need help please Use the following to answer questions (25) - (27):Two large tech firms, Dapple (D) and Googley (G), are considering a no poaching scheme. In sucha scheme, firms agree not to hire (i.e., poach) employees away from each other. Suppose each firm has todecide to either poach (P) or not poach (NP) employees away from the other firm, with the outcomesprovided in the payoff matrix below:GNP10, 100, 50DNP50, 030, 30Note: G's payoffs (in millions of dollars) are listed 1st, while D's payoffs (in millions of dollars) are listed2nd[25]The Nash equilibrium for the one-shot game is that both D and G select P as their strategy.A.TrueВ.FalseSuppose the[26]Assuming G's discount factor (8) is 0.25, across the three periods what is the most likely present value ofG's payoff stream?game is played three times (i.e., 3 periods), with each firm adoptinga tit-for-tat strategy.А.90В.53.125С.39.375D.13.125[27]trigger strategy. What values of the discount factor would ensure continuous cooperation among the twoplayers?Suppose the game is repeatedly played an infinite number of times, with each player adopting a8 > 0.258 > 0.508 > 0.758 = 0А.В.С.D.[28]curve = -1, and marginal cost = 20. Accordingly, the degree of competition in this industry, as measured bythe conjectural variation, equals:Currently, an industry is operating at a point where price = 20, quantity = 10, slope of the demandA.0.В.½.С.1.D.2.

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Two large tech firms, Dapple (D) and Googley (G), are considering a no poaching scheme. In such a scheme, firms agree not to hire (i.c., poach) employees away from cach other. Suppose cach firm has to decide to either poach (P) or not poach (NP) employees away from the other firm, with the outcomes provided in the payoff matrix below: G P NP 10, 10 0, 50 50, 0 NP 30, 30 Note: G's payoffs (in millions of dollars) are listed 1", while D's payoffs (in millions of dollars) are listed 2nd. (25] The Nash equilibrium for the one-shot game is that both D and G select P as their strategy. А. True В. False [26] Suppose the game is played three times (i.e., 3 periods), with each firmadopting a tit-for-tat strategy. Assuming G's discount factor (6) is 0.25, across the three periods what is the most likely present value of G's payoff stream? А. 90 В. 53.125 С. 39.375 D. 13.125 [27] Suppose the game is repeatedly played an infinite number of times, with each player adopting a trigger strategy. What values of the discount factor would ensure continuous cooperation among the two players? 8> 0.25 8> 0.50 8> 0.75 8 =0 А. В. С. D.