What Is Mind
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What Is Mind?
Taylor R. Jackson
PHI 103- Philosophy and Ethics
College of Huminites and Social Science, Grand Canyon University
Professor Gary Osmundsen
November 5, 2023
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What is Mind?
The mind-body problem has intrigued and confounded philosophers for centuries, serving
as a quintessential conundrum in the realm of metaphysics and philosophy of mind. This
enduring enigma centers around the fundamental question of the relationship between the mental
and the physical: How do our thoughts, consciousness, and subjective experiences relate to our
physical bodies and the material world? This essay delves into the heart of this philosophical
dilemma, seeking to provide clarity and insight for an entry-level audience on a digital
philosophy platform. In the following pages, we will explore the foundational issues surrounding
the mind-body problem and consider four prominent philosophical solutions: type identity
theory, functionalist physicalism, property dualism, and substance dualism. Ultimately, we will
discern which of these solutions appears most compelling based on the insights drawn from this
topic's course materials and additional academic sources. In doing so, we hope to contribute to a
deeper understanding of this perennial philosophical puzzle.
Defining the Mind-Body Problem
The mind-body problem is a foundational and enduring issue within the realm of
philosophy, primarily situated in the fields of metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. It
revolves around the central inquiry into the nature of the relationship between the mental and the
physical aspects of human existence. In essence, it seeks to answer the perplexing question of
how our thoughts, consciousness, and subjective experiences align or interact with our physical
bodies and the material world. This profound enigma has captivated the minds of philosophers
for centuries and remains a point of contention and contemplation in the philosophical discourse.
The mind-body problem invites exploration of the fundamental tension between the subjective
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realm of human consciousness and the objective domain of the physical universe, generating a
rich tapestry of philosophical perspectives and proposed solutions aimed at unraveling this
complex and multifaceted puzzle.
Philosophical Solutions
The mind-body problem, a central enigma in the realm of philosophy, has elicited a
multitude of responses, with four primary solutions detailed in our course materials. Type
Identity Theory posits a direct correlation between specific mental states and their corresponding
physical states, suggesting that every mental event can be entirely reduced to a particular pattern
of neural activity in the brain. However, this perspective encounters challenges in its endeavor to
account for the full spectrum of subjective experiences and consciousness through purely
physical means. In contrast, Functionalist Physicalism takes a more adaptable approach by
defining mental states not by their specific physical counterparts but by their functional roles in
cognition and behavior. This perspective allows for the possibility of different physical
realizations of the same mental state and demonstrates a capacity to accommodate evolving
scientific understandings of the brain (Block, 1980). Property Dualism recognizes the presence
of both mental and physical properties within the same entities, such as human beings. It
acknowledges the existence of subjective experiences, or qualia, while simultaneously accepting
the reality of physical properties in the body and the brain.
Property dualism seeks to strike a balance between dualism, which posits a clear
separation of mental and physical, and reductionism, which seeks to explain everything in purely
physical terms, acknowledging the autonomy of the mental while still acknowledging its
connection to the physical (Satel & Lilienfeld, 2022). Substance Dualism, famously attributed to
René Descartes, takes a more radical stance, suggesting that the mind and body are distinct
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substances. According to substance dualism, the mind is non-physical (res cogitans), and the
body is physical (res extensa). This approach preserves the uniqueness of mental experiences but
grapples with the formidable "interaction problem," attempting to explain how these two entirely
separate substances interact. These four philosophical solutions provide diverse perspectives on
the mind-body problem, each with its unique strengths and challenges. Type Identity Theory
simplifies the relationship but struggles to account for subjective experiences, while
functionalism offers adaptability. Property dualism balances dualism and reductionism,
acknowledging both mental and physical properties, and substance dualism emphasizes the
separation of the mental and the physical, even though it faces the challenge of explaining their
interaction. These solutions collectively contribute to the rich and ongoing discourse on the
nature of the mind and its complex relationship with the physical world.
Chosen Solution
Functionalism emerges as the most compelling solution to the mind-body problem, and
its strengths extend further upon closer examination. Unlike rigid theories like Type Identity
Theory, Functionalism offers a flexible and adaptable framework. It defines mental states by
their functions and roles in cognition, rather than tying them to specific physical states. This
adaptability allows Functionalism to seamlessly incorporate evolving scientific insights into the
nature of the mind. For instance, as our understanding of the brain advances, Functionalism
readily accommodates these discoveries without requiring a complete overhaul of its framework.
Moreover, Functionalism's adaptability aligns with the dynamic nature of modern science and its
evolving understanding of the mind. The brain, with its complex neural networks and intricate
operations, remains an ever-expanding realm of study. As Functionalism is not wedded to
specific neural configurations, it effortlessly incorporates new neuroscientific findings. For
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example, when researchers uncover novel patterns of brain activity related to mental states,
Functionalism can readily integrate this information into its framework without the need for
drastic revisions. This adaptability to the evolving landscape of neuroscience renders
Functionalism a strong contender in addressing the mind-body problem.
Functionalism also successfully bridges the gap between subjective experiences and
objective observations. It acknowledges the reality of subjective phenomena, like pain or color
perception, while providing a mechanism to understand them within the realm of empirical
science. For instance, Functionalism does not reduce color perception to a set of specific
wavelengths but rather to the functions it serves in processing visual information. This approach
reconciles the subjective experience of color with the objective observation of wavelengths,
offering a harmonious resolution to the mind-body problem. In doing so, Functionalism
highlights its compatibility with both the phenomenological and empirical aspects of the mind
(Stewart et al., 2013). While acknowledging the undeniable subjectivity of experiences, it does
not disregard the objective reality of the external world and the scientific methods used to study
it. This harmonious coexistence of subjective experiences and empirical observations positions
Functionalism as a bridge between two often opposing realms of inquiry.
In terms of explanatory power, Functionalism excels by accounting for a wide range of
mental states and their causal relationships. It offers a comprehensive framework for
understanding not only simple experiences but also complex cognitive processes. Beyond
explaining basic experiences, Functionalism can address higher-order cognitive functions such as
decision-making, problem-solving, memory, and creativity, without reducing them to mere
physical processes. This breadth of explanation highlights the strength of Functionalism in
navigating the multifaceted nature of the mind-body problem. Functionalism's versatility extends
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to the various levels of analysis in understanding mental states. It accommodates the micro-level,
where specific neural processes occur, as well as the macro-level, where complex cognitive
functions emerge. This multilayered approach provides a comprehensive account of the interplay
between the mental and the physical, encompassing the entire spectrum of mental phenomena.
In sum, Functionalism strikes a balance between subjective experiences and empirical
science, making it the most persuasive solution to this enduring philosophical enigma. Its
adaptability, ability to bridge subjectivity and objectivity, and robust explanatory power make it
an exceptionally compelling choice for addressing the complexities of the mind-body problem.
Whether we consider its adaptability to evolving scientific insights, its ability to harmonize
subjective experiences with empirical observation, or its comprehensive explanatory power,
Functionalism offers a robust and encompassing framework for understanding the intricate
interplay between the mental and the physical.
Conclusion
Functionalism proves to be a highly adaptable and persuasive solution to the mind-body
problem. Its flexibility in incorporating evolving scientific insights, its capacity to harmonize
subjective experiences with empirical observations, and its comprehensive explanatory power
make it the ideal framework for understanding the intricate relationship between the mental and
the physical. As we continue to delve into the depths of the mind-body problem, Functionalism
emerges as a compelling and enduring solution, offering valuable insights into the profound
mystery of the human mind, and enriching the ongoing discourse on this age-old enigma.
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References
Block, N. (1980). 22. Troubles with Functionalism. In N. Block (Ed.),
Volume I Readings in
Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I
(pp. 268-306). Cambridge, MA and London,
England: Harvard University Press.
https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674594623.c31
Satel, S., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2022).
Addiction and the Brain-Disease Fallacy
.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003032762
Stewart, D., Blocker, H. G., & Petrik, J. (2013).
Fundamentals of philosophy
(8th ed.).
Pearson. ISBN-13: 9780205242993