Class 3 Case Briefs- Family Law
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Case Briefs
Simone v. Simone
(1990)
Facts
Following a period of separation between
1982 and 1984, Catherine Simeone
(plaintiff), née Walsh, and her husband,
Frederick Simeone (defendant)
commenced divorce proceedings. In the
course of those proceedings, Catherine
sought alimony, which Frederick opposed
in light of a prenuptial agreement that
Catherine had signed on the eve of their
wedding. The prenuptial agreement had
been presented to Catherine at 5 p.m. the
night before the wedding and she signed
the agreement at that time without
seeking the advice of counsel. Testimony
at trial indicated that she and Frederick
had discussed the contents of the
agreement over a period of six months
prior to the wedding, and Frederick's
attorney who drafted the agreement and
witnessed its execution testified that
Catherine signed the agreement willingly.
Catherine did not seek the advice of
counsel during the six-month period
preceding the wedding. The prenuptial
agreement provided that in the event of a
separation or divorce, Catherine would be
entitled to receive a maximum of $25,000
from Frederick. Frederick claimed that he
had made payments to Catherine during
their separation and the maximum set out
in the prenuptial agreement had been
reached. The prenuptial agreement was
upheld by the master, and affirmed on
appeal to the intermediate appellate
court. Catherine then appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Issue
Must the court consider the
reasonableness of a prenuptial
agreement before it may be enforced?
Rule
A prenuptial agreement is enforceable as
a contract without consideration by the
court as to its reasonableness.
Holding
No. The precedent established in Estate
of Geyer (1987) which required the court
to consider the reasonableness of a
prenuptial agreement or consider whether
the spouse entering the agreement was
fully informed of its terms and impact, no
longer has validity.
Rationale
The rule in Geyer was founded on an
assumption of unequal bargaining power
between the sexes and a need to protect
women from the contracts that they
entered. Since women now possess the
same education and financial resources
as men, there is no need for the
paternalistic protections provided in
Geyer. Instead, prenuptial agreements,
and the parties that enter into them,
should be treated the same as other
contracts. However, since the parties to a
prenuptial agreement are in a relationship
of mutual trust, there must be full and fair
disclosure of their financial positions, or a
claim for misrepresentation in the
inducement could be asserted. Because
the court does not wish to undermine the
validity of prenuptial agreements by
questioning the reasonableness of an
agreement that both parties considered
reasonable at the time they entered into
it, the court will not grant Catherine
Simeone's request to impose a rule
barring enforcement of a prenuptial
agreement where the signing party has
not consulted legal counsel. Nor is there
an evidentiary basis for her claim that she
was under duress when she signed the
agreement. The testimony at trial
indicated that she had discussed the
agreement with her fiancé, Frederick
Simeone, over a period of six months
prior to the wedding and she did not sign
the agreement with reluctance when it
was presented to her on the eve of their
wedding. The order is affirmed.
Concurrence (Papadakos, J.)
The majority's opinion makes statements
about the equality of women that are not
necessary for the decision and
inaccurate, as evidenced by the unequal
pay, sexual discrimination, and sexual
harassment women encounter in the
workplace.
Prenuptial agreements
involve parties with unequal bargaining
power and the law should protect the
subservient party regardless of their
gender. However, this case does not
require addressing the broader issues of
gender inequality to reach the decision
that the majority reaches.
Dissent (McDermott, J.)
The majority's decision that full and fair
disclosure is an adequate basis to
enforce a prenuptial agreement fails to
consider the severe consequences that
grossly unfair and inequitable prenuptial
agreements could inflict on the public and
the state's interest in the preservation of
marriage and the family unit.
Prenuptial agreement
A contract entered into in contemplation
of marriage that sometimes governs the
relations of the parties during the
marriage but most often governs the
distribution of property in the event of
dissolution of the marriage. Prenuptial
agreements are also known as premarital
agreements or antenuptial agreements.
Duress
Occurs when a person is subjected to
such pressure from a third party that the
pressure overtakes the person’s free will
and the person does something that he or
she ordinarily would not.
Alimony pendente lite
An award of alimony while divorce or
separation proceedings are pending.
In Re Marriage of Shanks
(2008)
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Facts
Randall Shanks (plaintiff), an attorney,
and Teresa Shanks (defendant), a college
graduate who had worked in Mr. Shanks’
legal office, married in April 1998. Each
had children from a previous marriage.
Mr. Shanks made entering into a
prenuptial agreement a condition of the
marriage. He drafted and presented an
agreement to Teresa 10 days before their
wedding, and he recommended that she
obtain independent legal advice
regarding its terms. The intent of the
agreement was to maintain the parties’
financial positions as of the time of the
marriage. This provided Mr. Shanks more
financial protection given his higher
wealth, but the agreement did provide
certain benefits to Mrs. Shanks such as a
percentage of proceeds in the sale of
their house and an interest in her
husband’s life insurance and law practice
in the event of his death. The agreement
disclosed the parties’ financial positions.
It also waived Mrs. Shanks’ right to
alimony. She had the agreement
reviewed by a Nebraska attorney who
made a few comments and
recommended that Mrs. Shanks seek
Iowa counsel. She did not. She signed
the agreement six days before the
marriage. Six years later, the couple
entered divorce proceedings. Mr. Shanks
filed a claim to enforce the premarital
agreement, which Mrs. Shanks opposed.
The trial court ruled in favor of Shanks,
and the appeals court affirmed. Mr.
Shanks appealed to the Iowa Supreme
Court.
Issue
Is a prenuptial agreement designed to
preserve the parties' relative financial
positions enforceable as long as it is not
the result of duress, undue influence, or
the exploitation of an inferior bargaining
position, and the financial position of
each party is known at the time of
execution?
Rule
A prenuptial agreement designed to
preserve the parties' relative financial
positions is enforceable as long as it is
not the result of duress, undue influence,
or the exploitation of an inferior
bargaining position, and the financial
position of each party is known at the
time of execution.
Holding
Yes. A prenuptial agreement is
enforceable under Iowa law if it was
entered into voluntarily; full and
reasonable disclosure of the parties’
financial positions was made or known;
and the agreement was not
unconscionable when made.
Rationale
A prenuptial agreement is entered
voluntarily unless it results from duress or
undue influence. Here, the court
concludes that the Shanks’ agreement is
enforceable apart from its waiver of
alimony. Under Iowa law, which differs
from the Uniform Prenuptial Agreement
Act in this respect, spousal support may
not be eliminated through a prenuptial
agreement. Otherwise, however, there is
no proof of duress, undue influence, or
unconscionability to mar the Shanks’
agreement. First, the fact that one party
will marry only on the condition that a
prenuptial agreement be signed is not, in
itself, proof of duress. Nor is there
evidence that Mrs. Shanks’ judgment was
overcome by the will of Mr. Shanks, so as
to constitute undue influence.
Considering the intent and effects of the
Shanks’ agreement, the court does not
deem it to be substantively
unconscionable. The fact that a prenuptial
agreement is one-sided is not conclusive
since most prenuptial agreements are
one-sided. The purpose of the Shanks’
agreement was to maintain the parties’
financial positions as of the time of the
marriage. The agreement reasonably did
so. Although Mr. Shanks received a
greater allocation of property under the
agreement, Mrs. Shanks was also
provided benefits. The couple’s
obligations and covenants under the
agreement were mutual. Finally, the court
determines that the agreement was not
procedurally unconscionable. Mrs.
Shanks was provided sufficient time to
have the agreement reviewed by counsel.
Her failure to do so does not, in itself,
render the agreement unenforceable. The
decision of the trial court is reversed.
Unconscionability
A determination that a contractual term
was so procedurally or substantively
unfair and offensive that the harmed party
should be relieved from its
consequences.
Undue Influence
The use of persuasion, a special
relationship, or a position of power to
induce another to enter into a contract or
agreement.
Loving v. Virginia
(1967)
Facts
In June 1958, Mildred Jeter, an African
American woman, and Richard Loving, a
Caucasian man (defendants), were
married in the District of Columbia
pursuant to its laws. They later moved to
Virginia (plaintiff) and resided in Caroline
County. The laws of Virginia, however,
banned interracial marriages within the
state. In October 1958, the Lovings were
indicted for violating the Virginia law.
They plead guilty and were sentenced to
one year in jail, but the trial court
suspended the sentence for twenty-five
years on the condition that the Lovings
would leave Virginia and not return to the
state together for twenty-five years. The
Lovings then moved to the District of
Columbia, but filed suit in state trial court
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to vacate the judgment against them on
the grounds that it violated the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the
constitutionality of the Virginia statutes
and upheld the convictions. The Lovings
appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
Issue
May a state enact a statute that prevents
marriages between persons solely on the
basis of racial classification without
violating the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Rule
A state may not restrict marriages
between persons solely on the basis of
race under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Holding
No. State bans on interracial marriages
were passed as a reaction to slavery and
have been present since the colonial
period.
Rationale
Such bans were affirmed by the Racial
Integrity Act of 1924, passed during a
period of extreme nativism following
World War I. However, in the fifteen years
preceding the Lovings’ case, fourteen
states had repealed their own similar
bans on interracial marriage. In the
present case, the Commonwealth of
Virginia seeks to uphold its interracial
marriage ban on the grounds that it
furthers a legitimate state purpose of
preserving racial integrity and preserving
racial pride. Virginia also argues that the
regulation of marriage has traditionally
been left to the states under the Tenth
Amendment. Finally, Virginia argues that
the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause suggested that it is only obligated
to apply its laws equally among different
groups of people. Thus, it argues that it is
complying with its obligation by
preventing interracial marriage for all
people, not just Caucasians. The
argument that the mere equal application
of a law is enough to overcome the
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on
invidious racial discrimination is rejected.
Virginia’s statute is motivated solely to
restrict marriage based on race, and by
precedent, such laws have been found to
be a threat to equality. At the very least
such race-based classifications are
subject to strict scrutiny and cannot be
upheld unless they are shown to
accomplish a permissible state objective
independent of the racial discrimination.
In the present case, there is no legitimate
overriding purpose independent of
invidious racial discrimination that justifies
Virginia’s classification. The Virginia
statutes violate the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the judgment of the
court of appeals is reversed.
Concurrence (Stewart, J.)
As expressed in McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964), and restated here,
“it is simply not possible for a state law to
be valid under our Constitution which
makes the criminality of an act depend on
the race of the actor.”
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause
The provision set forth at Amendment
XIV, Section 1 of the United States
Constitution prohibiting states from
depriving any person of life, liberty, or
property by means that are arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair.
Strict Scrutiny
The most demanding standard of judicial
review used by courts. Strict scrutiny
review requires that the law or policy
being challenged supports a compelling
governmental interest, is narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest, and is the least
restrictive means available to achieve
that interest.
Zablocki v. Redhail
(1978)
Facts
A Wisconsin statute prevented members
of a certain class of residents from
marrying without first obtaining a court
order granting them permission to marry.
This class was defined by the statute to
include any Wisconsin resident required
by court order or judgment to pay child
support to a minor that was not in his
custody. A court order granting
permission to marry could be obtained if
a member of this class submitted proof of
compliance with his or her support
obligation and, in addition, demonstrated
that the children covered by the support
order were not then or not likely to later
become public charges. Redhail
(plaintiff), a Wisconsin resident, fathered
a child out of wedlock in high school. A
paternity action was instituted against him
in 1972. Redhail appeared in court and
admitted to fathering a baby girl. The
court entered an order requiring him to
pay monthly child support until the girl
reached age eighteen. For the next two
years, Redhail was unemployed and
indigent and was unable to make any
child support payments. In 1974, he filed
an application for a marriage license with
Zablocki (defendant), the County Clerk of
Milwaukee County. Redhail’s application
was denied on the grounds that he had
not obtained a court order granting him
permission to marry. It was stipulated that
even if he had applied for such a court
order, it would have been denied because
Redhail was unable to make child support
payments and his daughter was already
considered a public charge. Redhail
brought suit against Zablocki in federal
district court on the grounds that the
Wisconsin statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
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Amendment. The district court ruled for
Redhail, and Zablocki appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether a statute that prevents certain
residents from marrying without first
obtaining a court order granting
permission to marry violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Rule
The right to marry is a fundamental right,
and any legislative attempts by a state to
limit that right are unconstitutional unless
they are narrowly-tailored to the
accomplishment of an important
governmental purpose.
Holding
Yes. The right to marry is a fundamental
right and strict scrutiny is appropriate for
evaluating the constitutionality of any
state statutes limiting the right to marry.
Rationale
The right to marry among interracial
couples was first discussed in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), but
subsequent Court decisions extended the
right to marry to all persons as part of
their fundamental liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution. Additionally, marriage is
part of the fundamental “right of privacy”
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. The right of
marriage is legally on the same level of
importance as other decisions involving
procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and
family relationships. Reasonable
regulations that do not actually interfere
with the ability of a person to marry are
not subject to strict scrutiny and can be
legitimately imposed. The Wisconsin law
clearly and absolutely interferes with
Redhail’s right to marry on the grounds
that he can likely never attain the
financial means to fulfill his child support
obligations and thus receive a court order
granting him permission to marry.
Applying strict scrutiny, the Wisconsin
statute can be upheld only if it is
supported by sufficiently important state
interests and closely tailored to
accomplish those interests exclusively.
Despite the fact that Wisconsin offered
important state interests as justification
for the statute (i.e. counseling Redhail
about his support obligations and
ensuring out-of-custody children are
financially supported), the statute itself is
not closely tailored to accomplishing
these interests and is unconstitutional.
Numerous, less discriminatory means
exist by which the Court may compel
delinquent persons to fulfill child support
obligations. The Wisconsin statute is
unconstitutional and the decision of the
district court is affirmed.
Concurrence (Stewart, J.)
The majority improperly determines that
the Wisconsin statute violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The application of the Equal
Protection Clause is improper because
that Clause deals with the prevention of
invidious discrimination and not the
protection of fundamental rights and
freedoms. The Wisconsin statute exceeds
the bounds of permissible state regulation
of marriage and invades liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally,
a federal “right to marry” exists in the
Constitution. The regulation of marriage is
left to the states, subject to the limitations
of the Due Process Clause. Wisconsin’s
law particularly burdens the liberty
interests of the indigent, as it completely
eliminates their ability to marry for
financial reasons. The statute is
unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause.
Concurrence (Powell, J.)
Wisconsin’s restrictions on the right to
marry are unconstitutional. However, the
majority’s holding is overbroad in that it
seeks to subject to strict scrutiny every
classification that “directly and
substantially” relates to the right to marry.
Reasonable regulations that do not
significantly interfere with decisions to
enter the marital bond can be legitimately
imposed; it is problematic that the
majority provides no guidelines for
determining when a regulation falls into
this category.
Concurrence (Stevens, J.)
Lingering tension exists between the
Court’s holding in the present case and
its prior decision in Califano v. Jobst , 434
U.S. 47 (1977), which stands for the
principle that a law is not subjected to
strict scrutiny simply because the law
burdens an individual’s ability to enter into
a marital relationship in some way. In
Califano, the challenged program
involved Social Security benefits
assigned based on marital status. In
contrast, the Wisconsin program seeks to
restrict what persons can enter into the
bond of marriage. A significant
constitutional difference exists between a
program that allocates benefits and
burdens according to marital status, and
one that solely burdens the ability to
marry. Under the Wisconsin statute,
individuals are completely foreclosed
from marrying if they cannot afford to pay
child support. Thus, instead of regulating
based on marital status like the statute in
Califano, the Wisconsin statute unduly
burdens the right to marry of
impoverished persons. The statute
burdens low-income persons in particular
and violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Dissent (Rehnquist, J.)
Marriage is not a “fundamental right”
triggering the application of strict scrutiny.
Rational basis review should be applied.
Under rational basis review, the statute is
a permissible exercise of a state’s power
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to regulate family life and to assure the
support of minor children.
Rational-Basis Review
The level of scrutiny generally applied to
legislation that does not target suspect
classifications or impede fundamental
rights, which requires that a law be
rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.
Strict Scrutiny
The most demanding standard of judicial
review used by courts. Strict scrutiny
review requires that the law or policy
being challenged supports a compelling
governmental interest, is narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest, and is the least
restrictive means available to achieve
that interest.
Turner v. Safley
(1987)
Facts
The Missouri Division of Corrections
(DOC) (defendant) forbid prison inmates
from marrying unless permitted by the
prison superintendent for a “compelling
reason.” Missouri inmates (plaintiffs) filed
a class action seeking an injunction
against the regulation and damages. The
DOC contended that the regulation was
necessary to maintain prison security and
to carry out rehabilitative objectives.
Issue
Is a state regulation that forbids prison
inmates from marrying unless permitted
by the prison superintendent because of
a compelling reason constitutional?
Rule
Prison inmates have a constitutional right
to marry unless they are sentenced to life
with a ban on marriage constituting part
of their punishment.
Holding
No. Marriage is a fundamental right
protected by the United States
Constitution.
Rationale
Although inmates are subject to
substantial restrictions, they are
guaranteed those constitutional rights
that are not inconsistent with their status
as inmates or legitimate penological
purposes. Many benefits may accrue to
an inmate who marries notwithstanding
incarceration: emotional support, religious
and public significance, governmental
and private benefits, and eventual
consummation and family life. On the
other hand, Missouri’s justification of the
restriction—security and rehabilitation—is
scanty. The restriction is not reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.
First, any security concerns arising from
speculative “love triangles” are no less
likely to occur with respect to unmarried
inmates. The rehabilitation rationale is
directed at female inmates who seek to
marry other inmates or convicted felons.
The state’s justification for limiting such
marriages is paternalistic and unevenly
applied. It cannot serve as a legitimate
rationale. While it is true that the Court
upheld a restriction against inmate
marriage in Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953
(1974), that case is distinguishable
because the subject inmates had been
sentenced to life imprisonment and the
ban on marriage was part of their
punishment. On the basis of the record
and the above analysis, the Court
concludes that the Missouri regulation is
facially unconstitutional.
Facially Unconstitutional
A description of a government law,
regulation, or rule that is deemed to be
unconstitutional as written, as opposed to
being unconstitutional as applied.
Reasonable-relationship test
Also known as the rational-basis test, a
lower level of scrutiny applied in
constitutional jurisprudence to determine
whether state action rationally relates to a
legitimate state objective so as not to
unconstitutionally infringe upon the equal
protection rights of a specified class of
persons.
Obergefell v. Hodges
(2015)
Facts
In response to some states legalizing
same-sex marriage, various states
enacted laws and constitutional
amendments defining marriage as
between one man and one woman. When
James Obergefell’s (plaintiff) partner,
John Arthur, became terminally ill, the
pair decided to marry. The couple wed in
Maryland, where same-sex marriage was
legal. After Arthur died, however, the
couple’s home state of Ohio refused to
list Obergefell as Arthur’s surviving
spouse on the death certificate. April
DeBoer and Jayne Rowse (plaintiffs), a
same-sex couple living in Michigan,
adopted three children. Because of a
state ban on adoptions by same-sex
couples, DeBoer and Rowse could not
both be legal parents to their children.
Ipje DeKoe and Thomas Kostura
(plaintiffs) got married in New York before
DeKoe was deployed to Afghanistan with
the army reserve. They later moved to
Tennessee, which refuses to recognize
the union. These and similarly situated
plaintiffs separately sued state officials
(defendants) charged with enforcing state
marriage laws in federal courts in
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and
Tennessee, alleging violations of their
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district courts found for the plaintiffs
in each instance, but the state officials
appealed to United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The court of
appeals consolidated the cases and
reversed, holding that states were under
no constitutional duty to license or
recognize same-sex marriages. The
plaintiffs petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari, which was
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granted.
Issue
Must states issue marriage licenses and
recognize lawful out-of-state marriages
for same-sex couples?
Rule
Under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, states must issue marriage
licenses and recognize lawful out-of-state
marriages for same-sex couples.
Holding
Yes. Same-sex couples have a
constitutional right to marry protected by
the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rationale
Marriage is a fundamental right protected
by the Due Process Clause. For example,
in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
the Court struck down anti-miscegenation
laws that interfered with the right to marry.
Similarly, in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978), the Court invalidated state
laws limiting the ability of individuals with
unpaid child support to marry. Ultimately,
the four principles underpinning the
protection of the right to marry apply
equally to opposite and same-sex
couples: (1) the right to choose whether
and whom to marry is “inherent in the
concept of individual autonomy”; (2) the
right serves relationships that are equal in
importance to all who enter them; (3)
assuring the right to marry protects
children and families, which implicates
the myriad of rights related to procreation
and childrearing; and (4) lastly, marriage
is the very “keystone of our social order”
and foundation of the family unit. Though
marriage has historically been viewed as
between opposite-sex couples, the
institution has changed over time,
including through the changing legal
status of women. Similarly, while same-
sex relationships were once forbidden, in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
the Court held that same-sex couples had
an equal right to intimate associations.
Refusing to allow same-sex couples to
marry denies them a myriad of legal
rights, including those related to taxation,
insurance benefits, intestate succession,
spousal evidentiary privileges, child
custody and support, etc. In this instance,
the liberty interest protected by due
process intersects with the right to equal
protection, and same-sex marriage bans
violate both. Therefore, states must issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
Further, states must recognize lawful out-
of-state marriages between same-sex
couples. All contrary laws are struck
down. The court of appeals is reversed.
Dissent (Scalia, J.)
An unelected committee of nine lawyers
has stopped the debate and the
democratic process on this issue. There
is no question that those who ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment could not
possibly have intended for it to eliminate
the traditional and, at least at that time,
universal understanding of marriage. The
justices are selected for their skill as
lawyers, not policymakers, and in are in
no way representative of the rest of the
country.
Dissent (Roberts, C.J.)
Although there are strong arguments for
the inherent fairness in recognizing
same-sex marriages, this should be left to
individual states to decide. The
Constitution does not define marriage,
and states should be free to define it as
they will, including maintaining the
traditional definition of marriage
recognized throughout history. The Court
has usurped the right of the people to
make such a decision through the
democratic process and denied same-sex
marriage the legitimacy that comes with
that. Marriage developed as a means of
ensuring children were cared for by two
parents. The Court has warned of the
dangers of finding new, implied
fundamental rights as a matter of
substantive due process, as the Court
fatefully did in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19
How. 393 (1857) and Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Court is
acting as a super-legislature and
substituting its own judgment for the law.
Further, if same-sex marriage is valid,
there is no good argument why plural
marriage should not be. Finally, the Court
fails to conduct the traditional Equal
Protection Clause analysis before
declaring the clause to be violated.
Substantive Due Process
Provides that the government may not
deprive a person of certain fundamental
liberties.
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
(2018)
Facts
Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins (the
couple) (plaintiffs) asked Jack Phillips, the
owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
(defendant), to create a special cake
celebrating the couple's same-sex
wedding. Phillips refused because he
held sincere religious objections to same-
sex marriage. Phillips offered to sell
generic cakes to the couple. The couple
filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission (defendant),
triggering the commission's multilevel
review. The couple claimed Phillips
violated Colorado's law barring
discrimination against customers on the
basis of sexual orientation. Phillips
argued that forcing him to create a
wedding cake for a same-sex couple
would violate his First Amendment rights
to free speech and religious freedom. At
the same time, the commission allowed
three other bakers to refuse William
Jack's requests for a cake expressing
religious opposition to same-sex
marriage. In the final stage of the
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commission's proceedings in the Phillips
case, several commissioners implied that
religious objections should never
influence a public businessman's decision
to withhold services. One commissioner
disparaged religion and noted its historic
role in upholding discrimination,
intolerance, and even genocide. The
commission ruled for the couple. The
Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling, distinguishing the other cake
cases on the grounds the commission
found the customers' requests offensive.
The Colorado Supreme Court declined
review. Phillips appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.
Issue
Must adjudicatory proceedings against a
person for unlawful discrimination give
neutral and respectful consideration to
the person's defense of sincere religious
motivation?
Rule
Adjudicatory proceedings against a
person for unlawful discrimination must
give neutral and respectful consideration
to the person's defense of sincere
religious motivation.
Holding
Yes. Adjudicatory proceedings against a
person for unlawful discrimination must
give neutral and respectful consideration
to the person's defense of sincere
religious motivation.
Rationale
In protecting the civil rights of same-sex
couples, the government also must
protect the rights of those who object to
same-sex relationships on religious or
philosophical grounds. Here, the
commission three times upheld a baker's
right to refuse William Jack's request for a
cake containing a religiously-based
message opposing same-sex marriage.
By contrast, the commission ruled Phillips
must create cakes for same-sex couples
despite his sincere religious objections to
same-sex marriage. The commission
reached opposite results based on its
determination of which baker's position
was reasonable and which was
unreasonable, rather than on the sincerity
of each baker's position. The commission
demonstrated hostility toward religion's
role in public life and therefore found
Phillips's position unreasonable. The
commission had no business making
such value judgments and failed to give
Phillips's religious objections the neutral
and respectful consideration they
deserved. This violated Phillips's right to
religious freedom. The judgment of the
Colorado Court of Appeals is reversed.
Concurrence (Thomas, J.)
The commission also violated Phillips'
right to free speech by forcing him to
employ his artistic expression in the
service of a cause he opposed.
Concurrence (Gorsuch, J.)
Each baker refused strictly because he
disagreed with the message that would
have been conveyed on the cake. In
Phillips's case, the commission
condemned his sincerely held religious
belief as irrational and offensive. This
cannot survive the strict scrutiny applied
to First Amendment cases.
Concurrence (Kagan, J.)
The Philips case is distinguishable from
William Jack’s case. Colorado law
prohibits discrimination based on sexual
orientation. The other bakers did not
refuse Jack's requests because of their
sexual orientation. Rather, the bakers
refused to make a disparaging cake on
the same terms applicable to any other
customer.
Dissent (Ginsburg, J.)
Phillips refused the couples' request
because he did not approve of their
same-sex marriage. This was
discrimination based on sexual
orientation. Biased comments by some
commissioners did not taint the entire
multilevel proceeding, the validity of
which was upheld by the appellate court.
First Amendment
Guarantees that the government will not
abridge freedoms of the press, religion,
and speech; the right to peacefully
assemble; and the right to petition the
government to remedy grievances.
Free Exercise
The right to be free from government
interference into free exercise of one’s
religious beliefs.
In Re Adoption of M
(1998)
Facts
In 1991, when she was 15 years old, M.
(plaintiff) was adopted by a married
couple. The couple divorced in November
1997 after having been separated for a
period of time. In July 1998, M. gave birth
to a son whose paternity was
acknowledged by M.’s adoptive father. M.
and her adoptive father desired to marry
but were prevented by a state law
forbidding marriages among specified
family members. In order to avoid the
law’s prohibition, M. petitioned the
Superior Court of New Jersey (defendant)
to vacate the judgment of adoption as to
her adoptive father. The court considered
the petition.
Issue
Do “exceptional circumstances” exist to
justify vacating a judgment of adoption as
to an adoptive father and his adopted
daughter where, after the daughter turned
18, she and her father developed a
romantic relationship which produced a
child and the daughter and father now
wish to marry?
Rule
Where an adopted child, after turning 18,
develops a romantic relationship with an
adoptive parent without any evidence of
abuse or unlawful acts and the child and
parent conceive a child and wish to
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marry, the circumstances are sufficiently
exceptional to justify vacating the
judgment of adoption so that the couple
may legally marry.
Holding
Yes. New Jersey law does not allow
marriages between specified family
members, including “ancestors” and their
“descendants.”
Rationale
A judgment of adoption unequivocally
establishes adoptive parents as the
parents of their adopted child as though
the child had been born naturally to them.
Thus, M. and her adoptive father may not
marry under New Jersey law unless the
judgment of adoption is vacated. A
judgment of adoption may be vacated
only where justified by “truly exceptional
circumstances.” The court concludes that
such circumstances exist in this case.
The Adoption Act of New Jersey requires
that principal consideration be given to
the best interests of the adopted children
and that due regard be provided to other
affected interests. Here, because M. is
seeking to vacate the adoption after her
emancipation, the court reasons that the
“best interests” analysis need not be
applied to her. In considering other
affected interests, the court supports
vacating the adoption. There is no
evidence of abuse or unlawful acts
between the adoptive father and adopted
daughter. Being able to marry would
clarify the legal status of the parties and
would also legitimize their child.
Consequently, the court finds that truly
exceptional circumstances are present.
M.’s petition to vacate the judgment of
adoption as to her adoptive father is
granted.
Emancipation
The state, act, or point in time by which a
child is no longer under the custody,
control, and obligation of a parent or
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guardian.
Collier v. Fox
(2018)
Facts
Nathan and Vicki Collier (plaintiffs) had
been married since 2000. Nathan was
also in a committed relationship with
Christine Collier (plaintiff) and wanted to
marry Christine. Vicki and Christine knew
about each other, and both Vicki and
Christine consented to being married to
Nathan simultaneously. In June 2015,
Nathan and Christine applied for a
marriage license in Yellowstone County,
Montana. The application was denied,
and the county attorney’s office sent a
letter explaining that the marriage license
could not be granted because it would
violate Montana statutes criminalizing
polygamy. The letter did not threaten
Nathan and Christine with prosecution.
Nathan, Vicki, and Christine (collectively,
the Colliers) sued Montana Attorney
General Tim Fox and other county and
state officials (collectively, the officials)
(defendants) in federal district court,
arguing that Montana’s antipolygamy
statutes were unconstitutional.
Specifically, the Colliers raised a pre-
enforcement challenge to state statutes
that prohibited both knowingly committing
bigamy and knowingly marrying a
bigamist. The Colliers asserted that they
were afraid of being prosecuted under the
statutes, even though the state had never
previously prosecuted anyone for bigamy.
The Colliers also challenged a state civil
statute prohibiting plural marriage. The
officials responded that the United States
Supreme Court’s 1878 decision in
Reynolds v. United States had
established the constitutionality of state
antipolygamy statutes. The parties cross-
moved for summary judgment, and the
district court referred the matter to a
federal magistrate judge to recommend
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how the court should decide the motions.
The magistrate judge first found that Vicki
did not have standing to challenge the
laws because she was not trying to marry
another person while married or to marry
someone she knew to be committing
bigamy, nor had she been denied a
marriage license. The magistrate thus
recommended granting summary
judgment to the officials on Vicki’s claims.
The magistrate then considered Nathan
and Christine’s claims.
Issue
(1) Must a couple seeking to challenge
state antipolygamy statutes have
standing to bring the action? (2) Are state
statutes prohibiting polygamy
constitutional?
Rule
(1) A couple seeking to challenge state
antipolygamy statutes must have
standing to bring the action. (2) State
statutes prohibiting polygamy are
constitutional.
Holding
Yes to both issues.
Rationale
(1) Yes. A couple seeking to challenge
state antipolygamy statutes must have
standing to bring the action. A party
invoking a federal court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction must have standing. Standing
requires (1) a concrete and particularized
actual or imminent injury, (2) a causal
connection between the injury and the
defendant’s alleged conduct, and (3)
redressability of the injury by a decision in
the plaintiff’s favor. In determining
whether plaintiffs have standing to bring a
pre-enforcement challenge to a state
criminal antipolygamy statute based on a
claimed threat of prosecution, the court
considers (1) whether the plaintiffs have a
concrete plan to violate the statute, (2)
whether the relevant authority has
threatened to initiate prosecution, and (3)
the relevant authority’s history of
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prosecution or other enforcement of the
statute. If plaintiffs are challenging a civil
statute prohibiting plural marriage, the
denial of a requested marriage license is
sufficient to confer standing, because the
denial injures the alleged legal right to
marry, the injury is fairly traceable to the
relevant official’s denial of the license,
and the injury is redressable if the court
orders the official to issue the license.
Here, Nathan and Christine have not
demonstrated a genuine threat of
prosecution that gives them standing to
challenge Montana’s criminal antibigamy
statutes. Even assuming Nathan and
Christine had a concrete plan to violate
the statutes, they have not been
threatened with prosecution, and the
state has no history of enforcing its
antibigamy laws. Accordingly, summary
judgment should be granted to the
officials on the criminal-law challenge.
However, Nathan and Christine do have
standing to challenge the civil statute and
have presented a ripe claim for
adjudication because their request for a
marriage license was denied. (2) Yes.
State statutes prohibiting polygamy are
constitutional. Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878), established the
constitutionality of antipolygamy statutes,
and the Reynolds decision remains
binding authority. Although Chief Justice
Roberts’s dissent in Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), mentioned
that the majority’s reasoning in support of
finding a fundamental right to same-sex
marriage could also apply to support a
fundamental right to plural marriage, that
dissent is not binding precedent and did
not overrule Reynolds. Here, therefore,
there is no basis for a constitutional
challenge to Montana’s civil antipolygamy
law. Summary judgment should be
granted to the officials on this claim.
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Ripeness
Doctrine of justiciability that requires a
claim be sufficiently ready for adjudication
in order to be heard by a court; a claim is
only ripe if there is a present dispute that
is not speculative in nature.
Standing
A legal doctrine limiting the right to sue to
those parties who can show some injury
to their legal rights, a specific grievance
or impact that can be remedied by judicial
action, or a statutory basis for bringing a
suit.
Fundamental Right
As a matter of constitutional law, a
significant and deep-seated liberty right
whose impairment by state action is
subject to the highest level of scrutiny.
Bigamy
Marrying someone while being legally
married to another person.
Polygamy
The practice of having more than one
spouse at the same time.
Preenforcement Proceeding
A lawsuit brought to determine whether a
regulation applies to a particular
individual or business before an
administrative agency brings enforcement
proceedings.
Kirkpatrick v. District Court
(2003)
Facts
Upon their divorce, Bruce Kirkpatrick
(plaintiff) and Karen Karay were awarded
joint custody of their daughter
SierraDawn. While living with her mother
in New Mexico, 15-year-old SierraDawn
desired to marry 48-year-old Sauren
Crow. New Mexico law prohibited the
marriage because of SierraDawn’s age.
Karay approved of the marriage. Thus,
she, SierraDawn, and Crow traveled to
Las Vegas, Nevada, which permitted
marriages by minors under the age of 16
with the consent of one parent and court
approval. The Clark County District Court
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(District Court) (defendant) approved
SierraDawn’s petition, and she and Crow
were married. When Kirkpatrick learned
of the situation, he filed an ex parte
temporary restraining order (TRO) in a
New Mexico court to give him immediate
legal and physical custody of
SierraDawn. The court granted the TRO
but rescinded it four days later upon
determining that the Nevada marriage
was valid and, consequently, that it had
effectively emancipated SierraDawn from
the control of her parents. Kirkpatrick filed
a writ of mandamus to vacate the District
Court’s approval of SierraDawn’s
marriage and to annul it.
Issue
Does a state statute that permits minors
under age 16 to marry with the consent of
one parent and court approval violate the
substantive due process rights of the
parent who does not consent?
Rule
A statute that permits a minor to marry
with the consent of one parent and court
approval does not violate the substantive
due process rights of the parent who
does not consent.
Holding
No. While parents hold a fundamental
liberty interest in the upbringing of their
children, that interest is not absolute.
Rationale
The state has a right to limit the authority
of parents. Furthermore, the right to
marry is also fundamental. In this case,
the court concludes that the Nevada
statute strikes a constitutional balance
between the various interests at stake. A
number of state laws involve the
obtainment of one parent’s consent.
Acquiring both parents’ consent is not a
constitutional requirement. In Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), the
United States Supreme Court specifically
struck down a statute requiring two-
parent consent in order for a minor to
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obtain an abortion without judicial
authorization. In general, a statute that
impinges upon a fundamental liberty
interest is subject to a stringent standard
of review. The Court has recognized a
more lenient, flexible standard, however,
in family-privacy cases such as this one,
in which there are competing interests
among family members. In such context,
the statute is evaluated for
reasonableness with the level of scrutiny
adapted to the degree of governmental
intrusion into the interests involved. Here,
the daughter’s interest in marriage,
coupled with her mother’s interest in the
daughter’s well-being, outweigh the
father’s interest in having legal control
over his daughter until she reaches
majority age. The court concludes,
therefore, that the statute is
constitutional. The writ of mandamus is
denied.
Writ of Mandamus
An order from a higher court to a lower
court, public agency, governmental entity,
or governmental official directing the
recipient to perform an act on the
grounds that it is legally required or
appropriate. A writ of mandamus is also
known as a writ of mandate.
Blair v. Blair
(2004)
Facts
Nancy Blair (defendant) conceived a son
in 1976, during a time when she was
having sexual relations with her husband
and two other men, including William
Blair (plaintiff), with whom she had a one-
night stand. William saw Nancy soon
after the child, Devin, was born, but they
did not discuss paternity at that time and
went their separate ways. In January
1979, Nancy informed William that Devin
was his son. William met them both and
then he and Nancy resumed a
relationship. She separated from her
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husband that spring and in the following
year gave birth to a daughter fathered by
William. After Nancy’s divorce was
finalized at the end of 1980, she and
William married. He adopted both
children. In November 2001, Nancy filed
for divorce from William. William cross-
petitioned for an annulment on the
grounds that Nancy had induced him to
marry her through fraud: it turned out that
he was not Devin’s father as she had
claimed. At trial, William testified that he
never would have seen Nancy again had
she not lied to him about Devin.
Consequently, he would not have married
her. He admitted to falling in love with her
after resuming their relationship,
however. The trial court rejected William’s
petition for an annulment, and he
appealed.
Issue
Is a marriage procured by fraud where,
prior to the marriage, the wife falsely
represented to the husband that he was
the father of her son, after which he fell in
love with her, fathered a daughter with
her, married her and then adopted both
children as his own?
Rule
A marriage will not be annulled on the
basis of fraud where there is sufficient
evidence that the petitioning spouse
would have married the other person
even if no misrepresentation had been
made.
Holding
No. To prove fraud, the claimant must
show (1) that the other party knowingly
made a false, material misrepresentation
with the intent that the claimant act on it
and (2) that the claimant was unaware of
the falsity, justifiably relied on its
accuracy, and suffered injury because of
it.
Rationale
In this case, there was sufficient evidence
that Mr. Blair would have married Mrs.
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Blair notwithstanding her
misrepresentation about Devin’s
paternity. While it is clear that her
statement about Devin played a role in
Mr. Blair’s resumption of a relationship
with her, it is not so clear that such
statement caused him to marry her. The
testimony of both parties indicates that he
was in love with her. Furthermore, the
birth of their daughter could have
supplied sufficient reason for him to marry
her. In addition, it appears that Mr. Blair
entered the marriage despite having
reservations about Devin’s paternity.
Consequently, there is sufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s rejection of Mr.
Blair’s fraud claim. The decision is
affirmed.
Fraud
A false representation of a material fact
intended to deceive another so that the
deceived person will act upon it to his or
her detriment.
Annulment
A declaration that a marriage is void and
never occurred.
Carabetta v. Carabetta
(1980)
Facts
In 1955, Mr. Carabetta (defendant) and
Mrs. Carabetta (plaintiff) exchanged vows
in marriage before a Roman Catholic
priest. They did not, however, obtain a
statutorily required marriage license.
They lived together and raised four
children with all indications that they
considered themselves legally married.
Eventually Mrs. Carabetta filed for
divorce. The trial court held that the
marriage was void because the couple
had never obtained a marriage license.
The court then dismissed Mrs.
Carabetta’s divorce petition for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. She appealed.
Issue
Where a couple fails to obtain a marriage
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license but exchanges vows before a
priest authorized to perform the marriage
ceremony and then lives together and
raises a family without any evidence that
they do not consider themselves married,
is the marriage void?
Rule
A marriage is not rendered void under
Connecticut law by virtue of the couple’s
failure to obtain a statutorily required
marriage license.
Holding
No. When the legislature has decided
that the failure to meet a statutory
requirement for marriage should render
the marriage void, it has explicitly said so.
Rationale
For example, the law explicitly voids a
marriage that is entered into between
certain related persons. In contrast, the
statute requiring a marriage license does
not state that the failure to receive a
license will make the marriage void.
Rather, it states that the penalty for failing
to obtain a license is a fine levied on the
officiant who performed the marriage
ceremony. This court has a long history of
interpreting the absence of express
statutory language. In line with such
precedent, the court concludes here that
a marriage entered into without a
marriage license is dissoluble but not
void. The court’s conclusion is supported
by decisions in many other jurisdictions.
Consequently, the trial court order is
reversed.
Solemnization
The execution of a formal marriage
ceremony with witnesses.
Void
Having no legal effect.
Jennings v. Hurt
(1991)
Facts
Sandra Jennings (plaintiff) and William
Hurt (defendant) lived together from 1981
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until 1984. Hurt was married when they
met. In the spring of 1982, Jennings
became pregnant with the couple’s child.
They began negotiating a contract to
provide financial support for their living
arrangements and their child. In
September 1982, Hurt asked his wife for
a divorce because of his and Jennings’
impending baby. He told Jennings that
the divorce did not mean he was
committing himself to marry her. The
divorce became final on December 3,
1982. Throughout their relationship, Hurt
expressed to Jennings his dissatisfaction
with the institution of marriage. From
October 31, 1982 to January 10, 1983,
Jennings and Hurt lived together in South
Carolina while Hurt was filming “The Big
Chill.” Their relationship was tempestuous
during that time. At one point—the date is
unclear—Hurt allegedly called Jennings’
obstetrician to ask about his “wife.”
Otherwise, Hurt and Jennings did not put
themselves forward as husband and wife
in any manner. On December 27, 1982,
Hurt signed a “Paternity
Acknowledgement.” That same day, the
couple got into an argument during which
Hurt allegedly told Jennings that their
arrangement did not matter because he
considered themselves married “in the
eyes of God” and “more married than
married people.” Jennings later sued Hurt
in a New York court to confirm that the
couple had entered into a common-law
marriage in South Carolina. The trial court
considered her claim.
Issue
Is there sufficient evidence of a common-
law marriage based solely on a couple’s
short cohabitation in South Carolina
during which time the purported husband
allegedly told the purported wife, during
an argument, that he considered them to
have a marriage “in the eyes of God” and
to be “more married than married
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people”?
Rule
A common-law marriage will not be
recognized without a preponderance of
credible, strong, and competent evidence
that the couple intended to hold
themselves out as married.
Holding
No. While common-law marriages may
not be made under New York law, the
state recognizes common-law marriages
that are validly established in states that
allow them.
Rationale
The state of South Carolina permits
common-law marriage. Jennings has not
proven, however, that she and Hurt
entered into a common-law marriage
while in the state of South Carolina.
Because Hurt was legally married until
December 3, 1982, Hurt and Jennings
could not have established a common-
law marriage until after that date. The
evidence is insufficient to so establish.
The statements allegedly made by Hurt to
Jennings on December 27 do not indicate
an intent to marry her but rather an intent
that their relationship remain something
short of marriage. That interpretation
aligns with his behavior throughout their
relationship. The one incident in which he
referred to Jennings as his “wife” is not
firm and, in any event, of little
significance. Other evidence points to the
lack of a common-law marriage. The fact
that Hurt signed a paternity
acknowledgement on the date that he
allegedly “married” Jennings undermines
any intent to marry. He continually
identified himself as “single” on his tax
returns. Jennings’ claim is dismissed.
Common-Law Marriage
A legal marriage that is entered into on
the basis of the couple’s cohabitation,
intent to be married, and presentation of
themselves as married, without the
obtainment of a marriage license or
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ceremonial exchange of vows.
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