The following table shows payoffs to workers of each type (first number), High or Low; and to the firm (second number). There are 50% of each type of workers. The workers are allowed to make a claim to the firm about what type they are. The firm, after listening to the claim, assigns them to either a demanding or an undemanding job. demanding undemanding H. 7;8 3:4 5;3 4;5 1. Which job will the firm offer and what will be its payoff if it does not believe the workers' claim? 2. What will be the firm's payoff if it does believe the workers and they tell the truth? 3. Assume the firm believes the workers. Does the low type have any incentives to lie?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
icon
Related questions
Question
100%
The following table shows payoffs to workers of each type (first number). High or Low; and to the firm(second number).​​​​​​​
The following table shows payoffs to workers of each type (first number), High or Low;
and to the firm (second number). There are 50% of each type of workers. The workers
are allowed to make a claim to the firm about what type they are. The firm, after
listening to the claim, assigns them to either a demanding or an undemanding job.
demanding
undemanding
H
7;8
3;4
5;3
4;5
1. Which job will the firm offer and what will be its payoff if it does not believe the
workers' claim?
2. What will be the firm's payoff if it does believe the workers and they tell the truth?
3. Assume the firm believes the workers. Does the low type have any incentives to
lie?
Transcribed Image Text:The following table shows payoffs to workers of each type (first number), High or Low; and to the firm (second number). There are 50% of each type of workers. The workers are allowed to make a claim to the firm about what type they are. The firm, after listening to the claim, assigns them to either a demanding or an undemanding job. demanding undemanding H 7;8 3;4 5;3 4;5 1. Which job will the firm offer and what will be its payoff if it does not believe the workers' claim? 2. What will be the firm's payoff if it does believe the workers and they tell the truth? 3. Assume the firm believes the workers. Does the low type have any incentives to lie?
Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 2 steps

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Payoff Matrix
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
  • SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Economics
ISBN:
9780190931919
Author:
NEWNAN
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education