ABSTRACT AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Springman TITLE: The Rapier or the Club: The Relationship between Attrition and Maneuver Warfare FORMAT: Strategy Research Project DATE: 15 March 2006 WORD COUNT: 6598 PAGES: 24 KEY TERMS: Decisive Battle, War of Exhaustion, War of Destruction, War of Annihilation, Compound Warfare CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified If wars of attrition are generally more costly than wars of maneuver, why do modern wars so often become wars of attrition? This project compares the relationship between attrition and maneuver warfare. The study considers whether there are times wars of attrition should be fought and whether there are conditions that force wars of attrition. The project employs two case studies to better understand the relationship and the risks of attempting to impose maneuver warfare when the conditions that favor attrition exist. The results of the study indicate four major reasons exist to explain why wars of attrition are common and are sometimes the preferred form of war despite the costs involved. A better understanding of the relationship between wars of attrition and maneuver provides the professional officer with a wider range of options while developing and executing operations. Additionally, leaders must realize that the cost of returning to maneuver may be greater than continuing to fight with an attrition based strategy.

2 of annihilation or wars of destruction, because the enemy’s ability or will to fight is annihilated after a decisive battle or a series of decisive battles in different theaters. 5 Wars of attrition focus on the sapping of the enemy’s strength through the loss of personnel and materiel throughout an operation, not just during a decisive battle. The two sides are in almost constant combat and do not break contact . In a war of attrition, movement, position, and actual battle matter less than forcing the enemy to consume his resources or will at an unsustainable rate. His resources can be consumed through destruction, loss of sources, through use, or the combination of all three. Attrition does not necessarily mean trading casualties with the enemy. One side could completely dominate a war of attrition. Wars of attrition are sometimes referred to as wars of exhaustion. In wars of exhaustion, one antagonist’s ability or will to resist is exhausted and he finally submits to the other’s will. Wars of attrition can be presumed to be more costly to both antagonists in terms of loss of personnel, materiel, treasure, and time unless one side completely dominates the other. 6 Why Attrition Warfare? If wars of attrition are generally more costly than wars of maneuver, and practitioners of attrition are perceived as less enlightened than those who succeed through maneuver and a decisive battle, why do modern wars so often become wars of attrition? Four major reasons may be cited to explain why wars of attrition are common despite the costs involved. The first reason is that often the combat power the antagonists can generate at the “front” is almost equal. Temporary stalemate and attrition follow until one side achieves a decided advantage in the elements of combat power (leadership, fire power, maneuver, protection, information). 7 The second reason is that one of the antagonists perceives that its best chance of success is through a strategy of attrition. The third reason is that nations which produce their own major armaments, not just small arms or the modification of weapons systems produced elsewhere, possess a large population, and an adequate transportation system can replace losses in personnel and equipment at the front quickly. The fourth reason is simply a matter of choice. In all cases, the enemy may refuse to accept the decision of a seemingly decisive battle and fight on. In a war of attrition, the war may culminate in what appears to be a decisive battle but would actually be decided through attrition. Recognizing the advantages of attrition and the reasons attrition may be forced on a commander will allow the participants to determine if they want to fight a war of attrition, or use a phase of attrition to return maneuver to its “proper place” and force a decisive battle upon the enemy. Recognizing that you must fight a war of attrition

5 Why would anyone choose a war of attrition? The belligerent who perceives he can not win a decisive battle, or whose only hope is to defeat the enemy’s will, should choose a war of attrition unless the sacrifice of his force might produce some perceived moral gain. 15 By refusing to fight a decisive battle and causing casualties through attrition, an antagonist can slowly wear at its opponent until it either gains the upper hand in corresponding combat powers, or the enemy loses the will to continue to fight a seemingly endless war. The most obvious example is when a relatively weak power is involved in a war with a dominant power. A willing population and large area or restricted terrain that provide safe havens to reconstitute are crucial assets that increase the possibility of success through attrition. For example, Washington pursued a war of attrition strategy against the British in the American Revolution. While he maintained sizeable American armies and fought occasional large engagements, he and the other American commanding generals refused to allow their armies to be decisively engaged and focused their efforts on defeating detached elements of the British force. The British forces and national will were slowly reduced until Washington saw an opportunity to defeat a sizeable contingent and convince the British of the hopelessness of their aims. In following his strategy, Washington helped create and provided a great example of compound warfare. In compound warfare, one of the antagonists maintains both a conventional force and an irregular force. 16 The conventional force usually gives the antagonist more legitimacy; it represents a government in being. The conventional force ensures that the opponent must maintain a force that attempts to bring the conventional force to battle or defends against it. This allows the irregular force to concentrate efforts on detached or weak elements of its opponent’s overall force. A regular army is a crucial component of state sovereignty and legitimate authority. 17 A country is perceived as less legitimate with only irregular forces since its potential power is less. It might even be considered a terrorist organization based on how it employed its forces. Washington would give battle occasionally with his conventional force to keep the British focused on it and to assert the legitimacy of America as a nation that was willing to fight for its sovereignty, but he continued to sap British forces and will through attrition of their detachments with his irregular forces. All the while, America continued to build conventional power. After defeat at Yorktown, the British lost what was left of their will and entered serious negotiations, resulting in a peace that recognized American independence two years later. A nation that does not possess a large population or industrial base will not, as a rule, possess durable forces even if it is a modern nation. It will be forced to rely either on the industrial capacity of other nations or will not have the manpower required to maintain durable

8 which made the pursuit of a war of attrition much more difficult. Lee seems to have preferred a war of maneuver strategy culminating in a victory on Northern territory. 25 He invaded the North twice, with Davis’ permission. Neither invasion resulted in a decisive victory. Both men probably realized the disadvantages of the South, but disagreed on the most appropriate strategy. Davis did not realize President Lincoln’s determination to preserve the Union nor, for valid political and moral reasons, did he permit his subordinates to give up territory without resistance. Lee did not realize he could not win a decisive battle due to the durability of northern armies and the abilities of their field commanders. The manner in which the North initially prosecuted the war allowed the South to recover from major fights through 1863. In the East, the armies fought two or three campaigns per year seeking a decisive battle. After a major fight and typically a Northern tactical setback, the armies would withdraw and pause to reconstitute. The North, also, allowed the South operational pauses in the West. After Shiloh, Grant had wanted to move immediately on the Confederate forces at Corinth, Mississippi but was overruled. 26 General Halleck assumed personal command of the army and used a very methodical approach, allowing southern forces to rebuild and escape. It took Halleck a month to move the 20 miles to Corinth and Confederate forces increased from the roughly 30,000 after Shiloh to over 65,000 in the same period. 27 After Vicksburg, Grant’s forces were dispersed as opposed to moving on Mobile as he desired. 28 In both cases, operational advantages were not immediately acted on and pauses followed, allowing the Confederates time to reconstitute. The pauses in the two major theaters allowed the Confederates to focus on one theater at a time and parcel out their relatively meager resources and replace their losses. This brought the two forces back to rough parity in combat power which continued to provide the South opportunity for success in a war of maneuver. Beginning in May 1864, Grant began to synchronize the operations of the northern armies. His objectives were the southern armies and their resource centers. 29 Operations did not culminate after a major engagement. They were continuous and nationwide. Grant would have accepted southern defeat in a decisive battle but refused to be deterred by a tactical set back and refused to allow the Confederates time to reconstitute. Grant fought the type of war that was forced on him; a war of attrition. In the east, the North tried to gain positions of advantage and performed some fine maneuvering such as avoiding Confederate defenses at the North Anna and crossing the James River unopposed. The South’s defensive stance and command competence denied the North their decisive battle. Grant continued his relentless drive to fix the southern forces and

11 In 1915, the Allies used their naval superiority to attempt to force passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits. The operation was a turning movement attempting: to open a way to Russia, end Turkish pressure in the Caucasus, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, reinforce Serbia, influence then neutral Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece, and possibly precipitate an Austro-Hungarian collapse. 35 If successful the operation could have forced the Central Powers to shift combat power from other areas and, potentially, could have forced two of the Central Powers, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, from the war. The shift in forces alone could have had a decisive effect on the Central Powers' ability to fight on other fronts. The attempt failed for several reasons. First, the operation was conducted, initially, as a single service, naval, operation. The Allied land forces were to garrison the forts along the straits after the Navy drove the defenders out. Second, surprise was lost because the British Navy shelled some of the forts in an unrelated operation and the Turks took measures to strengthen their defenses on land and sea. Third, the initial landings occurred at the wrong beach increasing the distance and time the force was required to travel prior to exiting the beach. Fourth, the Allies lacked strong leadership and moved slowly while the Turks reacted resolutely. The Allied commanders did not fully understand the operation's relationship with other operations or believe in the task they were given. The Central Powers were not driven from the war and neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary had to make a major shift of forces to meet the threat. The stalemate continued. 36 In 1915, Germany ended its unrestricted submarine attacks on Allied shipping due to American pressure and German belief that they did not possess the required number of submarines to sink sufficient shipping to force Britain from the war. With continued stalemate and the Germans feeling the slow effects of the Allied blockade, the Germans decided to resort to unrestricted submarine warfare once again in February 1917. The Germans reasoned that they now possessed the submarines to sink enough Allied tonnage to starve and economically ruin Britain. The attempt, essentially a search for a decisive battle, not only failed but also brought the United States into the war on the Allied side less than two months after renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare. 37 The German attempt failed for several reasons. First, adoption of the convoy system provided greater protection for shipping and increased submarine sinking. Second, the Allies were able to sufficiently replace losses. 38 Third, the Germans had miscalculated British dependence on shipping.

14 believe he is not defeated but simply following a new non-military strategy. Examples of the better peace after a bitter war of exhaustion are the American Civil War and World War II; Napoleon’s various wars against the changing coalitions and the temporary peace after Operation Desert Storm are examples of the defeated not recognizing defeat after a decisive battle. The opportunity presented by German exhaustion at the end of World War I was wasted. The Peace of Versailles sowed the seeds for an even more tragic Second World War. The peace imposed was so harsh the Allies did not fully implement it and the German military, after the war, convinced itself it had not been defeated. 46 Conclusion The effects of decisive battles are obvious quickly, at less overall cost, and the peace can be lasting as long as the defeated recognize they are defeated. However, the effects of attrition can be hidden, especially in large industrial nations, for considerable time. 47 Then an abrupt collapse will occur. The act of collapse, such as the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, is sometimes considered decisive but in reality national exhaustion is the cause. Attrition warfare presents opportunities, not presented by decisive battle, to permanently resolve conflicts and is not necessarily a sign of poor generalship. Very competent generals may choose or have a war of attrition forced upon them. These generals may continue to maneuver or seek the decisive fight but if the opponent’s industrial and population bases, and leadership abilities reach a certain level, attrition warfare may be the best and only means to achieve victory. Attempts to end attrition are worth consideration as they may force decision earlier. However, the potential outcomes must be thoroughly understood or the attempt may cost more than any potential gain. Ultimately, it may be better to fight using attrition while protecting your own resources. Weaker adversaries may see no hope of victory except to defeat the will of their opponent through attrition warfare but they must be willing to accept the costs. As militaries formulate and execute plans, they must realize that attrition warfare is an option and may be the only option. If fighting a war of attrition by design or necessity, we must focus on exhausting our opponent’s resources quickly while preserving ours. End Notes 1 The relationships and conditions described here apply to conflicts between groups as well as between nations.

17 17 Military force is recognized as one element of sovereignty and national power. Other elements of sovereignty include the ability to tax, print money, legislate laws, etc; elements of national power include economic, diplomatic, and informational power. 18 Some European nations, such as Belgium and The Netherlands fall into the category of small modern nations that do not possess durable militaries when compared to large modern nations. A major power should triumph in a war of attrition; it may even force a decisive battle on a small nation. The smaller the nation’s area, the greater the opportunity to defeat it in a decisive battle unless the people are willing to resort to urban guerilla warfare. Of course, many small modern powers rely on collective security agreements such as NATO to ensure their security. 19 To win a decisive battle against a larger modern force or nation, a true genius would, probably, require a great amount of incompetence from an enemy. With modern military educational and training systems, this level of incompetence is less likely to occur than in past times. 20 Saddam may not have believed he was defeated or accepted the outcome any longer than it took to extract his forces but he was forced to leave Kuwait, the objective of the coalition. If he had refused to accept the decision at the time, he would have lost a major portion of his military to include a large number of Republican Guard forces, a resource he required to reconsolidate his control of Iraq. 21 Thomas L Livermore, Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America 1861 – 65 , (Boston, MA: The Riverside Press, Houghton, Mifflin, and Company, 1901) pgs 45-46. Available online from http://www.carlisle.army.mil/cgi-in/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=447. While Livermore and other historians admit that calculating Confederate strengths for later in the war is difficult, the numbers indicate that the South had been able to replace its personnel losses from 1863. Livermore reports a Confederate strength of 446,622 in January 1863; 481,160 in January, 1864, and 445,203 in January 1865. All southern personnel losses between January 1863 and January 1864 seem to have been replaced. It, also, appears the South had lost an aggregate of only about 36,000 in 1864 despite continuous contact in the major theaters; however, their strength reported in the Trans-Mississippi had increased about 25,000 and the Army of Tennessee’s strength is from December 10, 1864, prior to about 6,000 losses at Nashville. This would mean that east of the Mississippi the South had not replaced over 65,000 losses during 1864. During this time, the South made a considerable effort to put all eligible men into the force. Attrition was having a major effect on its forces. The estimated Confederate losses for Nashville are (Hood stated “very small”) estimated as not more than 6000 from Mark M Boatner III, The Civil War Dictionary (New York, NY: David McKay Company, Inc., 1959) pg 582. 22 J. F. C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1991,) pg 214. 23 Dr. Christopher Gabel asserts that the Confederates not only lacked the ability to maintain railroad infrastructure but also managed the assets poorly. In Railroad Generalship: Foundations of Civil War Strategy , he states: However, the Confederacy began the war with a fragmented and incomplete rail system (9,000 miles, as opposed to 20,000 miles in the north). Unlike the Union,

18 the Confederacy lacked the manufacturing capacity to expand, or even maintain, its railroad infrastructure once the fighting began…. For most of the war, military traffic moved only at the discretion of civilian railroad managers…. One example serves to illustrate the point: during the winter of 1863-64, when the Union Army of the Potomac subsisted happily on the deliveries of the Aquia Creek line, Lee” s Army of Northern Virginia suffered hunger, even though it had a direct, thirty-mile rail link to the national capital. Supplies for the troops were available, but the Confederate authorities could not get them to the front. Dr Christopher R. Gabel, Railroad Generalship: Foundations of Civil War Strategy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1997) pgs 22-23. 24 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977) pgs 96-97. Weigly makes the point that Davis favored a defensive strategy similar to Washington’s in the Revolution but realized ceding any territory was politically infeasible. 25 ibid, pgs 108-112. 26 U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant , edited by E. B. Long (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001) pg 195. 27 Boatner, pg 176. The southern forces not only received replacements and rest but also escaped without a fight due to Halleck’s very methodical approach. 28 Grant, pg 303. 29 Ibid., pgs 365-369. 30 Francis H. Kennedy, ed., The Civil War Battlefield Guide, Second Edition (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998) pgs 356, 352. Meade’s forces were engaged at Petersburg on 15 June, while Sherman’s forces arrived at Kennesaw Mountain on 18 June. 31 Grant, pgs 225, 330. 32 Early’s defeat was disastrous for the South. He not only lost the Valley’s resources but about 11,000 casualties not including his losses prior to Sheridan assuming command for the North. Kennedy, pgs 313-324. 33 Hood suffered about 27,000 casualties to Sherman’s 21,000. Archer Jones, Civil War Command and Strategy, The Process of Victory and Defeat (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1992) pg 206. 34 Peter Simkins, Geoffrey Jukes, and Michael Hickey, The First World War, the War to End All Wars (Oxford, U.K: Osprey Publishing, 2003) pgs 26-30. 35 Theodore Ropp , War in the Modern World (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000) pg 253.

19 36 The information on Gallipoli was gathered from past reading including Ropp pgs 252-255; Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century , 2 nd Edition (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994) pg 146; and, “The Gallipoli Campaign”, Internet, available from http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/gallipolicampaign. 37 The information on unrestricted submarine warfare was from Ropp, pgs257 – 262; Addington, pgs 148-162; and, Holger Herwig, “Strategic uncertainties of a nation-state: Prussia- Germany 1871-1918” in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and Wars , edited by Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knoz, and Alvin Bernstein: (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 38 Addington, pg 160. Addington notes that the Germans sank 12 million tons of Allied shipping during the war but the Allies built 13 million tons of shipping. 39 Ibid., pgs 155-158. Of the 371 tanks employed by the British at Cambrai in 1917 very few were mission capable by the end of the first day. The losses were due to the enemy and reliability. Simkins, et al, pgs 135-137 give the tank more credit, claiming 92 were still operational after 2 days but admit the tank was not able to exploit the initial successes. 40 Later the Germans would break through the French line but were again unable to drive to strategic depth. Two reasons for the lack of cavalry were the attrition of horses through four years of war and the Allied blockade of Germany which reduced the amount of fodder available. 41 The U. S. military defines culminating point as “The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible.” U. S. Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Terms (Washington, D. C.: Department of Defense, 31 August 2005) Internet, available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/c/01438.html. 42 Simkins et al, pgs 139-160. 43 Ibid., pgs 139-160. 44 Addington, pg 146. 45 Ropp, pgs 253-254. 46 The German military may have convinced itself it was not defeated during the war, at least partially, due to Ludendorf’s own actions. When the Allies were exerting pressure on the German Army, he warned of collapse and wanted armistice but when the pressure sagged, as it did towards the actual armistice date, November 11, 1918, Ludendorf wanted to continue to fight for better terms. Correlli Barnett, The Swordbearers: Supreme Command in the First World War (London, UK: Cassell & Co, 1988), 352-361. 47 The slow deterioration that turns into abrupt collapse manifests itself in many ways. In the American Civil War, southern infrastructure deteriorated throughout the war due to lack of resources. As territory was occupied and resource centers fell, fewer resources were available for the nation. Stocks were being consumed that could not be replaced. The slow

20 deterioration was magnified with each loss over a much shorter period of time and the ability to legitimately govern was decreasing accordingly. For example, Livermore lists southern strength on 1 January 1865 as 445,203. However, only 174,223 formally surrendered to northern forces at war’s end. That leaves roughly 270,000 unaccounted for. Some of these losses were battle and non battle casualties; some were men who stayed at their posts until the end but did not formally surrender; and, a large number were men who deserted for various reasons. The South had lost the use of about 270,000 men (60% of its force) in about 5 months; sign of an abrupt collapse.