lab six

Not use ai please

You like your job, but your boss gives lousy bonuses. You were recently offered a new job with better rewards and your friend wants to know if you intend to take it. You say, "It depends on whether the bonus this year is generous, Let's wait and see. We'll find out next week" The likely outcome of this game is your boss gives you a ousy :bonus and you ept the new job. If you want to stay at your current job and be better rewarded, you could improve your strategy if you: demand an increase in your bonus by a certain amount, but does not tel your boss about the job offer. adopt a dominant strategy to accept the other position and make this known to your boss. O tell the boss about the job offer you are prepared to take if your bonus structure does not increase by a certain amount. Cadopt a dominant strategy to stay at your current position and make this known to your boss.

Micro chapter 8

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2. Kier, in The scenario, wants to determine how each of the 3 companies will decide on possible new investments. He was able to determine the new investment pay off for each of the three choices as well as the probability of the two types of market. If a company will launch product 1, it will gain 50,000 if the market is successful and lose 50,000 if the market is a failure. If a company will launch product 2, it will gain 25,000 if the market is successful and lose 25,000 if the market will fail. If a company decides not to launch any of the product, it will not be affected whether the market will succeed or fail. There is a 56% probability that the market will succeed and 44% probability that the market will fail. What will be the companies decision based on EMV? What is the decision of each company based on expected utility value?

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Please no written by hand

*Game Theory* Need help checking my work/calculations....Thank you!

36. Over the centuries several eminent thinkers have offered insights into the prob- lems of decision making in the face of risk. Which of the following lists places the the thinkers in correct chronological order, from earliest to latest? (a) Pierre Simon de Laplace, Daniel Bernoulli, John von Neumann, Christian Huygens, Amos Tversky (b) Daniel Bernoulli, Christian Huygens, Pierre Simon de Laplace, Amos Tversky, John von Neumann (c) Daniel Bernoulli, Pierre Simon de Laplace, Christian Huygens, Amos Tversky, John von Neumann (d) Christian Huygens, Daniel Bernoulli, Pierre Simon de Laplace, John von Neumann, Amos Tversky

1. Suppose a company can select among two decisions (d1 and d2) and face three states of nature (s1, s2 and s3) with the following payoff table: Decision s1 s2 s3 d1 d2 150 200 200 50 200 500 The probabilities of s1, s2, and s3 are unknown. Using the optimistic approach, what is the optimal decision and what is the value of the payoff? Place the optimal decision in the first answer box and the maximum payoff used to arrive at this decision in the second. Question 6 options: 2. Suppose a company can select among two decisions (d1 and d2) and face three states of nature (s1, s2 and s3) with the following payoff table: Decision s1 s2 s3 d1 d2 150 200 200 50 200 500 The probabilities of s1, s2, and s3 are unknown. Using the conservative approach, what is the optimal decision and what is the value of the payoff? Place the optimal decision in the first answer box and the maximum payoff used to derive this solution in the second. Question 7 options: 8 3. Suppose a company must consider two…

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You and a coworker are assigned a team project on which your likelihood or a promotion will be decidedon. It is now the night before the project is due and neither has yet to start it. You both want toreceive a promotion next year, but you both also want to go to your company’s holiday party that night.Each of you wants to maximize his or her own happiness (likelihood of a promotion and mingling withyour colleagues “on the company’s dime”). If you both work, you deliver an outstanding presentation.If you both go to the party, your presentation is mediocre. If one parties and the other works, yourpresentation is above average. Partying increases happiness by 25 units. Working on the project addszero units to happiness. Happiness is also affected by your chance of a promotion, which is depends on howgood your project is. An outstanding presentation gives 40 units of happiness to each of you; an aboveaverage presentation gives 30 units of happiness; a mediocre presentation gives 10 units…

Typed plz nd asap thanks

3:51 9 M 23 The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the following * game is Player 2 R. L Player 1 U 2,2 3,1 D 3.-1 0.0 U with 3/4 probability and D with 1/4 probability for player 1; L with1/2 probability and probability for player 2 with 1/2 U with 1/2 probability and D with 1/2 probability for player 1; L with1/4 probability and R with 3/4 probability for player 2 U with 1/4 probability and D with 3/4 probability for player 1; L with1/2 probability and R with 1/2 probability for player 2 O None of the above. U with 1/2 probability and D with 1/2 probability for player 1; L with3/4 probability and R with 1/4 probability for player 2

Hand written asap i'll rate

Typed plzzzzx And Asap I vll upvote

1. A dealer decides to sell a rare book by means of an English auction with a reservation price of 54. There are two bidders. The dealer believes that there are only three possible values, 90, 54, and 45, that each bidder’s willingness to pay might take. Each bidder has a probability of 1/3 of having each of these willingnesses to pay, and the probabilities for each of the two bidders are independent of the other’s valuation. Assuming that the two bidders bid rationally and do not collude, the dealer’s expected revenue is approximately ______. 2. A seller knows that there are two bidders for the object he is selling. He believes that with probability 1/2, one has a buyer value of 5 and the other has a buyer value of 10 and with probability 1/2, one has a buyer value of 8 and the other has a buyer value of 15. He knows that bidders will want to buy the object so long as they can get it for their buyer value or less. He sells it in an English auction with a reserve price which he must…

2 Consider the two investments listed below with possible outcomes and probabilities: INVESTMENT (in $1000) SAFE RISKY INVESTMENT AMOUNTⓇ 40+ 40+ GOOD SCENARIO OUTCOME 45+ 80+ AVERAGE+ SCENARIO PROB OUTCOME 0.40* 0.40€ 42+ 45+ BAD+ SCENARIO PROB OUTCOME PROB 0.20 35+ 0.20 10+ 0.40€ 0.40+ b) a) Suppose I have utility function U(*) = (x)2. What is the expected utility from each investment? Which investment will I choose, if any? Show and explain your work and provide the intuition. c) What is the value of the risk premium for the SAFE investment? Show and explain your work and provide the intuition. d) What is the value of the risk premium for the RISKY investment? Show and explain your work and provide the intuition.< +

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Problem 7 A casino offers people the chance to play the following game: flip two fair coins. If both come up heads, the gambler wins $1. If both come up tails, the gambler wins $3. If one is heads and one is tails, the gambler gets nothing. The game costs $1.25 to play. Your friend, Richard, who has not taken a probability course and thus doesn't know any better, goes to this casino and plays the game 600 times. Estimate the probability that your friend loses between $132 and $195 over the course of the 600 games. (You need to provide a number instead of an expression involving NA(a,b)).

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2 Scenario Your client, InsureCorp, is an insurance company considering launching an 'income insur- ance' product in the nation of Motherland. Income insurance is a product that fully insures a household against changes in income caused by a major injury or illness. At present, no businesses are selling income insurance products in Motherland. Initial market research suggests that there are 15,000 households in Motherland interested in purchasing income insurance. Your client expects that the fixed cost of launching the income insurance product will be $25,000,000 per year, and that each policy issued to a customer will cost the company an additional $2,000 in sales commissions. 2.1 Your task Your client wants you to analyse the potential market for income insurance and report on the following: What is the maximum price the company can charge a household for an income insurance policy? What is the expected profit (or loss) for the company if it becomes a monopoly provider of income…

9. Decision (Payoff) Table ESA Dealers, Inc. is contemplating on how many units of cars to order to meet the customer demands for the month based on the following projection: Probability 10% 50% 40% Demand 0 unit 1 unit 2 units The profit for each unit sold is P 200,000 while the carrying cost for each unit of unsold car is P 50,000. REQUIRED: How many units of cars should ESA order and why? States of Nature (based on demand) Decision Alternative 0 unit (10%) 1 unit (50%) 2 units (40%) Stock 0 unit Stock 1 unit Stock 2 units Expected Value

Game Theory   I am trying to assign numbers (theoretical)to a game im making. Its about Tipping. Its based on 3 different efforts a server has showed   Can you assign numbers to each of these. This is all made up so you can use whatever values they just need to be in regard to the other values.   Thanks. I was thinking to start on high effort Tip could be +10 and no tip could be -10 Best and worst scenario. You do high effort service and get tipped and high effort with no tip.   Thanks

4. A taproom owner is trying to determine how to structure his manager's compensation. One option he considers is a flat salary of $70,000 per year. The second option is a base salary of $30,000 plus 15% of the taproom's profit. If the manager puts a lot of effort into her job, the taproom's annual profit will be $500,000 with 75% probability and $100,000 with 25% probability. If the manager exerts only modest effort, the taproom's profit will be $500,000 with 25% probability and $100,000 with 75% probability. The manager's opportunity cost of putting a lot of effort into her job is $50,000, while her opportunity cost of exerting only modest effort is $25,000. a. Draw the game tree for the interaction between the taproom owner and the manager. Assume that the taproom owner moves first. b. What is the equilibrium outcome for this game? What kind of contract should the taproom owner offer? What level of effort will the manager choose? Explain.

Suppose you are running a construction company and are in the process of signing a new contract with a lumber supplier. Getting lumber to a work site on time is critical and based on two things. First is the effort exerted by the lumber supplier and second how fast the shipper of the lumber will get the lumber to the construction site which involves some randomness. The lumber supplier can exert a high or low level of effort. If they exert a high level of effort they will produce the lumber quickly and there is then a 75% chance the shipper can get it to the construction site on time, and only a 25% chance that the shipper will be slow, and the lumber will arrive late.   If the lumber supplier exerts a low level of effort, they will take a long time to produce the lumber and there is no chance that it will ship on time. If the lumber supplier exerts low effort it costs them zero dollars, but if high effort is exerted then it costs six thousand dollars in extra resources. The lumber…

6. Jerry plans to buy a new Bluetooth headset. He knows that the same product is offered in different shops with prices of $44, $49, and $60, and with odds of one-third of finding each price. He just stopped at a shop and knows that their price is $49. If the search cost is $1 per additional search, what should Jerry do?

Only typed answer and give fast answer i will give you upvote