient needs lump sum to go to university or otherwise retrain. c. Ill will between parties means that clean break is ideal. ii. HOWEVER no proposition that a lump sum should be ordered due to recipient’s short lifespan/illness.
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33 iii. Married 2001, separated 2006 and cohabited for a year prior to marriage; no kids. Wife had AIDS, he was aware prior to marriage. Husband was high earner (approx. $200k/year) while wife held odd jobs during the marriage and was prostitute prior to marriage with gambling addiction. Rocky v Hartwell , 2016 ABQB i. Lived together 8 years; no kids. He started a business and his income fluctuated but was $12k at time of trial, her income was approx. $3k per month. She obtained undergrad degree during relationship, started Masters post-separation. H ii. Post-separation he paid her $2,500 per month sporadically. Interim order of $5k per month . iii. Court found that they were AIP despite not being financially intertwined; thus fell under FLA . Applying ss. 58 and 60: a. His ability to pay did not alone form the basis for entitlement to support. b. She was able to earn a higher income at the end of the relationship than she could at the beginning. c. The economic hardship arising from her Master’s was post -separation and unconnected to Mark. d. She was self-sufficient before she decided to quit and go back to school. e. Already received $89k in transitional partner support. i. NO NCS he didn’t interfere with her work or education. ii. NO CS she was able to become self-sufficient. Forming Families Key Elements 1. Paternity 2. Reproductive Technology 3. Adoption Paternity Under the Family Law Act Applicable Sections i. Seeking a declaration of parentage : a. The court can make a declaration respecting parentage (s. 9) if there’s a dispute as to whether a person is a parent under s. 7(2)(a) or (b), and the person who applies is one of the following: i. Person claiming to be a parent; ii. Person claiming not to be a parent; iii. The child; iv. Parent of the child (if under 18); v. Guardian; vi. Person who has care and control of the child. ii. The following are the parents of a child (s. 7(2)): a. (a) Birth mother and bio father; b. (b) If child was born of assisted reproduction, follow s. 8.1; c. (c) A parent named in an adoption order or recognized under the Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act . iii. There is no distinction between a child born inside or outside a marriage (s. 7(6)). iv. Biological fathers : a. Defined under s. 8, a man is presumed to be a bio dad if he was: i. Married to the birth mother (BM) at time of the child’s birth; ii. Married to BM <300 days before the birth of the child & it ended by death, nullity, divorce; iii. Married the BM after the birth and has acknowledged he is the dad; iv. Cohabited with BM for at least 12 mo. when child was born & acknowledged fatherhood. v. Cohabited with BM for 12 mo. and cohabitation ended <300 days before birth. vi. Registered as the parent at joint request with BM under VSA . vii. Found by court to be the father. In Loco Parentis : Standing in the Place of a Parent Standing in the place of a parent: s. 48 of the Family Law Act i. A person is standing in the place of a parent if the person (s. 48(1)); a. Is the spouse of a parent of the child, or is or was in a relationship of interdependence of some permanence with a parent of the child ( Chartier ); and b. Has demonstrated a settled intention to treat the child as the person’s own child. i. Chartier looking at settled intention holistically, not just subjective intention. ii. In determining whether a person has demonstrated a settled intention as required by s. 48(1)(b), the court may consider any or all of the following factors (s. 48(2)): a. The child’s age; b. The duration of the child’s relationship with the person;
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34 c. The nature of the child’s relationship with the person, including: i. The child’s perception of the person as a parental figure; ii. The extent to which the person’s involved in the child’s care, discipline, education, recreational activities; iii. Any continuing contact or attempts at contact between the person and the child. d. Whether the person considered: i. Applying for guardianship of the child; ii. Adopting the child; or iii. Changing the child’s surname to that person’s surname; e. Whether the person has provided direct or indirect financial support for the child; f. The nature of the child’s relationship with any other parent of the child; g. Any other factor the court considers relevant. i. Jane Doe v Alberta while agreements between the parties are relevant, the courts will still apply the factors to look holistically at the whole relationship between the person and the child. Test for “Standing in Place of a Parent” (Chartier ): Objective test examining the nature of the relationship : i. Intention formal expression of it, and inferred from the formation of a family unit. ii. What is the child’s perspective? Important factor. iii. Step- parent’s perspective. iv. Whether the child participates in the extended family unit. v. Whether the person provides financially (depending on ability to pay). vi. Whether the person disciplines the child as a parent would. vii. Whether the person represents to the world that they are responsible for the child (e.g. changing last name)? viii. Nature/existence of the relationship between the child and absent parent. Assisted Reproduction Assisted Reproduction Act , SC 2004, c 2: does not define the legal parent of a child (because this is a matter of provincial jurisdiction) but does regulate important aspects of ART. Generally has significant negative effects on people trying to use ART in Canada, and a disproportionate effect on same-sex couples. Section 6 bans: i. Payments to surrogates; ii. Accepting payment for arranging a surrogate; iii. Counseling or inducing a person under 21 to be a surrogate; iv. The sale of gametes/embryos. Section 12 holds: i. Egg/sperm d onors can only be reimbursed for ‘reasonable expenses’. The Family Law Act i. A person who donates human reproductive material/embryo without the intention of using it for their own reproduction is not the parent of the child born as a result (s. 7(4)). ii. A person married to or in a conjugal AIP with a surrogate at the time of the child’s conception is not the parent of the child born as a result (s. 7(5)). iii. Parentage by assisted reproduction governed by s. 8.1; parentage by surrogacy governed by s. 8.2. Surrogacy i. Surrogacy agreements are not enforceable (s. 8.2(8)), and a. The agreement can’t be used as evidence of the surrogate’s consent, and b. It can be used as evidence of intent to be a parent of a child born through assisted reproduction. Parens Patriae Jurisdiction Parens Patriae Jurisdiction i. The superior courts have inherent jurisdiction to act in the protection of the interests of minors and others without legal capacity. a. Can make an order to advance the interests of children where there’s a legislation “gap” ( Beson ). b. It must be exercised in the best interests of the person, for their benefit/welfare ( Eve ). ii. The court can use PP jurisdiction to grant a declaration of parentage where there’s a legal gap preventing legal recognition and it’s in the best interests of the child ( AA v BB ). a. For example, where gay male partners are left out H(DW) v R(DJ) . b. There does not need to be a n immediate “risk” to the child to invoke it – H(DW) v R(DJ) . c. Must promote BIC H(DW) v R(DJ) .
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35 Adoption Overview i. Provincial jurisdiction, through the Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act . ii. Effects: a. Creates parent-child relationship between adult and child. b. Terminates a parent-child relationship between the birth parent and child. c. Amends the birth records. iii. In adoption proceedings, best interests of child test is PARAMOUNT. Look at s. 58.1 of Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act which requires consideration of: a. Importance of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place in a family; b. Benefits of stability and continuity of care and relationships; c. Mental, emotional and physical needs of the chid and stage of development; d. Benefits to maint aining the child’s familial, cultural, social and religious heritage; e. Child’s views and wishes; f. Effects on the child of a delay in decision-making; g. Aboriginal child uniqueness of culture, heritage, spirituality, and traditions preserve cultural identity. iv. Two methods: a. Involuntary adoption child removed from family (child protection). b. Voluntary adoption both parents must give consent. Voluntary Adoption i. Through public child welfare system, or private adoption agency. ii. Includes familial relations (e.g. step-parents). iii. More likely to include medical history of the child. iv. Regulation to make sure birth parents are fully informed when they consent. v. Consent must be voluntary with 10 day cooling off period (s. 61 of CYFE Act ). vi. No payment can be made to a bio parent in exchange for their consent: ss. 83-86 of CYFE Act . Involuntary Adoption i. Through public child welfare system. Trociuk v British Columbia , 2003 SCC i. Established that the VSA by allowing moms to exclude dads from their kids’ identity for any reason violated the Charter ’s equity rights. ii. Mom registered triplets’ birth and said the father was unacknowledged; registered kids under her surname, BC Vital Statistics Act precluded dad from altering the registration. iii. Dad got an order for supervised access; she got an order for custody and CS. He wanted their names changed to reflect their parentage (Ernst-Trociuk) and argued the VSA infringed s. 15 of the Charter on the grounds of sex discrimination: a. It allowed mom to permanently exclude dad from birth registration for any reason. b. There was no method of recourse for dad. AB v CD , 2012 ABCA i. Two kids born during relationship; AB admitted paternity of youngest but denied oldest (even though married at time of the child’s birth). Application under s. 9(1) of the FLA to have CD, the suspected father of oldest child, to submit to DNA testing. Order upheld for paternity test for CD. M(JR) v M(TD) , 2006 ABPC i. JM was listed on birth certificate but wasn’t bio dad. He also didn’t meet test for guardianship under the FLA believed he was bio dad until mom told him otherwise. ii. He continued as in loco parentis , so he had standing . Jane Doe v Alberta , 2007 ABCA i. The person’s personal intentions don’t govern; what matters if whether, holistically, the person demonstrated a settled intention to treat the child as their own with regard to holistic factors. ii. Heavy weight will be given to agreements, but they won’t outweigh the court’s jurisdiction to determine whether the person is in loco parentis based on the whole of the relationship (instead of the snapshot of the time the agreement was made). iii. Jane had child via artificial insemination from sperm donor; John did n’t want to be a dad. They entered into an agreement setting out his rights and obligations w/r/t to the kid. iv. When determining in loco parentis , the court will look at whether there is a settled intention to treat the child as his own; must take a holistic approach at that intention ( Chartier ) looking at the nature of the relationship.
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36 v. Court states that a relationship of interdependence with the mother in the same household is likely enough to create a relationship of interdependence of some permanence toward the child. a. See also factors under s. 48(2), which look at child’s perception of the person as a parental figure . W(HL) v T(JC) , 2005 BCSC i. Status quo wins again for determining where child stays. ii. Bio mom (HLW) and her spouse refused to consent to the adoption of the baby she was carrying as a surrogate for JCT and his wife; JCT was the bio dad. iii. Court ruled that pending trial, the child was to stay with JCT and wife because it was status quo . H(DW) v R(DJ) , 2013 ABCA i. Courts can invoke parens patriae jurisdiction where there is a legislative gao and where doing so is in the best interests of the child (look for a benefit to the child). No need for immediate “risk” to child; incidental benefit to parent is fine as long a s it’s BIC. ii. Complicated sperm donor situation: a. Couples: H&R (gay couple) and C&D (lesbian couple); R and D combine to make kid (S) who lives with H&R. H&R separated, kid stays with R. Issue was whether to grant H parentage and guardianship of S even though he was not biologically related. b. D was the kid’s only legal parent (on the birth certificate). iii. Court declared Mr. H a parent under s. 9 of the FLA .
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37 Parenting Issues Research, etc. Research Overview Parents who separate or divorce may: o Project their own feelings about their separation onto their kids; o Assume their kids agree with the separation (i.e. that they were unhappy too); Kids of separated parents: o Do less well than children of intact families including poverty rates; o Are all different; It is important to: o Protect kids form conflict and violence; o Ensure adequate financial support; o Develop clear parent/child rules; o Develop a positive environment by responding to kids’ questions and fears; o Promote use of detailed parenting plans. Parenting Plans and Parenting Agreements Most parents will develop their own parenting plan upon separation. Parenting plans will generally include: o Residency schedule; o Holidays; o Decision-making; o Who holds health card, birth certificate, etc. o Who takes kids to appointments; o Agreed-upon special extracurricular activities. Statistics: o 90% of parents have a primary residence agreement (59% written down); o 84% have agreement for time spent with children (45% written down). 11% non-resident, no-contact parents had written agreements. Living Arrangements and Parenting Time Mom’s home most common primary residence (70%); 15% with Dad . Only 9% spending equal time in both households. 73% of non-resident parents within a one-hour drive of their ex; most common within 10 minutes. Most likely to live close together where kids spend equal time with both parents. Over 60% of non-resident parents spent no time or less than 3 months with their kid in the last 3 months. Decision-Making 35% of parents report making major decisions jointly or alternatively. However, there are variations depending on residency: o 49% of NR parents indicated joint/alternative DMing; o 21% of resident parents claimed same; o 76% of resident parents claimed being sole DMers. Where equal residency, 83% reported joint decisionmaking. Statutory Framework for Custody and Access Overview Gender neutral approach. Focuses on the circumstances of the individual child and their best interests. Broad discretion for judges. Divorce Act: Custody and Access i. A court can make an order for custody or access under s. 16 of the Divorce Act , including an order for joint custody or access (s. 16(4)). ii. Principles for access: a. Access is based on the “ maximum contact principle ” which holds that the COM should have as much contact as is consistent with the best interests of the child (s. 16(10)). i. But, must also consider the person’s willingness to actually facilitate that contact ( s. 16(10)). b. The court can’t take into account the person’s past conduct in making the order, unless it actually is relevant to the person’s ability to act as parent (s. 16(9)).
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38 i. So it’s irrelevant if they previously didn’t have must contact; if they want to be in the child’s life now, and it’s in the child’s best interest, that’ s what matters. c. Spouses who are granted access have a right to make inquiries and be given info on the kid’s ( s. 16(5)): i. Health; ii. Education; iii. Welfare. iii. Best Interests of the Child: a. When making an access or custody order, the court must take into account only the BIC as determined by looking at (s. 16(8)): i. Condition; ii. Means; iii. Needs; iv. And other circumstances of the child. Family Law Act: Guardianship and Access i. Bests Interests of the Child: a. The FLA has broader criteria outlining what the court should consider when making a guardianship or access order. b. In determining BIC, the court must (s. 18(2)): i. Ensure the greatest possible protection of the child’s ( s. 18(2)(a)): 1. Physical, 2. Psychological, and 3. Emotional safety. ii. Consider all the child’s needs and circumstances including ( s. 18(2)(b)): 1. The child’s physical, psychological and emotional needs, including the child’s need for stability, taking into consideration the child’s age and stage of development; 2. History of care for the child; 3. The child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage; 4. The child’s views and preferences , to the extent that it’s appropriate to ascertain them (s. 18(2)(iv)); a. Stefurak v Chambers kids should be able to make their preferences known; if they can’t, they may feel alienated; however kids don’t get to choose their own fate. b. Options: i. Views of the Child Reports prepared by social workers and psychologists; ii. Judicial interviews; iii. Testimony from parents or layperson witnesses; iv. Testimony from child. 5. Any plans proposed for the child’s care and upbringing; 6. Family violence, including its impact on: a. The safety of the child/other family and household members; b. The child’s general well-being; c. The ability of the person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child; d. The appropriateness of making an order requiring the guardians to co-operate on issues affecting the child. i. s. 18(3) FLA “family violence” includes behaviour by a family or household member 7. The nature, strength, and stability of the relationship: a. Between the child and each person residing in the child’s household and any other significant person in the child’s life, and b. Between the child and each person in respect of whom an order under this Part would apply. 8. The views of the child’s current guardians, the benefit to the child of developing and maintaining meaningful relationships with each guardian or proposed guardian; 9. The ability and willingness of each guardian or proposed guardian to exercise the powers, responsibilities, and entitlements of the guardianship, and 10. Any civil or criminal proceedings relevant to the safety or well-being of the child. Shared Parenting i. Options include: a. Joint Custody b. Shared Parenting c. Shared Custody d. Joint Guardianship ii. Under the Federal Child Support Guidelines : a. If a spouse exercises access not less than 40% of the year, child support is determined according to (s. 9): i. Set-off of child support; ii. Increased costs in custody arrangements (e.g. buying two sets of furniture, etc.). iii. Conditions/means/needs and other circumstances of each spouse.
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39 Parallel Parenting i. Each parent makes decisions about different things: a. E.g. mom makes decisions around education and health while dad makes decisions involving religion and extracurriculars.
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40 Guardianship Guardianship Under the Family Law Act i. A parent is a guardian under s. 20(2) if they: a. Acknowledge being a guardian, and i. Demonstrate and intention to assume responsibility ii. Within one year of becoming aware of the pregnancy or birth (whichever is earlier). b. Demonstrated intention by: i. Being married to the other parent at the time of birth (or within 300 days before it, and either dying or ending the marriage by nullity/divorce); ii. Being AIP at the time of birth or after; iii. Enter into a guardianship agreement ; iv. Marry the other parent after the birth of the child; v. Cohabit with the other parent for at least 12 consecutive months when the child was born; vi. Carry pregnancy to term; vii. Being a parent under s. 8.1 (Assisted Reproduction); viii. Providing financial support to the birth mother; ix. Any other circumstance. c. Note that if the child is a result of sexual assault, the abuser is not the guardian . The Role of a Guardian i. The role of guardians is to exercise powers and responsibilities in the BIC (s. 21(1)). ii. Both guardians can exercise responsibilities unless court orders otherwise (s. 21(2)). a. Provide info to other guardian; b. Best effort to cooperate with each other; c. Can enter into agreement w/r/t allocation of powers and responsibilities. iii. A person does not have to financially support the child from their own resources unless (s. 21(3)): a. A parent; or b. In loco . iv. Guardians have the right to be informed and consulted about all significant decisions affecting the child (s. 21(4)). a. They also need sufficient contact to carry out those powers and responsibilities. v. Duty to make decisions in relation to evolving capacity of the child (s. 21(7)). Duties of Guardians i. Guardians must (s. 21(5)): a. Nurture the child’s physical, psychological and emotional development and guide them to adulthood. b. Ensure the child has the necessaries of life (i.e. medical care, food, clothing and shelter). ii. Can make decisions about (s. 21(6)): a. Day-to-day decisions including activities. b. Place of residence. c. Education (incl. place/extracurrics). d. Cultural/linguistic/religious/spiritual upbringing. e. Who the child lives/associates with. f. Whether the child should work and, if so, where. g. Consenting to medical, dental treatment etc. h. Granting/refusing consent where required by law. i. Receiving/responding to a notice. j. Commence/defend legal proceedings per Minor’s Property Act and Public Trustee Act . k. Appoint substitute where guardian temporarily absent. l. Receive 3 rd party health/education/etc info re child. m. Exercise other powers necessary to carry out guardianship. Termination of Guardianship i. Must be another guardian in place (s. 25(1)). ii. The guardian consents to the termination or court order (s. 25(1)). iii. If the child is over 12, they must consent or else the court may dispense with it (s. 25(2)). iv. Ends upon the earliest of (s. 26): a. Guardian’s death; b. Child turns 18; c. Child becomes spouse/AIP; d. Termination under s. 25 (court order). Guardianship Orders i. The court may, on application by a person who (s.23(1)):
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41 a. Is an adult and has had care and control of a child for >6 months (s. 23(1)(a)); i. SB v JF step- dad got guardianship of his wife’s young child from previous relationship instead of bio -dad. b. Is a parent other than a guardian of a child (s. 23(1)(b)). ii. The new order must be in the best interest of the child ( SB v JF , DS v TY ). a. Generally, maximum contact with both parents is in BIC ( DS v TY ) Consent to Guardianship i. A guardianship order can only be made with the consent of (s. 24(1)): a. Each guardian; b. The child, if over 12; c. The proposed guardian. ii. However court can dispose of consent if there’s a g ood reason to do so (s. 24(1)). a. SB v JF the fact that the dad trying to get guardianship refused/couldn’t communicate without being an asshole towards mom was enough not to dispense with mom’s refusal to consent. Parenting Orders i. Threshold: a. To get a parenting order, the person must be recognized as a guardian ( DS v TY , s. 32(1)). ii. The court can make an order relating to the exercise of guardianship powers (i.e. parenting order) if (s. 32(1)): a. The child has more than one guardian; b. They can’t agree; and c. They’re living separate and apart. iii. The order can (s. 32(1)): a. Allocate power/responsibilities; b. Parenting time; c. A dispute resolution process; and d. Anything else. i. SB v JF court ordered that COM’s residence couldn’t be moved more than 50km outside of Calgary ; specific instructions if either parent wanted to travel with child outside of Alberta. iv. The guardian can make inquiries and be given information re the other guardian’s responsibilities ( s. 32(4)). Contact Orders i. The court can order contact between a person who is not a guardian and the child (s. 35(1)). ii. The people who can make an application without court permission (s. 35(2)): a. Parent; b. Guardian; c. A person standing in place of the parent. iii. Other people need court permission to apply for a contact order (s. 35(2)), except for: a. Grandparents don’t need permission of the court if ( s. 35(3)): i. The parents are guardians; ii. The parents live separate and apart or one has died; and iii. Their access was interrupted by the death/separation. iv. In making orders, must always consider BIC (s. 35(4) and (5)). R v R , 1983 ABCA i. No more tender years doctrine; instead, must decide each case on its own merits based on the best interests of the child. Custody and Decision-making Who is a child? i. Under the Divorce Act : a. Court can make a custody order for “any or all COM” ( s. 16(1)). b. Child of the marriage defined as (s. 2(1)): i. A child of two spouses or former spouses who, at the material time, is: 1. Under the age of majority and has not withdrawn from their charge, or 2. Is over the age of majority and still under their care but unable to withdraw due to illness, disability or other cause (i.e. education). ii. Under the Family Law Act : a. Every child is subject to guardianship, unless AIP or a spouse (s. 19(1)). b. “Child” is defined as a person under 18 years ( s. 1(c)). Relocation i. Needs to be in BIC ( DS v TY ).
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42 ii. Relocating parent bears onus of satisfying BIC requirements to vary an existing order (i.e. material change) ( Gordon ). a. If no existing order, same requirements apply except material change ( DS v TY ). Ex Parte Custody Orders i. On an ex parte motion without notice, the person must make full and frank disclosure of all material facts; without it, the order can be set aside ( AM v JM ). Marital Conduct and Domestic Violence i. Past conduct can’t be considered in deciding custody, except where it is relevant to parenting capacity (s. 16(9) of Divorce Act ). ii. Under the Family Law Act , can consider family violence’s impact on ( s. 18(2)(vi) of FLA ): a. Safety of the child and family members; b. Child’s general well -being; c. Ability of the person to care for the child; d. Appropriateness of making an order requiring the guardians to cooperate. iii. Isakhani v Al-Saggaf mom’s physical and mental abuse by dad can expose the child to serious harm iv. Definition: a. Family violence includes causing or attempting to cause physical harm (to the child or another household member) including forced confinement or sexual abuse, or causing reasonable fear for safety (s. 18(3)). Varying a Parenting Order under the Divorce Act i. Court can make an order under s. 17(1); there must be ( Gordon ): a. A change in the conditions, means, needs or other circumstances of the child since the last order (s. 15(5)); b. Which materially affects the child; and c. Which was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonable contemplated by the judge who made the initial order. i. A material change is a change which, if known at the time the original order was made, would have resulted in a different order; once material change is established, the issues of custody and access are determined in light of those new circumstances ( Willick v Willick ). ii. A DECISION TO MOVE IS A MATERIAL CHANGE! ( Gordon ). ii. If threshold met, need new inquiry into BIC ( Gordon , Dix ) based on: a. Original findings of TJ; b. New circumstances. iii. There is no presumption in favour of the custodial parent, but the custodial parent’s views are entitled to “great respect” ( Gordon ). a. Note: In Nova Scotia there is now a presumption in favour of the moving parent. iv. Fact-specific inquiry ( Gordon ). v. Focus is always the BIC, and not the interests/rights of the parents ( Gordon ). vi. Must weigh importance of remaining with status quo parent against the continuance of full contact with the child’s access par ent, extended family, and community ( Gordon ). vii. The judge should consider ( Gordon ): a. Existing custody arrangements and relationship between child and custodial parent; b. Existing access arrangement and relationship between child and access parent; c. Desirability of maximizing contact between child and both parents; d. Views of the child; e. Custodia l parent’s reason for moving, only in the exceptional case where it’s relevant to the parent’s ability to meet needs of the child; f. Disruption to the child due to removal from school, family, community. viii. Change in Residence Statutory Requirement : a. The parent who has custody and intends to move the kid has to give 30 DAYS’ NOTICE to anyone who has access to the child (s. 16(7) DA). b. Need to tell them: time the change will be made, new place of residence. ix. Mobility Under Bill C-78 a. If a person who has parenting time , or decision-making responsibility for a child and intends to move has to notify anyone else who has parenting time, decision-making responsibilities, or contact with the child within 60 days of the move (including address, proposal for new arrangements, except where there’s family violence ). b. Can move as of the date of the notice as long as court authorizes or no objections and no order prohibiting relocations. NOTE THAT GORDON ALSO APPLIES TO THE FAMILY LAW ACT, per Gordon v Towell . Post Gordon v Goertz Trends Analysis of 750 post-Gordon v Goertz cases (2001 2011) Analysis of trends: Success rate was 46%-55% 92% of applicants were Mothers (success rates were similar regardless of whether it was Mom or Dad)
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43 Children’s wishes (only mentioned in about 1/3 of the cases) when the children do express them, courts give them considerable weight Most common reason for the move is a new job, improved economic prospects or new intimate relationship Those with sole custody or where there is a history of DV have better chances of gaining permission for the move Those with joint custody have a decreased chance of gaining permission Age seems to have no impact International moves are more successful than domestic moves Third Party Access/Custody Orders i. Where there’s competition between a legal guardian and a legal stranger, the court can’t wrest custody from lawful guardian w ithout first demonstrating that ( SJ v WR , WD v GP) a. The guardian either abandoned or neglected the child, or b. Other commanding reasons ( WD v GP ). i. Court can terminate guardianship pursuant to s. 25(1)(b) if the court considers it necessary or desirable to do so. ii. The “fitness test” no longer applies when determining whether guardian is appro priate, only need to apply BIC test under s. 18 ( DJ v PC ). ii. Contact may be granted instead if it’s in BIC ( SJ v WR ). Shared Custody/Guardianship i. Basic principles: a. Must take a realistic and practical approach should only order joint custody in exceptional circumstances which are rarely present when the parties end up in court! ( Baker ). b. It should not be considered unless that parties are sincerely and genuinely willing to work together ( SB v JF ) i. However lack of cooperation is a factor but not a bar to joint custody ( Parsley/Terwin ). c. The BIC won’t be fostered if the parents aren’t able to communicate and cooperate in making decisions affecting the child ( Kruger ). d. Big questions ( Kruger ): i. Is a reasonable amount of communication/cooperation in place now? ii. Is it achievable in the future? e. Maximum contact principle still applies ( Terwin ). Custody Orders: General Principles Wakaluk v Wakaluk , 1976 SKCA i. Ratio: The most important thing for determining custody is evidence about the Best Interest of the Children! Need to bring evidence to demonstrate intellectual, moral, emotional, physical needs of each child and what is subjectively needed by them! ii. Court based decision on how one spouse treated the other badly; failed to actually assess what was in the best interests of the children in determining custody. S(D) v Y(T) , 2010 ABPC i. As a general rule, maximum contact with both parents is in a child’s best interests. ii. Mom wanted to move to Calgary; Dad opposed the move and wanted guardianship. Never married and never AIP. None of the s. 20 guardianship presumptions applied but he had standing under s. 23(1)(b) as a parent under the FLA. M(A) v M(J) , 2016 ONCA i. Status quo is key if you need to work against the status quo, you need to work quickly. ii. Court doesn’t like to screw around with the status quo; really important what happens with the kid right after separation. If the child is fine, the interim order will likely become the permanent order! iii. Dad got an emergency ex parte order giving him custody but there wasn’t full and fair disclosure; unlawful status quo and children thrived in mom’s care – by the time it made it to ONCA the kids had been in mom’s care f or a while, new status quo. Spencer v Spencer , 1980 BCCA i. Don’t remove kids from a stable and secure environment. If the kids are secure where they are, leave them there! ii. Appealed because it was incorrectly decided based on tender years doctrine which is no longer a thing! iii. If kids are happy and doing well, court shouldn’t risk changing their lives again. Dix v Thomas , 2006 ONSC VARYING CUSTODY ORDER under Gordon rules
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44 i. Court will look at which parent will be more likely to ensure access is provided, as well as which home is more stable and would be easier adjustment for child. ii. Are they being taken away from connections ? iii. Dad wanted vary custody order for son to live with him in Kingston; kid lived week-on week- off with parents. Dad’s new spouse was primary earner; Mom’s family was difficult and wouldn’t accommodate dad. iv. Held that it was in BIC to stay with Dad, particularly because it would be a bigger adjustment for him to reduce time in dad’s home, and the importance of dad’s new partner and her kids in the COM’s life. DS v TY , 2010 ABPC VARYING CUSTODY ORDER under Gordon rules (moving) i. Parties are parents of 1.5 yo daughter, mom wants to move to Calgary with the kid (from Grande Prairie). ii. Lived together off and on with bio dad, unplanned pregnancy. She lives and works in GP making ad hoc money; he is successful and works in GP as metal worker. Parties have poor communication and are immature. Dad wanted guardianship s tatus; court found that it was in BIC that this happen, and his desire to be in his daughter’s life was sincere. Court grants it. iii. Regarding change in residence: a. Needs to be in the best interests of the child . b. Gordon criteria apply. Court finds that it’s no t in BIC because mom would have a hard time getting a job (and she has a nice house with fair rent now); few family supports and friends in Calgary, would strain dad’s relationship with kid. c. She can’t move to Calgary. iv. Regarding parenting order: Court provides parenting order providing that mom is solely responsible for certain decisions up until 5 years of age. Kaplanis v Kaplanis , 2005 ONCA i. Sole issue in custody cases is BIC; for joint custody/parallel parenting to be ordered, there must be evidence that the parties can communicate despite their differences. ii. Dad wanted parallel parenting; Mom disagreed because they couldn’t communicate without screaming at each other. Terin v Krisco , 2008 ABPC i. Failure to get along isn’t a bar to joint custody; all that matters is that it’s in BIC; court can grant joint guardianship and then vary the powers given to each guardian under s. 21(2)(a). ii. Dad was a prima facie suitable guardian and demonstrated an ability and willingness to exercise guardianship powers; court declared him a legal guardian as it was in the child’s best interests. Parents couldn’t communicate . iii. Where the child has more than one guardian, they may each exercise those powers ( presumption of equality ) unless the court orders otherwise (s. 21(2)(a)) ). The court can order a different arrangement under s. 32 if it’s in the BIC; in this case, there was no evidence the parents couldn’t actually cooperate an d the dad rarely got involved in decision- making anyway, so joint custody was ordered. D(J) v P© , 2009 ABQB i. Not looking at “fitness” – only consideration is BIC . ii. Parents cohabited for 3 years, had 2 kids. Paternal grandparents wanted guardianship (dad wasn’t really interested). Gave full guardianship to mom, with access for grandparents because grandparents were great influence, grandma did everything with the kids, etc. Domestic Violence P(JY) v M(RJL) , 2007 NSCA i. Hard to say how much weight the court will give to spousal abuse re child’s best interests. ii. Mom claimed dad was abusive and that it was relevant to custody; TJ granted divorce on the basis of mental cruelty. Evidence was entered about husband’s abusive nature, TJ questioned relevance to parenting and child’s best interests. Isakhani v Al-Saggaf , 2007 ONCA i. Abuse of another family member (e.g. mom) can expose the child to serious harm. Consider the impact of the abuse on the kid! Kid was acting out because of dad’s abuse. ii. Lived in Dubai mostly, but son born in Toronto. Mom moved to TO with son after separation and claimed husband was physically and mentally abusing and she feared for kid; dad claimed she abducted the child. iii. Court upheld motion judge’s decision that the husband’s physical and mental abuse of mom exposed the child to serious harm. P(JY) v M(RJL) , 2007 NSCA i. Example of court improperly ignoring family violence. ii. TJ granted divorce on basis on mental cruelty; said it was irrelevant to the divorce.
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45 S(J) v S(M) , 2014 ABPC i. Facts have to be extreme (i.e. sex offender dad) to terminate guardianship completely with no access provided to the bio parent. Has to be heavy duty . ii. Mom claimed registered sex- offender dad was risk to child’s physical, psychological, and emotional safety. Court terminated his guardianship and access based on the evidence. Impact of Extended Family Dix v Thomas , 2006 ONSC i. Court will look at other people in the household (e.g. grandma helping out) as persuasive and relevant factor in examining custody. ii. Context of a mobility case Dad wanted son to live with him in Kingston; kid lived week-on/week-off with both parents. Both parents had significant strengths and weaknesses. iii. Deciding factor was dad’s new spouse who was providing a happy/stable household and wasn’t thwarting access ( mom’s family were much more likely to thwart access ). S(J) v W(R) , 2008 ABQB i. Impact of extended family on determining “best interests.” ii. Where there is competition between the legal guardian and the legal stranger, the court will not wrest custody from lawful guardian without evidence the legal guardian abandoned them. iii. Mom died; her sisters wanted contact order (access) to him. Mom was primary caregiver, but died when kid was 5. Her sisters were afterwards very involved, wanted guardianship and contact . Culture etc. Van de Perre v Edwards , 2001 SCC i. Under s. 2(3) of the FLA, cultural, linguistic etc factors should be considered. Under the common law best interests test, it’s relevant but not determinative. It is context-specific. ii. White mom had baby with black dad; BCCA said it was a critical error by the TJ to fail to give weight to the fact that it’s in the best interest of the kid to live with a parent who would nurture his racial identity; SCC said there was no evidence presented and that relevancy of race/culture is context-specific. Perron v Perron , 2012 ONCA i. Language is a relevant consideration and should be considered under BIC; however, status quo maintained (not going to pull the kids out of school!). ii. Mom wanted to put kids in French Immersion; dad wanted them in French School (mom English speaker, dad French speaker). Variation of Orders Gordon v Goertz , 1996 SCC i. Test for varying custody and access orders. Must compare previous evidence and new evidence to determine best interests of the child. ii. Mom wanted to move to Australia. SCC established that the parent seeking the variation must demonstrate a material change in circumstances of the child since the order; threshold met if th ere’s been a change in the condition/means/needs/circumstances of the child which materially affects the child and which was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge who made the initial order. Guardianship SB v JF , 2008 ABQB REQUESTING GUARDIANSHIP under FLA i. Guardianship is always based on best interests of the child ! If your ex is an immature dick who can’t communicate to facilitate the best situation for the kid, the court’s not going to lean towards giving h im guardianship (because that requires making decisions together). ii. Need a good reason to dispense with guardianship consent when ordering guardianship. iii. Big considerations: a. Will they be able and willing to share guardianship? b. Will they exercise the duties of guardianship in BIC? c. Is it in the BIC to order guardianship? iv. JF (mom) and SB (bio dad), have infant child, IF. They have a strained, high-conflict relationship. She has since remarried to MFB (new dad) and had another child. v. Both original dad and new dad applied to be appointed guardian of IF under the Family Law Act . SB also sought an order for contact. Under statute, JF was the sole guardian because bio dad didn’t meet statutory criteria – she did not consent to his guardianship. vi. A guardianship order must be made with consent of mom (s. 24(1)) unless the court has a good reason to dispense with her consent. Must take into account only BIC to making the order (s. 18).
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46 vii. The evidence led the court to believe that bio dad did not have the ability or willingness to communicate or co- operate on issues affecting the child. Evidence included: refusing to communicate with mom and only communicating through step- dad, referring to child as “my kid” instead of “our kid.” viii. Held: a. Not in IF’s best interests that dad be made guardian; he is immature, he’s prone to exaggeration, he has little appreciation for the needs of 17-month-old baby, inability/unwillingness to communicate with guardian mom, more concerned about his own rights. b. Provided contact order because in BIC. c. In BIC to appoint step-dad as guardian. AM v JM , 2016 ONCA EX PARTE CUSTODY ORDER i. On an ex parte motion without notice, must make full and frank disclosure of all material facts or else order can be set aside. Status quo is influential in determining BIC. ii. Both parents were good parents; kids had been living with Dad with access to Mom; he got an ex parte order giving him custody but the TJ found he had provided incomplete disclosure so the status quo was unlawful. Custody given to mom since the children had thrived in her care previously. iii. Dad appealed the finding that he obtained an unlawful status quo; court held that ex parte order was wrongly given, new status quo was maintained because kids were with mom and doing well. JS v MS , 2014 ABPC MUST CONSIDER BIC i. When considering whether to terminate guardianship under s. 25, need to consider BIC under s. 18. As part of that analysis, court needs to consider greatest possible protection of kid’s physical, emotional, and psychological safety. Sharing Custody/Guardianship Baker v Baker , 1979 ONCA i. Joint custody should only be ordered in exceptional circumstances which rarely are present in cases where custody goes to court! A “realistic and practical approach” is required. Kruger v Kruger , 1979 ONCA i. If the parties can’t cooperate, then joint custody/guardianship should not be ordered. B(S) v F(J) , 2008 ABQB i. COOPERATION IS KEY if no cooperation, no shared guardianship . ii. If the guardian opposes it, need a good reason to dispense with consent under s. 24 FLA. iii. Step-dad and bio-dad sought guardianship; bio-mom consented to step- dad’s claim and opposed bio - dad’s guardianship. iv. Parties were high conflict and never lived together, had no willingness to cooperate or communicate. That alone said court should not dispense with her consent. Bio dad was immature; step-dad was better parent and was in BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD . Kaplanis v Kaplanis , 2005 ONCA i. If you’re gonna order counselling, parents have to buy into it. ii. The sole issue in custody cases is the best interest of the child. iii. For joint custody, there must be evidence the parties can communicate. iv. Dad wanted parallel parenting (i.e. one parent gets particular piece of custodial decision-making, other parent gets other piece) TJ says joint custody isn’t precluded just because parties can’t communicate; ordered joint custody and counselling/ v. ONCA SAYS THE SOLE ISSUE IS BIC need cooperation for joint. Terwi v Krisco , 2008 ABPC i. The key factor looked at is how persistent the parent is in genuinely wanting to be part of child’s life courts will sometimes order joint custody paired with detailed parenting plan/order. ii. Even if it’s high conflict, maximum contact principle applies . iii. Poor communication is not a bar to joint custody. iv. Short relationship; one child. Dad wanted joint; mom wanted sole decision-making for everything except health. Court found that both could provide loving homes, but couldn’t parent together. Chronic conflict was mom’s fault , but need to look at BIC here, ordered joint custody with super-detailed parenting plan so they don’t have to communicate too much. Contact Orders JS v RW , 2008 ABQB AUNTS WANT CONTACT ORDER
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47 i. Where there’s a competition between a legal guardian and legal stranger, court can’t wrest custody from lawful guardian without first demonstrating that the lawful guardian has abandoned or neglected the child ( Bowes ). ii. Contact order based on BIC under s.18; need to get leave for contact order request when not parent or standing in place of parent per s. 35(4). iii. Mom and dad were married and had one kid, separated when child was one. Mom was primary caregiver, but died when child was 5; dad took child back to Newfoundland with him. iv. Mom’s sisters (aunts) wanted contact they had to seek leave under s. 35 of the Family Law because they aren’t parents nor standing in place of parents. In determining whether to grant leave, the court had to consider BIC under s. 18 and the following (s. 35(4) of FLA ): a. The significance of the relationship, if any, between the child and the applicant, and b. The necessity of making an order to facilitate access between the child and applicant. v. Court granted contact order, based on: a. The fact that he was close to his mom’s family when his mom was alive and he lived there; b. The aunts are responsible f or administering his mom’s estate for his benefit; c. He is entitled to know his mom’s family and experience their love and affection; d. Knowing them will enhance his security and well-being; e. Denying contact could jeopardize his emotional health. D(J) v P(C) , ABQB i. When there is competition between legal guardian and stranger, must apply s. 18 BIC test that’s the only test you need to apply. ii. Paternal grandparents wanted guardianship (supported by bio dad); parents had joint custody with primary care and control belonging to mom. Dad had weekend access; changed to alternating weeks between mom and grandparents. iii. Strong relationship between grandparents and kids grandma did everything for them, including school trips; grandpa disciplined. Kids doing very well. Best Interests of Child Van de Perre v Edwards , 2001 SCC i. Where the child’s racial and cultural identity is important , the big question is: which parent will be able to contribute to a healthy racial socialization and overall healthy development of the child? Which parent will facilitate contact and development of racial identity in a way that avoids discord and disharmony? ii. Ultimately culture may play a critical role, but is not determinative ( HD v MH ) BIC reigns. iii. BCCA awarded joint custody to both parents; was critical of TJ’s failure to give weight to the fact that the mixed -race child would need influence of parent who could help nurture his identity. Perron v Perron , 2012 ONCA i. Court can include order requiring kids to attend relevant language school as a condition of awarding custody in order to make sure kids maintain cultural heritage and can connect with parents in their best interests. ii. Dad’s first language was French, mom’s was English (both spoke both). At time of appeal, kids were enrolled in French Immersion school, dad wanted them in full-on French school. iii. ONCA held it was an error not to consider the option of ordering French-language schooling as a condition of awarding sole custody to mom. French immersion increased the risk of linguistic alienation toward dad. Stefurak v Chambers , 2004 ONSC i. Four ways to determine child’s views and preferences: a. evidence of trained professionals (e.g. child psychologists, social workers), evidence of parties/witnesses, judge interviewing child, child testifies . ii. Court cannot delegate to child the disposition of their own fate ! And sometimes views and preferences are unnecessary because common sense prevails . iii. Children who are left out of the custody/access decision-making process feel alienated, angry, fearful . Moving Variation of Parenting Orders Gordon v Goertz , 1996 SCC i. The test for mobility under the Divorce Act and Family Law Act: a. Parents seeking variation must demonstrate a material change since the original order: i. Condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child; ii. Which materially affects the child; and iii. Which was either not foreseen or which could not reasonably have been contemplated by the judge who made the initial order. b. If this test is met, the judge must consider custody and access freshly in light of all the current circumstances and in the BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD . Must have regard to all the relevant circumstances related to the child’s needs and ability of respective parent to satisfy them. Based on:
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48 i. No presumption in favour of custodial parent; ii. Each case turns on its own unique facts; iii. BIC RULES not rights and entitlement of parents; iv. Weigh and balance factors relevant in case, without preconceived notion. c. The judge should consider, along with s. 18 factors: i. Existing custody arrangement and relationship between child and cust. parent. ii. Existing access arrangement and relationship between child and access parent. iii. Desirability of maximizing contact between the child and both parents. iv. Views of the child. v. Custodial parents’ reason for moving, only in the exceptional case where relevant to that parent’s ability to meet the needs of the child. vi. Disruption to the child of a change in custody. vii. Disruption to the child consequent on removal from family, schools, and the community he or she has come to know. d. Maximum contact principle is not determinative. e. Custodial parents do not have an inherent right to move Carter v Brooks . Access Key Principles i. Access is the right of the child, not the parent ( Dix v Thomas, Young ). a. Custodial parent has the duty to ensure, protect and promote BIC which includes facilitating access (because access is ordered based on BIC). b. Role of access parent is to give love and support to the child Young . ii. The test is BIC; underlying principle of maximum contact except where it conflicts with BIC Young . a. Children who have contact with non- custodial parent have better psychological adjustment than kids who don’t. b. Judges rarely deny access, except where there’s risk of physical or emotional harm to the child they only deny in approximately 3% of cases! Application Under the FLA: Best interests test, looking at: o Significance of the relationship; and o Necessity of making the order to facilitate contact. Are they actually going to facilitate the order? Is one parent going to thwart access? Are people going to abide by it? Must consider BIC (s. 35 of FLA) including: o Kid’s physical, psychological, or emotional health would be jeopardized if contact denied? o Whether denial is unreasonable? Can order oral or written communication if that makes more sense e.g. Skype (s. 35(6)). Seeking Access Access Under the Divorce Act i. Court can make an order granting access to either spouse or any other person (s. 16(1)). ii. Rights: a. Unless otherwise ordered, a spouse who has access has the right to make inquiries and to be given info as to the health, education, and welfare of the child (s. 16(5)). b. Does not grant authority for access parent to make major decisions for child Young v Young . iii. The test is BIC based on means, needs, and other circumstances (s. 16(8)). Contact Orders Under the Family Law Act i. Court can make an order providing for a person who is not guardian and a child (s. 35(1) FLA). ii. Only people who can make an application without first seeking leave of the court are (s. 35(2) FLA): a. Parent; b. Guardian; c. Person standing in place of a parent ( in loci ). d. Grandparents (s. 35(3) ) don’t need leave as long as: i. Parents are guardians; ii. Parents live separate and apart or one has died; and iii. Access was interrupted by death or separation. 1. Note that there is no presumptive right to access for grandparents; must still establish that continuing relationship is in BIC C(JL), Johnston iii. When court is granting leave, must consider BIC based on (s. 35(4)): a. Significance of the relationship, and b. Necessity of making the order to facilitate contact.
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49 iv. Must consider BIC in line with s. 18 factors (including family violence), as well as (s. 35(5)): a. Whether the child’s physical, psychological, or emotional health may be jeopardized if contact is denied; AND b. Whether denial of contact is unreasonable. i. C(JL) v L(JL) grandparents sought access, it was important to granddaughter and good for her, and in line with her expressed needs/desires ii. Hardie will the application be stressful for the child? v. Contact can also be ordered via oral or written communication, or any other method (e.g. Skype), and an order can provide for any other matter the court considers appropriate (s. 35(6)). vi. The court can also impose terms and conditions on contact (s. 36). Alienation and Enforcement How do you meaningfully enforce access? i. Failure to enable access for access parent/person is typically treated as contempt of court. a. Issuing fines, censure, imprisonment. b. Problems: fines lower family resources, license to break the law for those who can afford it, imprisonment impacts relationship with the child. ii. Courts can reverse custody as a result, to give the other parent the opportunity. Enforcement under the FLA i. If a person who is granted contact is denied that time, the court can make an enforcement order, including (s. 40 FLA): a. Compensatory time; b. Security; c. Reimbursement for expenses incurred as a result of the denial of the time; d. A penalty not exceeding $100/day for denial of time (max $5k 90 days imprisonment). e. Imprisonment until time with child is given (max 90 days); f. Enforcement of time with the help of an officer to find the child and bring them to applicant. Supervised Access i. Ordered where the parent can’t be trusted with the child alone (e.g. parent is a drug addict). ii. Short-term remedy to resolve parental difficulties over access M(BP) v M(BLDE) Alienation i. Warning signs of alienation ( L(AG) v D(KB) ): a. One-sided view of parents one is all good, one is all bad, idealizes one and devalues the other. b. Vicious vilification of targeted parent; campaign of hatred. c. Trivial, false and irrational reasons to justify hatred. d. Reactions and perceptions unjustified or disproportionate to parent’s behaviours. e. Talks openly to anyone about rejected parent’s perceived shortcomings. f. Extends hatred to extended family and pets (hatred by association). g. No guilt or ambivalence regarding malicious treatment, hatred, etc. h. Stronger but not necessarily healthy psychological bond with alienating parent than with rejecting parent. ii. Alienating parent behaviour includes ( L(AG) v D(KB) ): a. Allowing and insisting the child make decisions about contact. b. Rarely talking about other parent, uninterested in child’s time with other parent after contact, gives cold shoulder, silent treatment, or moody after kid’s return from visit. c. No photos of target parent, removes reminders of other parent. d. Refusal to hear positive comments, quick to discount good times as trivial and unimportant. e. No encouragement of calls to other parent between visits; rationalizes that kid doesn’t ask. f. Tells child fun things were missed during visit with other parent. g. Indulges child with material possessions and privileges. h. Sets few limits or is rigid about routines, rules and expectations. iii. Parental behaviours that make rejection/alienation more likely ( L(AG) v D(KB) ): a. Harsh, rigid and punitive parenting style. b. Outrage at child’s challenge to his/her authority. c. Passivity or withdrawal in face of conflict. d. Immature, self-centered in relation to child. e. Loses temper, angry, demanding, intimidating character traits, but to level of abuse. f. Counter-rejection behaviour. g. Lacks empathetic connection to child. h. Inept and unempathetic pursuit of child, pushes calls and letters, unannounced or embarrassing visits. iv. Test is still BIC and must consider ( L(AG) v D(KB) ): a. Willingness of person seeking custody to facilitate access with the other parent, as is consistent with BIC;
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50 b. Low weight given to views and preferences where child has been alienated, because their views and preferences are not their own ! v. Older children are more likely to vote with their feet if the kid refuses to comply with a court order that has them going to the alienated parent, there’s not much that can be done about it ( L(N) v M(RR) ). a. “Courts have recognized that older children will often make their own residential choice, regardless what the court says, and let their feet do the talking.” ( L(N) v M(RR) ). b. Orders creating barriers between the kids and the people they have bonded with (i.e. alienating parent) may just serve to isolate older kids who refuse to stay with alienated parent. ( L(N) v M(RR) ). Young v Young , 1993 SCC i. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD ALWAYS WINS. ii. Talking about religion with kids is OK custodial parent can’t stop that even if they have decision -making power regarding kids’ religion. No restriction on sharing religion, unless not in BIC. iii. Marriage broke down largely due to religious differences; dad converted to Jehovah’s Witness religion and gave kids instructions about his religion during access periods. Mom had custody, dad had access. iv. Court enunciates the following principles re access: a. It’s the right of the child, not the parent . b. BIC governs, except where access conflicts with BIC . c. Need to consider whether there’s a risk of harm to the children outweighing benefit of full access to dad’s values . d. There is value in getting to know the access parent . C(JL) v L(JL) , 2016 ABPC i. Grandparents have no presumptive right to access and must discharge onus of showing that continuing relationship is BIC ( Johnston ). ii. C ourt will consider whether denying contact will jeopardize kid’s physical, psychological, or emotional health and whether guardian’s refusal is unreasonable. iii. Note that grandparents don’t need leave to request access under s. 35 of FLA. i. Maternal grandparents wanted contact under s. 35 of the FLA; they had access every 3-4 weeks for 4-5 hours, child had counsel who focused on BIC. The child’s wishes were to sleep over at Grandma’s house, for Grandma to come visit, for everything in her room to be pink, and to be happy, and to share a doughnut with her mom and mom’s bf, and to jump in the leaves. ii. Grandma’s testimony was similar – granddaughter kept asking when she will see her. Hardie v Payne , 2010 ABQB i. Court won’t intervene in parent’s view of child’s best interests where their views are being contested regarding contact unless the parents are unable to act in kids’ best interest. ii. The existence of a relationship (even a biological one) is not enough to establish the kind of relationship required to grant leave in an action for contact. iii. NEED TO LOOK AT SIGNIFICANCE OF RELATIONSHIP. iv. Big, negative ramifications because dad was opposing and no status quo really a contact action would be expensive and take resources away from kid, plus it would be stressful for him. v. Sister wanted contact under FLA with her 13-year-old brother; dad opposed contact. She only had minimal contact with him over last 7 years, but previously had daily caregiving contact with him when he was young. vi. She failed to establish BIC by showing her brot her’s physical, psychological or emotional health would be jeopardized if the application was not granted. L(AG) v D(KB) , 2009 ONSC i. Long list of factors to consider when assessing alienation (see above). ii. Test remains BIC, even when there’s alienation. Consider the willingness of the parent seeking custody to facilitate access with the other parent as is consistent with BIC. iii. Low weight to views and preferences where kid has been alienated. iv. Mom slowly began to alienate dad from kids’ lives (di sobeyed access orders), influenced kids to say negative things about their dad; maternal grandmother was also a bad influence. Dad alleged alienation and sought sole custody and no access to mom except for counselling. v. An assessment recommended custody be granted to dad. L(N) v M(RR) , 2016 ONCA i. Older kids will vote with their feet; not much can be done to force them to go to an alienated parent’s house. ii. To use the order to isolate the children from the alienating parent (i.e. by imposing sanctions for having them stay over) just services to isolate the kids which is not in their BIC. iii. Older kids can miss the period where reunification is still possible. Kids’ wishes are warped, but they’re “strong, consistent and long- lasting.” Court decided the boys could do what they want.
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51 LSUC v Curtis , 1993 i. Counselling disobedience of a court order is ordinarily breach of professional negligence, but it is acceptable where: a. Reasonable and honest belief of imminent risk or danger to the child; b. Immediate application to a court to have the issue determined; c. If court does not change the order, so be it must comply with the order. ii. What to do when you suspect there is abuse! iii. Mother alleged husband was abusive, lawyer recommended in writing that her colleague take a bunch of steps in response. The colleague made the mistake of giving the letter to the client mom, who went underground for a year with the child as a result. Potential Abuse TAKE THE FOLLOWING STEPS: ( LSUC v Curtis ): Contact local Children’s Aid Society – find out what they intend to do. Advise lawyer for child (and put it in writing); Seriously consider not allowing the child to be transferred (breach the order); Advise other party’s lawyer that you recommend no further contact; Motion to vary; Consider calling the police; o If the motion t o vary doesn’t work… that’s it. You have to comply. Conduct is acceptable where: 1) Reasonable but honest belief there’s imminent risk of danger to the child; 2) Immediate application to the court to have issue determined. a. No change? Must comply with order. Child Support Overview: i. Federal Child Support Guidelines apply to: a. Married and unmarried parents; b. Context of separation and divorce. ii. Objectives (s. 1 CSG): a. Establish a fair standard to support children, to ensure they continue to benefit from the financial means of both spouses. b. Reduce conflict by making the calculation of support objective. c. Encourage settlement. d. Improve efficiency by providing guidance. e. Ensure consistency for spouses and children in similar circumstances. How much should a step-parent pay? Basically unpredictable. General rule is that the contribution to be paid by bio parent should be assessed separately from that of step-parent, but all persons who owe CS are “jointly and severally liable.” Trends: o (1) Non-mathematical weigh factors to determine reduction. o (2) Subtraction payments by non-custodial parent subtracted from full amount step-parent owes. o (3) Cumulative full table amount. o (4) Apportionment between step-parent and bio parent (however makes sense). Statistics Child Support Statistics i. 64% of non-custodial parents pay CS (92% dads). ii. Cs received by 41% of resident parents (93% moms). iii. 19% of parents who share parenting pay CS. iv. 93% of payors say they fully comply; 75% of recipients say they received full amount. v. Most common amount $3k - $5k per year. vi. Monthly CS most common (55%). vii. 55% of all written arrangements registered with maintenance enforcement program.
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52 Child Support Agreements i. 3% have no written/verbal CS arrangement. ii. 71% have written arrangements. iii. 35% used lawyers to draft agreements. iv. 37% were court ordered. Child Support Orders Under Statute The Divorce Act i. Who is a child? a. Child of the marriage under s. 2(1) DA: i. Child of two spouses/former spouses who, at the material time, is: 1. Under the age of majority and has not withdrawn from their charge; or 2. Is over the age of majority and still under their care but unable to withdraw due to illness, disability, or other cause . ii. Court can make an order requiring a spouse to pay CS for any/all COM (s. 15.1(1)). a. Must be done in line with Federal Child Support Guidelines (s. 15.1(3)). i. However can deviate from CSG s if (s. 15.1(5)): 1. (a) A different order or arrangement (e.g. property/support) would benefit the child another way, or other arrangements are made; AND 2. (b) ordering CS under the CSGs would be inequitable . ii. Or if on consent of the parties, as long as court’s satisfied there are reasonable arrangements made for the child in light of CSG (s. 15.1(7) and (8)). 1. E.g. if parties are fine with not ordering table amount because their incomes are sufficient to take care of the child. Have to give evidence and be specific! b. Order can be (s. 15.1(4)): i. Interim; 1. e.g. while other money stuff is being figured out. ii. Definite; 1. Until the end of the first post-secondary degree or diploma (s. 2 DA). iii. Indefinite. 1. i.e. if the kid is ill (s. 2(1) DA) and maybe can never withdraw. c. Order can also impose terms/conditions as court thinks fit and just (s. 15.1(4)). Step Parents under the Divorce Act ii. Spouses who are/were married to each other are included. iii. A child of the marriage includes a child for whom the spouses stand in place of parents or one is the parent and the other stands in place of a parent (s. 2(2)). STEP PARENTS iv. Spouse standing in place may be required to pay CS if (s. 5): a. Court considers it appropriate; b. Having regard to CSG and other parent’s legal duty to support child. v. Relevant period: a. At time of the application for child support, consider BIC. b. Consider behaviour at the time of the existence of the parental relationship ( Chartier ). vi. Test for “Standing in Place of a Parent” (Chartier ): a. Objective test examining the nature of the relationship : i. Intention formal expression of it, and inferred from the formation of a family unit. ii. What is the child’s perspective? Important factor. iii. Step- parent’s perspective. iv. Whether the child participates in the extended family unit. v. Whether the person provides financially (depending on ability to pay). vi. Whether the person disciplines the child as a parent would. vii. Whether the person represents to the world that they are responsible for the child (e.g. changing last name)? viii. Nature/existence of the relationship between the child and absent parent. vii. If test finds they’re standing in place of parent, then child is COM and treated as if born of the marriage. Child Support Orders Under the FLA Family Law Act i. Who is a child? a. Every parent has an obligation to support his/her child (s. 49(1)). b. A child is a person who is (s. 46(b)): i. Under 18; or
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53 ii. 18-22 and can’t withdraw because they’re a full -time student . 1. DOES NOT INCLUDE ILLNESS AND CAPS DEFINITION AT 22 in AB (not in Ontario, found unconstitutional in Coates . ii. The following people can bring an application for CS (s. 50(1)): a. The child ; b. Parent or guardian; c. Person who has care or control of the child ; - IN LOCO PARENTIS! d. Anyone who seeks leave and court allows. iii. Court can make a CS order as long as (s. 50(2)): a. Parents living separate and apart; b. Court doesn’t expect them to live together; c. Person neglected to provide necessaries of life to the child; or d. Child is not in their care and control. iv. How long? a. Capped at age 22 (s. 46(b)) note that can’t be indefinite due to sickness, unlike DA. v. Step-Parents: a. Parent includes person standing in place of a parent (s. 47). b. Rule: i. Must be AIP or spouse AND ii. Must have demonstrated “settled intention” under CL in loco parentis test. (s. 48(1) FLA). c. Relevant period: i. At time of the application for child support, consider BIC. ii. Consider behaviour at the time of the existence of the parental relationship ( Chartier ). d. Test for “Standing in Place of a Parent” (Chartier ): i. Objective test examining the nature of the relationship : 1. Intention formal expression of it, and inferred from the formation of a family unit. 2. What is the child’s perspective? Important factor. 3. Step- parent’s perspective. 4. Whether the child participates in the extended family unit. 5. Whether the person provides financially (depending on ability to pay). 6. Whether the person disciplines the child as a parent would. 7. Whether the person represents to the world that they are responsible for the child (e.g. changing last name)? 8. Nature/existence of the relationship between the child and absent parent. Child Support: Step-Parents Chartier v Chartier , 1999 SCC i. Step parents can’t unilaterally withdraw/walk away from kids ( IT’S NOT IN BIC ). ii. Once a person is found to stand in the place of a parent, can’t unilaterally withdraw. Purpose of including step- parents in Child Support under DA is to ensure the separation/divorce affects the kids as little as possible. iii. Step dad wasn’t bio dad; issue wa s whether he could unilaterally withdraw from that relationship after separating from the mom or, did he need to pay CS? iv. Evidence: a. Amended birth certificate to state him as a father; discussed adoption; once they separated however he was completely cut off. v. SCC Held: a. Can’t unilaterally withdraw from acting as a step - parent; it can’t possibly be in the best interests of the child. b. Material time is at the time of application for CS H(KA) v H(RS) , 2001 ABPC i. Court might end in loco parentis Child Support obligations if : a. An older child chooses to unilaterally withdraw , and b. There is enough money coming from other sources to take care of kid (e.g. other step-parent, bio parent, etc.). ii. Still BIC test though. iii. Step- dad 1 was going to adopt kid at one point; didn’t end up adopting her. She was registered in school under his name, definitely a settled intention. The child withdrew from the relationship with SD 1 and built a relationship with step-dad 2 instead. iv. Key differences from Chartier : a. Kid was older and was more able to personally change nature of relationship; b. It was the kid, not the step-parent, who changed the nature of the relationship; c. There are two other people who can pay (mom and SD2), so t here’s enough money to go around.
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54 M(ST) v F(MD) , 2002 ABQB i. There is a trend that court will find in loco parentis and order CS focus remains on BIC . ii. Not entirely consistent with H(KA) because there were other support sources and yet court didn’t end CS obligation for step-dad after child unilaterally withdrew. iii. Just because there are other sources, including a new step- parent, doesn’t mean CS will end. iv. Child was 7.5; there was no relationship between him and the step-child after separation. Appellant since remarried with new husband who had two kids of his own. Child Support: How Long? Achkewich v Achkewich , 1998 ABQB i. General rules for extending CS due to education: a. There may be a moral obligation to support a child’s education ( C v C ). ii. Cases in which CS may be denied: a. Part-time studies; b. Child has resources (good job? Trust fund?); c. Questionable intention to return to school; d. Second degree contingent upon the parents ; if they are highly educated, or have always supported this child in getting 2 nd degree, court may order support. Wahl v Wahl , 2000 ABQB i. Factors to consider in education-related CS: a. Enrollment pursuing post- sec is usually considered a “cause” for failure to withdraw; i. TEST FOR SCHOOL ( Welsh ): 1. Child must have aptitude that is reasonably likely to lead to success; 2. Must pursue school with diligence; 3. Reasonable likelihood it will lead to gainful and self-supporting employment. b. Going away for school need compelling reasons to go away for travel expenses to factor in; c. Student loans and financial situation child expected to contribute to education to fullest extent possible e.g. court will order that they have to work during the summer; d. Career plans reasonableness and aptitude; e. Age test is dependency, not age; f. Past academic performance success in chosen course of studies e.g. order to maintain grades ; g. Parental plans did parents agree? Courts will enforce; h. Agreement agreement that her education would be supported? (here: yes); ii. Relationship and unilateral termination for CS: a. Unilateral termination is a factor , not final look at context (abuse?); b. Greater weight given to termination as kid gets older makes withdrawal more meaningful; c. Parents might have to support kids no matter what? d. Agreement made to support her education during parents’ relationship . iii. Daughter used school money to go to Egypt against dad’s wishes; he cut off child support and didn’t support her education choices. Agreement said that if she wanted to go to school past 18 th bday, CS would continue until she was 21 or until she discontinued her education . iv. The daughter withdrew from dad through an angry letter and threatened to sue him for CS. v. Court held she was still a COM and he was ordered to pay CS to her directly, not during summer months she had to get a job. Reviewable based on her grades, she also had to prepare a budget every year and give it to him. B(L) v V(PA) , 2009 ABQB i. What section does it fall under s. 3(2) or s. 7? -> doesn’t matter. a. TABLE AMOUNT can’t apply when kid isn’t living with either parent. b. Post-secondary expenses must then fall under s. 7. ii. What if the kid has money ( Lewi v Lewi )? a. Child should contribute if they can ( meaningful and reasonable contribution ). b. Need to balance liquidation of the trust fund against ability to contribute . c. No requirement for the fund to be depleted for the kid to go to the parent. iii. Kid had trust account intended to provide for their post-secondary education; issue was whether the money off-sets child support obligations. One of the kids wanted to go to school, and some money was withdrawn as he was working on a first degree and not living at home , $108k remained. What happens deplete the funds first, or preserve the funds for a second degree?
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55 Federal Child Support Guidelines Unlike the SSAGs, these are legislation and thus law! Framework: i. Objectives s. 1 ii. Presumptive table amount s. 3 iii. Special rules for high income (>$150k) s. 4 iv. Rules to determine income s. 15-18 v. Ability to impute income s. 19 vi. List of special or extraordinary expenses s. 7 vii. Adjustments based on: a. Shared parenting s. 9 b. Step-parenting s. 5 c. Split custody s. 8 i. Note that the table amount applies when there is one parent with sole custody ; what happens if there are kids going between the homes? ( see below ) viii. Undue hardship s. 9 a. What happens if it’s not fair in the end and the other party can’t pay it? Key Elements: i. Which table, which province? ii. How many children (who are actually a child of the marriage )? iii. Income of the payor. a. Unless otherwise provided, CS for children under the age of majority is the table amount and s. 7 extraordinary expenses. Split Custody i. Section 8 allows for a set-off the amount of CS is the difference between the two table amounts where each spouse has custody of at least one child. ii. Basically figure out how much mom would pay, how much dad would pay, and just have the higher of the two pay the difference. Shared Custody i. Under s. 9 there’s a 40% threshold above which the amount of CS is determined based one: a. Set-off, b. Factoring increased costs of shared parenting (e.g. two bedrooms, duplicates of everything can increase costs for the parents); c. Conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and of any child for whom support is sought. ii. Application: a. Once 40% threshold met, look at: i. Table amount for mom and dad, respectively, and then figure out the difference between the two so the person paying more is the only one paying the difference ( set off ). ii. Increased costs of shared custody (increased expenses of having two of everything?) iii. Conditions, means, needs and other circumstances (is one parent relying heavily on CS? Does the child have special needs?). iii. What does 40% mean??? a. No right answer. i. Hours? Overnights? Days? b. In real life, try to figure out if client is trying to reduce child support or if they actually want to spend more time with their kid . Incomes over $150k i. Under s. 4, over >$150k the CS is: a. The table amount, OR b. Table amount plus something else (based on needs, means, other circumstances and s. 7), if the table amount alone is inappropriate. i. Highly discretionary, see R v R (2002) ONCA and Ewing . ii. Ultimately looking a BIC ( R v R ). a. Per Francis v Baker : i. Table is presumed to be the appropriate amount , onus is on the person seeking to rebut the presumption of the table. ii. Divorce should affect the children as little as possible. iii. Wealthy kids = reasonable needs include reasonable and discretionary expenses. iv. Parent claiming table is too high must show that budgeted child expenses are unreasonable, that it has become a transfer of wealth as a result. iii. If wealth is post-separation, kids should be able to benefit as they would if parents were still together! ( R v R ).
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56 iv. CS for wealthy families includes discretionary spending as long as budget is reasonable given increase in income ( R v R ). v. If income fluctuates, can do top-ups KLH v SH vi. Note that this hasn’t changed since 1997 - $150k is not that high of an income anymore, especially in big cities ! Special or Extraordinary Expenses i. Special Expenses: a. Child care due to custodial parent’s illness, employment, disability or education ( s. 7(1)(a)); i. Cannot be to go hang out with friends, etc ! b. Medical and dental attributed to child (s. 7(1)(b)); c. Health related expenses over $100/year (not covered by insurance) orthodontics, professional counselling, OT, speech therapy, drugs, hearing aids, glasses, contacts (s. 7(1)(c)). ii. Extraordinary Expenses: a. Extraordinary primary/secondary school or other educational programs (s. 7(1)(d)). b. Post-Secondary s. 7(1)(e). c. Extraordinary extra-curricular activities s. 7(1)(f). iii. Special expenses are generally health-related; extraordinary are generally extracurriculars, education expenses, etc. iv. Means: a. Amounts the recipient can’t reasonably cover with table amount OR amounts in relation to recipient’s income ( including table ), nature and number of programs/activities, special needs and talents, overall cost, any other relevant factors . b. Generally s. 7 expenses are shared in proportion to income if parents have roughly equal income, they will share s. 7 expenses roughly equally (s. 7(2)). c. Take into account subsidies, benefits, income tax deductions . v. General application: a. Amounts need to be high to fall into s. 7. b. Special amounts will automatically be special amounts. c. The lower the table amount, more likely it will be a s. 7 expense (because an expense is more expensive for a low-income family!). Undue Hardship (s. 10(1)). i. This is an extremely high threshold , but gets used if someone truly can’ t support themselves. ii. Factors outlined under s. 10(2) outline circumstances which cause undue hardship. a. Unusually high debt reasonably incurred to support spouses and children prior to separation, or earn a living; i. Need to show you’re paying & the debt is outstanding. b. Unusually high expenses in relation to exercising access; i. Has to be really high not just a couple tanks of gas; needs to be so high that there’s not much money left for CS and themselves. c. Legal duty to support a person; i. Court likely won’t be sympathetic; first family first. d. Legal duty to support a child who is under the age of majority or over the age of majority but can’t obtain necessaries of life due to illness, disability, or other cause ; e. Legal duty to support a person who is unable to obtain necessaries due to illness/disability . iii. Section 10(3) obliges court to consider SOL between the two houses; it’s not undue hardship if the payor’s household would have a higher SOL than the recipient. iv. Section 10(5) there could be two amounts; a lo wer one while there’s another obligation and higher one after obligation is paid off. Tax i. Not taxable in the hands of recipient, not deductible in hands of payor. Income i. Income is calculated in accordance with CSB ss. 16-20 however, may accept another amount on the consent of both parties if it’s reasonable and there’s sufficient disclosure ( s. 15(2)). ii. Disclosure means (s. 21): a. Last three income tax returns and NOA/NORA (pay stubs, letter from employer showing that this year’s will be similar); b. Use last year’s line 150 amount adjusted in accordance with Schedule 3 od FCSG (s. 16) to determine the amount of CS going forward; can adjust it next year when you get the new tax return. i. Schedule 3 adjustments include deductions (e.g. union dues, spousal support being paid/received should be taken out of their income, universal child care benefit, social assistance not attributable to the spouse); ii. Add in actual amount of dividends received; actual CGs, CCAs deducted; iii. Use the net self-employment income (including NAL salaries/benefits). c. The complicated ones are when they get a bonus, getting paid dividends , etc. iii. Under s. 17(1) court can determine what’s fair and reasonable in light of the pattern/fluctuation/receipt of income etc. a. It’s not unrea sonable to leave out bonus amount and then have top-up lump sum amount at the end of the year when one spouse gets their bonus (rather than having them pay and then it turns out they never got their bonus and they’ve overpaid).
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57 b. Keep an eye out for things you should be asking questions about is there trust income? Is there personal corporation income? Etc. iv. Unreasonable salaries paid to NAL people are put BACK IN to income within s. 18(1). It’s not about figuring out the exact right number, it’s about trying to make sure there’s enough money for the child. Imputing Income i. The duty to disclose is part of the duty to pay child support Cunningham a. Disclosure doesn’t just require providing statements, but also sufficient explanation of where the money is coming from to be able to tell if it’s a reasonable picture of income! – Cunningham ii. The court can impute income where the spouse (s. 19(1)): a. Is intentionally under- or unemployed (except out of health or educational needs of spouse or the child). b. Is exempt from paying income tax; c. Lives in a country that has lower income tax rates than in Canada; d. Diverts income such that it affects CS amount; e. Is not reasonably utilizing property to generate income; i. On recipient’s side too! For example, blowing through your lump sum spousal support or not investing your huge spousal support payout. f. Failed to provide information when under legal obligation to do so; g. Unreasonably deducts expenses from income; h. Receives significant income from dividends, CGs, or other sources taxed at a lower rate; i. Is a beneficiary under a trust and is/will receive income/benefits from it. i. Bak v Dobell money from grandparents was capital but not income; more like gifts. ii. Bak v Dobell lifestyle isn’t enough to impute (not standalone ground), need evidence that the payor has undisclosed income iii. HIGH BAR: Unusual gifts can be income where ( Bak v Dobell ) determined based on: a. Regularity of the gift; b. Duration of the receipt; c. Part of family’s income during cohab – entrenched a lifestyle?; d. Something make them exceptional?; e. Do more than provide basic standard of living?; f. Income generated from gifts? How much?; g. Paid to support adult child through crisis or disability (i.e. Bak )? h. Likely to continue? i. True purpose and nature? iv. Reasonableness of deduction is not governed by whether it is deductible under the ITA (s. 19(2)). a. Reasonableness is to be decided by the court in assessing the payor’s reported income! – Cunningham v. If income doesn’t fairly reflect actual income, the court can add stuff back in! Cunningham Cunningham v Seveny , 2017 i. Onus is on the person claiming expenses to show that the expenses are reasonable/unreasonable. ii. Rule is that the content of the disclose has to be enough for meaningful review must be complete and comprehensible . Person claiming deductions needs to explain why there’s no personal benefit! iii. Some personal benefits may be added back into income ( Roseberry ): a. Personal use of corporate vehicles; b. Computers, cell phones, personal benefits (e.g. travel); c. Entertainment and promotional expenses; d. Non- arm’s length expenditures . iv. Dad was self-employed through his own corporation and claiming a ton of deductions to reduce his actual income. v. TJ screwed up and put the onus on the applicant to show that the expenses were unreasonable; in reality, it’s the opposite when corporation is claiming weird expenses, must also balance necessity of expense against using the money for child support (i.e. for benefit and BIC!). vi. Level of scrutiny over finances should match level of control the person ahas over the corporation and how much information they actually have. Bak v Dobell , 2007 ONCA vii. Section 19(1) is not closed re sources of income. Long list of potential situations where gifts can potentially be imputed into income under s. 19(1). i. In determining whether unusual gifts are income, look at: 1. Regularity of the gift; 2. Duration of the receipt; 3. Whether the gifts were part of the family’s income during cohabitation and entrenched a certain lifestyle;
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58 4. Income generated by the gifts in proportion to payor’s income; 5. Are the gifts exceptional? 6. Do the gifts do more than provide a basic standard of living? 7. Income generated by the gifts compared to payor’s entire income? 8. Paid to support an adult child in crisis? viii. Dad wanted to lower child support obligation; ex wanted to impute income based on the lifestyle due to money he was receiving from his parents (he was mentally ill, couldn’t work, etc.) A(AE) v E(H) , 2016 ABPC ix. Gift found to be income and imputed because he received money from parents lived with them got new credit cards spent the money gambling was earning income from drug trafficking but couldn’t figure out how much so imputed $$$ based on lifestyle. Hanmore v Hanmore , 2000 ABCA x. HIGH THRESHOLD for undue hardship has to be seriously hard. xi. Need to meet two-stage test under s. 10 of CSG = actual proof of what you’re claiming, and need to show household would enjoy lower SOL than recipient household if CS isn’t reduced. xii. If payor has higher SOL = not undue hardship. xiii. Hardship must be “exceptional, excessive, disproportionate.” xiv. A general claim regarding inability to pay isn’t enough – need to actually show that hardship will exist. Can’t assume that money won’t be enough NEED PROOF!!! R v R , 2002 ONCA xv. Discretion must be applied to high income earners AND for decrease in income after separation. xvi. Per Francis v Baker : a. Table assumed to be appropriate amount, onus is on person seeking to rebut the presumption of the table . b. Divorce should affect kids as little as possible. c. Wealthy kids have different reasonable needs includes discretionary expenses . d. Parent claiming table is too high must show budgeting child expenses are unreasonable; that it has become a transfer of wealth as a result. xvii. Kids get to share in post-separation increases in income , kids should be able to benefit just as they would have if the parents were still together. xviii. CS for wealthy families ought to include large element of discretionary spending . a. TJ largely ignored her budget because it included things that the family had never done before ONCA says that’s the wrong approach, because it’s not unreasonable to include new things where there’s an increase in income. b. Ask: is the budget reasonable given the increase in income . xix. Married for 8 years, 4 kids together mom stayed at home, dad’s income after separation was $4.1M (due to dramatic rise post-separation). TJ said the $80k/month she was getting was way too high even though it was table amount and reduced it to $12k per month plus s. 7 for private schools , etc. xx. Held: a. TJ made two errors: i. Based order on lifestyle and income during marriage; failed to take into account whether mom’s budget was reasonable. b. Lots of discretion under s. 4 need to focus on the considerations relevant to meet the children’s needs – final test is BIC. c. Kids get to share in post-separation increases in wealth. d. Ask: is the budget reasonable given the increase in income? Leonelli-Contino v Contino , 2005 SCC xxi. Whether it is a first order or a variation impacts analysis under s. 9 if it’s a variation, look at impact of the change on the receiver. xxii. Dad’s income was $87k, mom’s was $55k. She asked him to take the kid one extra day so that she could go to school; it brought dad to 40% threshold so he brought a request to vary CS. xxiii. SCC says: a. The specific language of s. 9 warrants emphasis on flexibility and fairness. b. Because it was a variation , and the mom’s lifestyle (new house etc.) had relied on that, they weren’t going to have a huge difference so it did n’t have too big of an impact on the recipient. c. No presumption of table CS for shared custody cases under s. 9. d. No presumption that meeting 40% threshold will result in reduced amount of CS; could still be full table. e. No presumption of straight set-off. f. Ultimately, HIGHLY DISCRETIONARY .
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59 Retroactive CS Remember that the 3 years’ disclosure requirement is to try and make sure that the CS order is close enough to the person’s a ctual income. If you were trying to figure out income, you’d be basing it on last year’s line 150 amount and so on. Usually CS will change in April (i.e. on May 1 st based on previous years’ income). Retro is usually invoked where: 1. Child support wasn’t paid; or 2. Where the paying parent doesn’t disclose the fact that they got a raise i.e. CS set in 2012 but didn’t disclose the raise they got in 2014 and are seeking top-up . Rule: Payor parents have the obligation to disclose increases in their income usually done by exchanging tax returns ( DBS v SRG ). Court will also look at the r eason for the delay on the payor’s side (i.e. why wasn’t it disclosed?), and on the recipient’s side (i.e. were they afraid to ask?) Look at it holistically what are the circumstances for the parties and for the child? Look at the date of notice the start date (for counting backwards by three years) is from the date asked, and not from the date the income changed. a. So can’t come to court and say the payor owes a huge lump sum of money for the last 10 years! b. Notice can be informal, like an email asking if the income has gone up. If it’s informal, then it’s subject to proof. Have written proof of asking! Framework: 1. Is the retroactive award appropriate? a. Reason for delay in seeking support? b. Conduct of the payor parent? c. Past and present circumstances of the child? i. Has the child been missing out, did they need the money? d. Hardship imposed on payor parent? i. Would retroactively imposing the duty to pay be really hard for the payor? Or can they easily pay? 2. What period should the award cover? a. Start date is date of notice can be informal notice. b. Generally up to 3 years prior. c. Blameworthy conduct by the payor may result in an award going back to the time of change. i. E.g. situations where the recipient just found out and asked very fact-specific. Generally will not go back beyond three years. ii. Justice Abella says Child Support is the right of the child and a joint obligation from both parents; we shouldn’t look at blameworthy conduct in this case because we don’t look at it in any other case! 3. Child must be a child of the marriage purpose is looking for money to support the child. Remember that you’re always basing it on year before, even when calculating the retro amount. So your 2017 amount is based on 2016 amount, etc. DBS v SRG , 2006 SCC i. Retroactive claims are permissible where : a. Up to three years in the past ; b. Child is still COM at the time application is made; and c. Recipient gives effective notice to the payor whose income has changed . ii. Recipients have a positive duty to actively explore and pursue support increases to which children may be entitled e.g. exchanging tax slips . iii. Support payors have positive duty to increase CS when income increases . iv. Unreasonable delay can be a factor . McBean v McBean , 2017 ABQB i. Delay by the recipient parent in bringing the application, if found to be unreasonable, favours against a retroactive child support award in respect to the payor parent’s interest. Facts: Parties entered into their own agreement that was higher than the table amount, because his income was high and difficult to predict. He agreed to pay $4500 per month, based on income of $300k. So, based on full financial disclosure plus top-up. They failed to exchange disclosure, she was looking for 10 years with retro.In 2015 she brought a claim for $1.1M in retro support; he claimed he had actually overpaid and not underpaid! Issues: Held:
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60 Analysis: Applying first factor: a. What’s the reason for delay? She asked a couple times, but never actually filed a claim or followed through, and so that worked against her and made her delay unreasonable. No barriers existed she had the money for a lawyer, has access to senior counsel. b. What’s the conduct of the p ayor parent? Did it privilege his own interests over the kids? No he had lots of evidence that he was providing sufficient support, and frequently gave the kids money directly. One kid lived with him for a year and he never sought support from her. He never prioritized his own needs over the kids, and big factor of him paying for the kids’ education outside of CS. Failing to disclose a significant increase may be blameworthy conduct… but it was not the case here. c. Circumstances of the children? Kids are entitled to a standard of living similar to what they would enjoy if both parents were together. Argument is less compelling if the kid is already receiving all of the advantages they would be if both parents were supporting them. d. Hardship? No hardship for him to pay he had huge means. This is the only factor in her favour. Court held that no retro was ordered huge factor that dad was already paying for post-secondary education, she was financially fine, plus there was very little time left to go (becaus e they are finishing degrees and won’t be COM soon!). Class Notes:
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