CASE STUDY

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Nov 24, 2024

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CASE STUDY #1: Fannie and Freddie Instructions Please read the mini-case study (Fannie and Freddie) on pages 167 – 168 in the Rubin text (The Politics of Budgeting) and prepare a 3-page case analysis. Within your case analysis, please be sure that you are identifying major issue(s) and/or benefits of Fannie and Freddie; determining the scope of potential problems; and analyzing the issue(s) and the outcome(s) (do you agree; do you have alternate recommendations etc.). It is recommended that you incorporate course material and additional readings (i.e., journal articles, books, etc.) into your analysis to strengthen the content of your paper. Within your analysis, please be sure to discuss two or more of the following main learning objectives for this case within the analysis section of your paper: Main Learning Objectives · Think critically about the intersection between politics and Government- Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs). · Explore the benefits and drawbacks of GSEs. · Articulate the effects that Fannie and Freddie have on society and taxpayers. It is a good idea to organize your paper in at least 4 sections: 1.) Summary of the case (key players; background). Please include a background/history of Fannie and Freddie in this section. 2.) Identify the scope of the problems with Fannie and Freddie. 3.) Analyze issues/outcomes. 4.) Recommendations. Minicase Fannie and Freddie: Government Bailout, a Loan, or Investment? The national government includes two huge government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs): the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), nicknamed Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC). The goal of these two GSEs is to make more mortgage money available to lend. They buy mortgages from commercial lenders. The commercial lenders who sell their mortgages to Fannie and Freddie get their money back immediately rather than over the life of the mortgage, and thus can relend it immediately. Over the years, these GSEs have made money, requiring no taxpayer support, but they had implicit federal government and taxpayer backing, which enabled them to borrow at below-market rates and improve their profitability. In the 1970s and 1980s, Fannie and Freddie began to issue mortgage-backed securities; that is, they bought mortgages, insured them, pooled them, and sold shares of the pool. They also held some of the mortgages in their own portfolio. As commercial lenders accepted more and more high-risk borrowers before the bubble in property prices burst and as variable mortgage rates became more popular, Fannie and Freddie came to hold a riskier portfolio. When the real estate market collapsed and the foreclosure rate skyrocketed, the value of the portfolio declined. The GSEs had to make good on their guarantees to buyers of mortgage-backed securities. Investors lost confidence: Shares of Fannie and Freddie tumbled more than 90 percent in one year. Fears of undercapitalization led investors to worry that the GSEs might declare bankruptcy. In September 2008, the government took over both Fannie and Freddie. For now, a federal regulator makes their business decisions. Estimates of the cost of the bailout have varied, but the figure mentioned most often is about $187 billion. The implicit government backing of
the GSEs, along with the impact on the housing market and economy of failure of these two giants, made it desirable for the federal government to bail out these two quasi–private sector organizations, at great public cost. During the federal bailout and takeover, the implication was that when the GSEs had recovered, they would be returned to the shareholders, but that did not happen. When Fannie and Freddie returned to profitability, in 2012, their profits became revenue for the federal government. The bailout was treated not as a loan, but as an investment, and hence the agreement was written in such a way that Fannie and Freddie could not pay off the original bailout, no matter how much money they turned over to the government. As of 2017, they had turned over $270 billion, considerably more than the estimated $187 billion cost of the bailout.1 1 Gretchen Morgenson, “Fannie and Freddie and the Secrets of a Bailout With No Exit,” New York Times, May 20, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/business/how-freddie-and-fannie-are- held-captive.html. Although the GSEs have become a good source of revenue for the federal government, the Trump administration has expressed an interest in ending their conservatorship after reforms that would minimize risk to the tax payers. Congress was considering various reforms in early 2018 but had not yet come up with a single approved plan; in the meantime, the GSEs continued to turn over their profits to the treasury, despite multiple lawsuits of investors wanting their share of the profits.
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