week 4 case briefs
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Jun 18, 2024
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Chap 4 Disparate impact Note: Discriminatory motive is not a required element. The gravamen of the offense is the unjustified impact of the policy or action. A.
Basic theory and method of proof Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
Facts:
New hires were employed only in the Labor Department, where the highest-paying jobs existed, and were paid less than the lowest-paying jobs in the other four departments, which employed only whites.
Promotions were typically made based on job seniority within each department.
The company required a high school education for initial assignments to any department except labor and for transfers from coal handling to any inside department.
Despite the high school requirement, white employees hired before its institution continued to perform satisfactorily and achieve promotions in the operating departments.
On July 2, 1965, the company instituted further requirements for new employees. To qualify for placement in any department other than labor, it became necessary to have a high school diploma and register satisfactory scores on two professionally prepared aptitude tests: the Wonderlic Personnel Test (which purports to measure general intelligence) and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test.
In September 1965, the company began allowing employees without a high school education to qualify for transfer by passing the two aforementioned tests.
Procedural History:
The District Court found that the company openly discriminated on the basis of race prior
to July 2, 1965, but concluded that Title VII was intended to be prospective only, and the impact of prior inequities was beyond the reach of the Act.
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court in part, holding that residual discrimination from prior employment practices was not insulated from remedial action.
The Court of Appeals noted that the high school diploma requirement and intelligence tests had been applied fairly to both whites and African Americans but had a disparate impact due to the inferior education received by African Americans.
Issue:
Whether the high school diploma and general intelligence test requirements violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 due to their disparate impact on African American employees.
Holding:
The Court of Appeals held that the company adopted the diploma and test requirements without any intention to discriminate against African American employees. However, good intent or the absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures that operate as built-in headwinds for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.
The Supreme Court held that the company's lack of discriminatory intent did not justify the requirements that disproportionately excluded African Americans and were unrelated to job performance.
Rule:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 mandates the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when these barriers operate to discriminate based on race or other impermissible classifications.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court ruled that the high school completion requirement and general intelligence tests (Wonderlic Personnel Test and Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test) were not shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful job performance. The company failed to prove these requirements were necessary for the jobs in question. The judgment emphasized that employment practices must be related to job performance to be permissible under Title VII.
Connecticut v Teal Facts:
Respondents Winnie Teal, Rose Walker, Edith Latney, and Grace Clark are black employees of the Department of Income Maintenance of the State of Connecticut.
Each was promoted provisionally to the position of Welfare Eligibility Supervisor and served in that capacity for almost two years.
To attain permanent status as supervisors, they had to pass a selection process, starting with a written examination administered on December 2, 1978.
Of the 329 candidates who took the exam, 48 identified as black and 259 as white. The passing score was set at 65.
Only 17% of the black candidates passed the exam, approximately 68% of the passing rate for white candidates.
The four respondents failed the examination and were thus excluded from further consideration for permanent supervisory positions.
Over a year later, and about a month before trial, petitioners made promotions from the eligibility list generated by the exam, considering past work performance, supervisor recommendations, and, to a lesser extent, seniority.
An affirmative action program was applied to ensure a significant number of minority supervisors. Of the 46 persons promoted to permanent supervisory positions, 11 were black and 35 were white.
Overall, 22.9% of black candidates were promoted, compared to 13.5% of white candidates. Petitioners argued that this bottom-line result should be a complete defense to
respondents' suit.
Procedural History:
The case was brought to challenge the use of the written examination as a barrier to permanent supervisory positions, alleging it had a discriminatory impact on black candidates.
Issue:
Whether the use of a written examination that disproportionately excludes black candidates from promotion violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, despite an overall promotion rate that favors black candidates.
Holding:
The Supreme Court held that an employer cannot use a non-job-related barrier that has a significant adverse impact on minority candidates as a defense to a claim of discrimination, even if the overall promotion rate is more favorable to minorities.
Rule:
Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII prohibits the use of discriminatory, artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment that limit or classify applicants in any way that would deprive them of employment opportunities based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
An employer's good faith efforts and a non-discriminatory workforce might assist in rebutting an inference of intentional discrimination, but they do not serve as a defense to the use of discriminatory barriers.
Analysis:
The Court emphasized that the focus should be on the individual employment opportunity
denied due to the non-job-related barrier.
The passing rate disparity on the written test constituted a significant adverse effect on black candidates, demonstrating an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.
The "bottom-line" result of overall promotions being favorable to black candidates did not negate the discriminatory impact of the written exam on individual respondents.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents, finding that the written examination used by the Department of Income Maintenance was an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.
Dothard v Rawlinson Facts:
Diane Rawlinson, a 22-year-old college graduate with a major in correctional psychology, sought employment with the Alabama Board of Corrections as a prison guard, known in Alabama as a correctional counselor.
She was denied employment because she did not meet the minimum weight requirement of 120 pounds established by an Alabama statute, which also set a minimum height requirement of 5 feet 2 inches.
Rawlinson claimed that the height and weight requirements discriminated against women
by disproportionately excluding them from eligibility for employment with the Alabama Board of Corrections.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Rawlinson demonstrated that the facially neutral standards had a significantly discriminatory impact on women.
The District Court found that the height requirement excluded 33.29% of women but only
1.28% of men, while the weight requirement excluded 22.29% of women but only 2.35% of men.
These findings showed that the height and weight standards had a discriminatory impact on female applicants.
The court held that statistical evidence from national demographic data was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, even without comparative statistics from actual applicants for the correctional counselor positions in Alabama.
Procedural History:
The District Court found that the height and weight requirements had a discriminatory impact on women and held that Rawlinson had established a prima facie case of unlawful
sex discrimination.
The court also found that the defendants (Alabama Board of Corrections) failed to show that the height and weight requirements were job-related.
Issue:
Whether the height and weight requirements for correctional counselors, which disproportionately exclude women, violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Holding:
The Supreme Court held that the height and weight requirements violated Title VII because they had a discriminatory impact on women and the defendants failed to prove that these requirements were job-related.
Rule:
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employment practices that disproportionately exclude a protected class must be shown to have a manifest relationship to the job in question. Employers must demonstrate that such practices are job-related or that there are no alternative practices that would serve the employer's legitimate interests without having a discriminatory effect.
Analysis:
The court found that the height and weight requirements disproportionately excluded women from employment as correctional counselors.
The defendants argued that these requirements were related to the necessary strength for the job but failed to provide evidence to support this claim.
The court noted that job-relatedness could be demonstrated by validating a test that directly measures strength, which would be a fair and non-discriminatory practice.
Since the defendants did not provide evidence to justify the height and weight requirements, the court concluded that the standards were not job-related.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that the height and weight requirements were discriminatory and violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
New York City Transit Authority v Beazer Facts:
The New York City Transit Authority (TA) operates the subway system and certain bus lines in New York City, employing about 47,000 people. Many of these positions involve
significant safety risks.
TA enforces a general policy against employing persons who use narcotic drugs, reflected in Rule 11B of TA's Rules and Regulations.
Methadone, a synthetic narcotic used in the treatment of heroin addiction, falls under this rule.
Diane Beazer and other respondents were participants in methadone maintenance programs and were denied employment or dismissed because of their methadone use.
Methadone maintenance programs are designed to treat heroin addiction by providing methadone in controlled doses to prevent withdrawal symptoms and curb cravings.
The District Court found that methadone is an effective treatment for heroin addiction but
noted that some individuals in these programs might still face issues with drug or alcohol abuse.
The District Court enjoined TA from denying employment solely based on participation in a methadone maintenance program but allowed TA to exclude methadone users from safety-sensitive positions or require at least a year of successful participation in such programs.
Procedural History:
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